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FOURTEENTH WAR NUMBER

THE ROUND TABLE

**A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS
OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH**

Contents of Number 130

CASABLANCA

THE BEVERIDGE PLAN

DARLAN AND AFTER

THE FARMING FRONT

AN AFRICAN PROBLEM

STRATEGY OF THE WAR. XIV

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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS
OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Casablanca	103
The Beveridge Plan	107
Darlan and After	115
The Farming Front	123
An African Problem	134
Strategy of the War. XIV	142
India	150
<i>Political. Military. Economic.</i>	
Great Britain	157
<i>Three Good Months.</i>	
Ireland	163
<i>Public Opinion in Eire. In the Six Counties.</i>	
Canada	168
<i>The New Conservatism.</i>	
Australia	175
<i>Constitutional Questions.</i>	
South Africa	183
<i>General Hertzog. Planning Reconstruction.</i>	
New Zealand	190
<i>A Brighter Outlook. Economic Stabilization.</i>	
<i>The Tasman Tercentenary.</i>	

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CASABLANCA

THE world as yet knows nothing of what passed at the Casablanca Conference, and is not likely to know until its decisions are made manifest in action. The necessary secrecy of the proceedings, however, in no way prevents the recognition of their profound significance—which resides ultimately in the atmosphere of power that surrounded the coming together of the American President and the British Prime Minister. It is the power of initiative, the power to control the movement of coming events. This power is quite as apparent to the enemy as it is to the Allied peoples, as is shown by the evident apprehension in the orations of the Nazi leaders on the disturbed tenth anniversary of their installation. For the first time in the course of the war all forecasts for the coming year depend on the answer to the question, not what will the Germans do, but what is the plan of campaign of the United Nations. Part of it no doubt will be a logical working out of the sequel to the great Russian victories; but the part that will mould the still undetermined prospects of 1943 will be that which has been formulated at Casablanca.

The conference was, of course, attended by a much narrower body than the supreme war council of the allies for which many have hoped, and will still wish to see created, as the necessary organ of grand strategy and final victory. The published account of its own genesis shows the great difficulty of setting up such an organization; for the attendance of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek was made impossible by the great distance, and Mr. Stalin, although a change of the meeting-place was offered to suit his convenience, could not leave the head-quarters from which he has been directing the tremendous winter campaign of the Soviet. These are unanswerable reasons; and other reasons were doubtless held, as Mr. Mackenzie King has explained, to rule out the leaders of the British Dominions; though a special argument might perhaps have been found—in a conference held on African soil and concerned largely with African problems—for an invitation to the outstanding statesman and strategist of Africa, General Smuts.

Yet, in spite of the omissions from the list, it is easy to see why, at the opening of 1943, a conference of Great Britain with the United States, the other two principal Allies being kept scrupulously informed, may exercise the crucial influence upon the strategy of all the United Nations. The parts to be played by both Russia and China in coming events have already largely defined themselves. China will continue to hold at bay, probably for yet another year, the main strength of Japan in Manchuria, and so create the opportunity for the maritime Powers to cut the tentacles of Japanese aggression in the Pacific and ultimately come to her relief. Meanwhile it is for Great Britain and America to sustain Chinese resistance by lend-lease supplies, and by any land campaign which the needs of supply may dictate. Similarly, Russia will be holding a vast German army on the horns of a dilemma, presenting the enemy's High Command with the choice between

attempting a third summer offensive at the cost of denuding the defence of the Reich, now approaching a man-power crisis, or reinforcing the garrisons of occupied Europe at the risk of a collapse of their defensive line in the East.

In contrast with these largely determinate parts of the strategic pattern, the conference at Casablanca represented the flexible elements of Allied power. The flexibility is of course the direct consequence of the success of the Chinese, and especially of the Russians, in holding down so great a proportion of the enemy's strength. The more heavily the German army is engaged, the greater the range of potential threats that the two western Powers—controlling the mass of manoeuvre—can keep in being. The objective in view at Casablanca must have been to draw a line of Allied force round every sea frontier of the fortress of Europe, to compel the whole of those frontiers to be manned by a total German strength known to be inadequate for so gigantic a task, and ultimately to detect the inevitable weak spots and break in at one or more of them. Sea power makes this use of exterior lines possible. When such a plan can be launched, Germany is faced with that war on two, and perhaps several, fronts which there is every reason to believe will be fatal.

But before these gigantic lines of circumvallation can be drawn round the Reich and its conquered provinces, two preliminary problems have to be solved. The first is to find some degree of release for sea power, on which all depends, from the grave and growing menace to which it is constantly subjected. On the British side the recent creation of the anti-U-boat warfare committee attests afresh the urgency of the danger, and promises that still more strenuous efforts will be made to avert it. No doubt the Casablanca Conference drew the work of the committee into still closer relation with American sea strategy. What is comparatively a small-scale campaign, measured against the present in Russia and the future in Europe, is second to none in significance. Its prospects are discussed elsewhere in this number in the quarterly strategic survey. But it has unfortunately to be considered in another aspect in a separate article. The unhappy political dissensions on the lines of communication in North Africa have more than once threatened to wreck an enterprise on which the highest hopes are founded; nor is there yet any evidence that the meeting of the two fighting French leaders, General de Gaulle and General Giraud, has cleared the atmosphere of bitterness and distrust. The author of a special article on this aspect of the situation finds it unnecessary to fix personal blame for these misunderstandings on any of the officers or diplomatists, British or American, who have become embogged in the morass of French North African feuds. Yet at the highest level Allied statesmanship stands convicted of a dangerous lack of foresight in approaching the political problems that the unfolding of the strategic plan must raise.

These problems are unlikely to be found peculiar to Algeria, and the greatest issues may depend on the thoroughness with which the rulers of the United Nations have learnt the lessons of the immediate past. The doctrine that strategic planning must be conditioned by a plan for the post-war future

has been preached so long and heard with such complacency that there has been a tendency to dismiss it as a pious platitude with no practical application. It may be hoped that Allied forces will not again enter new territory without full prior study of the political as well as the military problem that war has created there, and without a concerted plan for solving both as part of a single operation.

Some of these problems are already fully posed. Allied forces, for instance, mostly belonging to Great Britain and the Dominions, are now in occupation of the whole Italian Empire in Africa. The responsibility for the future of these vast regions, though it is of course shared with the Allies, can be neither evaded nor postponed. On the negative side it is presumably understood that they shall never return to Fascist rule; at the same time the signatories of the Atlantic Charter are pledged not to seek territorial aggrandizement. By the provision now made for the social advance of these liberated lands, even during war, the intentions of the United Nations may be assessed in lands not yet set free.

Whatever provision is attempted, the integrating tendency of contemporary thought will demand that it shall fit into some coherent plan for Africa as a whole. A search for such a plan is undertaken by the contributor to this number of an article on the more limited subject of the British African Colonies. He discerns an unresolved dualism between the political ideas of the Colonial Office, ultimately deriving from public opinion in England, and those that permeate from the Union of South Africa. Although a proper care for the trusts involved in colonial administration will insist on preserving direct and undiluted responsibility in the separate Imperial Governments on which history has laid it, and to which loyalties have been built up, the British Empire is certainly prepared to work with others to give expression to the ultimate unity of Africa.

Beyond the unity of Africa lies the unity of Europe. We have to contemplate a process of liberation by military means, which, if not more successfully controlled than in North Africa, may let loose in the wake of the armies all the forces of disintegration which Nazi tyranny has held in check. If those forces gain free play, they are capable of gravely imperilling the military enterprise. In order to disarm them it is necessary for the United Nations to enter Europe with a coherent plan of their own, so firmly based and so interpreted to the European peoples that each of them, as its shackles are struck off, may feel that it is leaving the "new order" of the Nazis, not for isolation or chaos, but for an immediate place in the better order based on the Atlantic Charter.

Thus the success of the grand offensive to which we look forward is likely to be accompanied by a widespread demand for the translation of the principles of the Charter into a programme of social action. As the liberated peoples are invited to dispose of their quislings and put free Governments in their place, their need will be for a reviving social philosophy to fill the void left by the expulsion of Fascism; and they must be assisted to that end by those undefeated Powers to which, for a long time to come, Europe is bound to look for leadership. They will ask what these Powers, and perhaps

especially Great Britain, project for the social future of their own peoples. This is the deep reason underlying the world-wide interest in the Beveridge Report. Evidence of this interest, as shown within the Empire, will be found in the articles in this number from Eire, Canada, and South Africa, in all of which countries the report has started eager discussion. It is also being closely studied in the United States.

Thus the Beveridge plan is ultimately linked with the Casablanca plan. An economic analysis and criticism of its main argument will be found elsewhere in this number. From it emerges a warm appreciation of the largeness of Sir William Beveridge's central conception, which depends on a wider-ranging sense of the mutual responsibility of all members of a community for the welfare of each. In so far as the plan, in seeking to establish "freedom from want", extends the fortifying principle of insurance to the exclusion of the degrading principle of the dole, and thus inculcates in all the sense that only by the labour of all can the common wealth be built up, it will be a strengthening force for the future of society. But the writer also detects an opposite tendency, which perhaps owes less to Sir William than to the more uncritical enthusiasts for the superficialities of his scheme. The Report, apparently in a rather abstract search for mere logical symmetry, is inclined at many points, not merely to provide help for those whom social disorder has hitherto left helpless, but also to press help upon those who stand in no need of it; and such thinking works too easily with the unconstructive enthusiasm of those who applaud the prospect that every man shall be able to draw out of the purse of the State, and lay no emphasis on his duty to put something in. Here, perhaps, is the supreme danger of the coming times—the danger of breeding a generation that thinks of social security as something received from an impersonal organism above, and not as something built up by the effort of countless individuals working from below.

For it is very certain that the world in the immediate future holds out small prospect of doles for anybody. Its demands upon energy and service are illimitable. The problem of peace, like the problem of war, will be one of man-power—of finding innumerable men and women who, on a desolated globe, must for long be prepared to put more into the common stock than they take out. This is true in the social sphere; it is also true in the international. The United Nations have assumed a vast responsibility for the leadership of mankind—by the Casablanca formula of "unconditional surrender" they have further emphasized the duty they have assumed under the Atlantic Charter, to keep the world policed while its foundations are being relaid on the lines they have defined. This responsibility will fall above all on the British Empire and the United States. Its successful discharge will demand two things above all—first, the continued harmony of the two great communities in the common purpose; but most of all the maintenance of the robust tradition of both peoples, so that, scorning war-weariness and relaxation, they can continue to supply for the world's service an endless succession of individuals of self-reliance and initiative, who expect to give rather than to receive.

THE BEVERIDGE PLAN

A CRITICAL SURVEY

SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE was appointed in June 1941 as Chairman of an inter-departmental committee of officials

"to undertake, with special reference to the inter-relation of the schemes, a survey of the existing national schemes of social insurance and allied services, including workmen's compensation, and to make recommendations".

From these terms of reference, and from the composition of the Committee, it might have been expected that a highly technical report of a pedestrian character would eventually emerge. But, if any such result was intended, the wrong Chairman had been chosen. After the Committee had been sitting for a few months it became clear that "issues of high policy" would arise; the status of the members of the Committee was promptly reduced to that of "advisers and assessors"; and Sir William Beveridge was left free to produce a Report on his sole responsibility, and without undue regard for his terms of reference. The result is the plan that has rung round a world at war.

TWO WELCOME PROPOSALS

THIS plan is primarily one for transforming the existing insurance schemes and allied services into one giant system of social insurance, with higher rates of benefit and contribution, and applicable to almost everyone. Two of its most important and arresting proposals do not, however, form an integral part of this system, but are put forward as "assumptions" outside it. These are the proposals for a state scheme of children's allowances and for a comprehensive national medical and dental service. These are both proposals of the first importance, for which there has long been an overwhelming case. There is no more vital social problem before the British people than that of restoring their birth-rate to a reproduction level; and, though this problem will not be solved by children's allowances alone, it will certainly not be solved without them. Medical and dental treatment is pre-eminently a class of service which should be supplied in accordance with need and without regard to ability to pay.

The practical efficacy of the arguments in favour of these reforms is considerably reinforced by the circumstances of the war. Children's allowances are in fact being paid in war-time for a substantial proportion of our children, as part of service pay, and under evacuation schemes. This is likely to swell the volume of public opinion which will regard children's allowances in future as a right and reasonable arrangement. A large proportion of our doctors are engaged during the war in the service of the state, and the supply of new doctors has been maintained and stimulated by exempting medical students freely from military service. If there were to be nothing but competitive private practice for doctors to return to after the war, the post-war prospect would not be without its terrors for the medical profession; and

this consideration is likely to do much to overcome what might otherwise have been an invincible professional opposition to the project of a national medical service.

The tide of circumstance is thus favourable to both these proposals. On the other hand the force of inertia, the question of finance, and the intrinsic difficulties and complexities of the problem of a comprehensive medical service are formidable obstacles. In these circumstances the Beveridge Report may well prove a decisive influence in securing their adoption. If it accomplished nothing else, this would be much.

"ABOLITION OF WANT"

WHEN we pass to the Social Security scheme itself, we enter much more disputable ground. Sir William Beveridge tells us repeatedly that the object of his plan is the "abolition of want" and that it is based on a "diagnosis of want"; and he cites the evidence of "the social surveys made by impartial investigators" in East London, York and Bristol to show that our pre-war national income was more than sufficient to have abolished want, if it had been better distributed. To this theme he devotes many eloquent passages; for example, the following:

"Want could have been abolished before the present war by a redistribution of income within the wage-earning class, without touching any of the wealthier classes. This is said not to suggest that redistribution of income should be confined to the wage-earning classes; still less is it said to suggest that men should be content with avoidance of want, with subsistence incomes. It is said simply as the most convincing demonstration that the abolition of want just before this war was easily within the economic resources of the community; want was a needless scandal due to not taking the trouble to prevent it."

In fact, however, the relation between the abolition of want and the Social Security scheme which he propounds is neither so close nor so clear as these claims might lead us to suppose. It is true that the proposed rates of benefit are materially higher than any, and much higher than most, of the benefits payable under any of the existing insurance schemes. But they are not materially higher than the sums that can be paid to-day under Unemployment Assistance or other forms of Public Assistance. The latter sums are, of course, only payable on proof of need, and subject to a means test, whereas the Beveridge plan benefits would be payable as a matter of contractual right. Thus the main difference which the Beveridge plan would make to persons in want would be not that they would receive more than they do at present, but that they would receive it as a matter of right and without being subject to the means test procedure.

An inquiry into means, though nowadays far from being the humiliating inquisition that is sometimes supposed, is none the less distasteful and unsatisfactory in various respects. If therefore we can afford them, there is much to be said for arrangements which will suffice to prevent want in the large majority of cases without involving any means test. But arrangements of this kind are necessarily expensive, for it is of their essence that the same "adequate" benefits are to be paid to persons who are in want and to persons

who are not in want. Under the Beveridge plan, indeed, they are no longer to be confined to persons who are comparatively poor, but are to be extended to all classes, including the wealthy, in the name of "comprehensiveness". The manager with a four-figure salary, the film star, the civil servant are all to be brought within its scope, to pay their weekly contributions, and to receive in the event of sickness unemployment and retirement benefits intended to be adequate in themselves to provide the means of subsistence. All classes, moreover, will receive something like 1s. for 3d., partly at the expense of the National Exchequer. Doubtless this comprehensiveness has its attractions; but it takes us a long way from the theme of abolishing want.

It is no exaggeration to say that by far the greater part of the large additional expenditure under the Beveridge plan would go, not to increase the payments made to persons who are in want, but to persons who are not in want under our existing arrangements. This is not necessarily an objection to the plan. Want, in the sense of an income insufficient for a bare subsistence, is not the only evil that follows from "interruption or loss of earning power". There is much hardship that falls short of want in this sense; and if it were not for our system of social insurance, there would be a great deal more. It is a hardship to find oneself unable to maintain the essentials of an accustomed standard of life, even though this may be well above subsistence level. Insurance is a fundamentally appropriate method for providing against contingencies which entail hardships of this kind. The original object of our national insurance schemes was to perform this service for the mass of wage-earners, rather than to abolish want; and it may be that a good case can be made out from the same standpoint for reshaping these schemes on a more generous financial basis.

But proposals which are really directed to this end must be examined on their merits, and not upon the misleading assumption that they are necessary to abolish want. Moreover, their financial implications must also be examined on their merits. Sir William Beveridge's attempts to demonstrate that the abolition of want is "a practicable post-war aim" are entirely irrelevant to the scheme that he propounds. What is the use of showing that the surplus of working-class incomes above a subsistence minimum greatly exceeded the deficiency of those below it? This would be relevant if Sir William Beveridge proposed merely to raise the family incomes of those below a subsistence level up to that level and not beyond; that is to say if he proposed to relieve want solely by the method of Public Assistance with a strict means test. But as in fact he proposes very nearly the opposite of this, his attempts to show that we can "afford" his plan must be dismissed as a confusion of thought, not the less regrettable because it is likely to be a very popular confusion.

UNIFICATION

FIRST, then, what of the main Beveridge proposals on their merits? There is an overwhelmingly strong case for the suggested inclusion of workmen's compensation within the scope of the insurance system, in place of the present arrangements under which this compensation is a liability of the em-

ployer to be assessed in the last resort by litigation. The enforcement of claims through the machinery of the law courts is an expensive and somewhat chancy business, generating unnecessary friction and suspicion; and the new system proposed in the Beveridge plan would undoubtedly be more satisfactory both to employers and to workpeople. There may be some opposition to the change, arising from the higher scale of compensation obtainable in certain cases from the law-court procedure. But Sir William Beveridge has done his best to disarm such opposition, at the expense of his principle of "flat rate of subsistence benefit"; and it seems reasonable to expect that this reform will be adopted to the general advantage without any serious challenge.

There is also a strong case for the proposal to supersede the approved societies as independent financial units in the administration of health insurance, and to pay the same rates of benefit for sickness as for unemployment. The obvious desirability of the latter reform provides the chief argument for the former change of system; for it is impossible to place the sickness benefits on a uniform basis under the present arrangements. This advantage would not, however, be obtained without some loss, for the approved societies render real services to their contributors with a sympathetic personal touch in which a more centralized administration would be apt to fail. Sir William Beveridge recognizes this and tentatively suggests that friendly societies and trade unions giving sickness benefit might be retained as responsible agents for the administration of state benefit. In short, this proposal raises certain difficulties; but the balance of argument seems to be decidedly in its favour.

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT

THE proposals relating to unemployment and retirement are far more dubious. The increase proposed in the rates of unemployment benefit (to 24s. for a single person and 40s. for a married man) may perhaps be regarded as not unreasonable in itself, though, of course, this helps to swell the expensiveness of the scheme. But it is open to serious question whether it is wise to make the payment of unemployment benefit unlimited in time, subject only to the condition of attendance at a training centre if the unemployment is prolonged. As Sir William Beveridge himself points out, this condition "is impracticable if it has to be applied to men by the million or the hundred thousand"; and the test of the offer of work through an Employment Exchange also "breaks down in mass unemployment". For this and other reasons, Sir William takes for granted as one of the three assumptions on which his scheme is based "maintenance of employment, that is to say avoidance of mass unemployment".

Now it is one thing to proclaim this as a major objective of post-war policy; it is quite another thing to put forward an ambitious plan for early adoption on the assumption that this objective can certainly be attained. For some years after the war, while the accumulated shortages of war-time are being overtaken, and depleted stocks replenished, "mass unemployment" should not be a serious danger. Subsequently, however, we must expect to run into a very difficult period, marked by large-scale problems of readjustment,

similar to those which arose after the last post-war boom; and, though we should certainly resolve to do our utmost, with the aid of every resource of organization and intelligence, to maintain a high level of employment when these difficulties arise, it is idle to pretend that this will be an easy task. We cannot truly assert, nor indeed does Sir William Beveridge assert, that we know clearly how it can be done. In these circumstances it becomes a pertinent question whether an unlimited duration for unemployment benefit may not act as an impediment to the readjustments that may be needed and may not thus serve as a contributory cause of "mass unemployment".

Under our present system unemployment benefit is paid as a matter of insurance right for 26 weeks. The benefits paid subsequently need not be any lower, in fact they are often higher, but they are paid through the mechanism of Unemployment Assistance and subject to various conditions, including, of course, a means test. There is much to be said on merits for applying different treatment to short spells of unemployment and prolonged unemployment respectively; and a desire to dispense with the means test is the only apparent motive which leads Sir William to seek to disturb this arrangement. But here it becomes a question whether his scheme would not in practice fall between two stools. His rates of benefit, though intended, as he tells us, to be sufficient in themselves to maintain subsistence, would in fact prove insufficient in a great many cases. A giant difficulty arises in the shape of large differences in rent, with which Sir William wrestles gallantly, but which he can hardly claim to have overcome. "The average of the actual rents" as he tells us "runs from 16.0 shillings a week in London to 7.6 shillings in Scotland for standard industrial households, and is 4.7 shillings in agricultural households." Sir William Beveridge takes 10s. as a rough and reasonable average, and builds up his subsistence minimum on this basis. But the benefits so calculated will be insufficient for individuals in London or large cities who are entirely destitute of other resources, and many of them will need therefore to have recourse to the Public Assistance system with its means test. On the other hand the proposal to continue to pay unemployment benefits without any time limit to individuals who may not be in want at all may serve in various ways to increase the numbers of the recorded unemployed, and to throw a needless expense upon the scheme.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

THE further feature of "comprehensiveness" will, in its application to unemployment benefit, raise formidable administrative problems which Sir William Beveridge does not appear to have considered. Unemployment benefits, under the insurance scheme, are paid to-day without any means test in the ordinary sense of the term. No account, that is to say, is taken of any investment income or aid from relatives that the applicant may receive. But, of course, account is taken of any earnings he may receive. The unemployment for which the benefit is paid is taken to signify in Sir William Beveridge's phrase "interruption of earnings"; and it would clearly never do to pay the benefit to a man because he had lost a particular job, if he was earning about as much in some other way.

In practice the application of this rule to manual wage-earners presents no serious difficulty. The miscellaneous sums which they may earn when formally unemployed are seldom large; in any case these sums are usually paid at the time when the work is done. But the application of this rule to many of the new classes who are now to be brought in will raise very formidable difficulties. If a journalist loses a salaried position and devotes himself to writing "free-lance" articles, which may be accepted or rejected after varying intervals by the editors to whom he sends them, is he to receive his unemployment benefit in the meantime? This is one of many similar conundrums behind which there lies what is really a fundamental difficulty, namely that the conception of "interruption of earnings" has not the clear-cut character in many non-manual occupations that it has in manual occupations. Sir William advocates comprehensiveness partly on the ground that it will make for administrative simplification. But he appears to have considered only one side of the case, and it may be questioned whether the balance of administrative advantage is not heavily against this principle. Since the inclusion of the higher-income classes will ultimately cost the scheme far more than the contributions paid by them, the balance of financial argument is certainly against it.

OLD AGE PENSIONS

THE proposals for old age pensions, or retirement pensions as they are to become, constitute by far the costliest feature of the plan. They are estimated to cost £126 million in 1945 rising by gradual stages to the figure of £300 million in 1965, and, it would seem, a much larger figure later on. The total cost of the Social Security scheme proper is estimated at £553 million for the latter year, so that retirement pensions will account for more than half the fund's expenditure. To appreciate the magnitude of the sum, it may be useful to recall that our total budget expenditure in the days of Mr. Lloyd George's budget of 1909 was well under £200 million. Proposals which will reach a cost of more than £300 million must be subjected to a searching scrutiny. It is proposed, when the scheme is in full operation, that the same weekly rates of benefit as for unemployment and sickness (i.e. 24s. for a single person and 40s. for a married couple) shall be paid to insured persons who retire at the pensionable ages of 65 for a man and 60 for a woman, as a matter of insurance right. If they postpone their retirement, they are to receive larger pensions when they do retire, an additional 1s. for a single person and 2s. for a married couple for each year of postponement. Moreover, they can retain in addition to their pension any miscellaneous income they may earn after retirement up to £3 a month, and from one-third to one-half of earnings in excess of this amount.

Thus Sir William Beveridge is proposing eventually to pay what will be in many cases larger sums to retired persons than to sick or unemployed persons, although, as his examination shows, their subsistence needs are appreciably less. He justifies this on the grounds that

"there is strong public opinion in favour of securing for the aged something more than bare subsistence, and apart from this there is convenience in keeping pensions

at least equal to working age benefits in order to avoid stepping down from benefit to pension on reaching a particular birthday".

The last argument seems a slight one in a setting in which "every shilling added to pension rates is extremely costly in total", costing in fact £20 million a year. The former argument carries us back to the general consideration already emphasized, that most of the money will go to persons who have already more than a bare subsistence. Upon this point the Report supplies decisive evidence. At present, the old-age pension which insured persons can claim as a matter of insurance right is only 10s. per week (or 20s. for a married couple); but in case of need they can apply for supplementary pensions. In fact, however,

"at the end of 1941, only 37 per cent, just over one-third, of all persons having contributory or non-contributory pensions, had claimed or qualified for supplementary pensions; the rest, nearly two-thirds, had either felt able to manage without applying for supplementation or had been disqualified under the means test".

In addition to this, moreover, nearly a third of the population of pensionable age "were not in receipt either of state pensions or of public assistance in any form".

It is clear, therefore, that the large majority of persons of pensionable age are not in "need" of pensions as high as Sir William Beveridge proposes; and it would obviously be far less costly to meet the needs of the minority who do need them by the system of supplementation. This, it is true, involves a means test; but the question arises whether the objections to a means test are to be regarded as of decisive weight, even if the cost of avoiding it amounts, as it does, to some hundred million pounds a year. This question is the more pertinent, in that Sir William Beveridge does not in fact propose to get rid of the means test, as applied to retirement pensions, until 1965. Under his plan the insurance pension rates will only increase gradually over 20 years from near the present level to his subsistence figures, and in the meantime those pensioners who have no other resources must continue to apply as now for supplementation. It is thus for a somewhat distant as well as an essentially sentimental advantage that we are asked to incur definite commitments for an additional expenditure commensurate with the total national budget of 1909.

CAN WE AFFORD IT?

THIS brings us to the broad financial question: Can we afford the Beveridge plan? We are still at war; and we do not know how long it will last. We know that we have already used up an important part of our overseas capital assets, and have incurred large liabilities to other countries; so that our means of obtaining our essential supplies from abroad have been seriously reduced, and can only be restored by a large increase in our export trade. We cannot tell whether this will be practicable in the unforeseeable conditions of the post-war world; it will certainly not be easy. We cannot assess the repercussions which a heavy adverse balance of payments may exert on our national prosperity and national income; but it would be rash to assume that

they may not be formidable. To enable us to cope with difficult conditions we shall have many sources of strength—among them an essentially united people. But we must be prepared for difficult conditions. The budgetary problem will be formidable. Money will have to be found for many other social purposes, besides the Beveridge plan—housing and education, for example. It may be that defence expenditure will have to be maintained at a much higher level than in the 1920's. It would be fatal to proceed in peace on the basis of the idea, which always attains such a vogue during war, that a large budget deficit is of no consequence.

Against the background of this prospect, some of the leading features of the Beveridge plan, in particular comprehensiveness and those aimed at dispensing with a means test for the relief of old age and prolonged unemployment, seem altogether too lighthearted. It is not enough to say that taxation and expenditure merely entail a redistribution of income. The taxation side of the redistribution has its difficulties and drawbacks; incidentally it involves a rigorous inquiry into means. Sir William Beveridge's chief argument against the means test is that it acts as a discouragement to thrift. But the high rates of taxation that will be needed to finance his scheme, in addition to heavy contributions from employers and employed, must also tend to discourage thrift, together with things like enterprise and effort, which may be even more important in the post-war world.

DARLAN AND AFTER

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NORTH AFRICA

IN the night of November 7-8 a great armada which had gathered in Gibraltar waters got under way and sailed east from the Straits. For many days before the air was thick with reports from Spanish and Axis sources of the coming and going of many ships—big ships and little ships, warships and merchant ships. Rumours were rife of preparations for an impending landing on the Atlantic shores of French Africa. Dakar was on all lips, and especially on the enemy's lips. Vichy France in alarm removed women and children from the great naval base. Speculation was busy even with the possibilities, romantic and remote as they were, of American forces which had been landed in Liberia some months before making an attack from the land side. Not until after the ships assembled at Gibraltar had set their momentous course did the enemy realize that Algiers and Oran, not Dakar, were the objective. Thus one of the greatest strategical surprises in the history of war was effected. Of at least this phase of an enterprise which was soon to experience rude jolts it may be said that the success was complete and impressive. A masterly plan was launched well.

The genesis of the plan goes back to December 1941, when Mr. Churchill discussed with President Roosevelt in Washington a joint Anglo-American campaign in North Africa with a view to striking at the enemy's exposed "under-belly". In July 1942 orders were issued for the preparations to go forward. An Allied Force Headquarters was set up in London by direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. The American General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in whose energetic leadership and soldierly qualifications there was the utmost confidence, was designated Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was given supreme command on the naval side. What in fact was being organized was the mightiest amphibious expedition ever to venture forth.

THE GREAT CONVOY

ALTOGETHER, at least 850 ships of the United Nations were concerned in the North African expedition—500 transports and supply vessels and 350 escort ships, many of the latter from the Western Approaches Command, which knows as much about this kind of work as any other body. The great convoy which weighed anchor in the night of November 7-8 was only one of three of comparable strength. Two were mustered in Britain, one was mustered in the United States, making the voyage to French Morocco direct without loss. The German High Command, happily bemused by its own false and inflated estimates of Allied shipping losses (severe though these have been), may well have believed that such a diversion of cargo space from normal service to a major oversea expedition was not within the realm of the practical: in any case it was ignorant of what was brewing. An

incidental but not unimportant detail was that the British people were required to forgo extra rations at Christmas so that precious ships might be freed for sterner work—austerity's own solid contribution to victory. The full facts of the assembling and of the leaving of this myriad of ships on one of the most adventurous and hazardous quests ever embarked on by brave and high-spirited men cannot yet be told; but it may be said that the theme is in every sense one worthy of treatment in the manner of Masefield's majestic description of how the crowded transports sailed from Mudros on another great adventure in the Four Years War. General Eisenhower has described the achievement of the Royal Navy as magnificent. "I am", he said, "overcome with admiration of the way Admiral Cunningham and the Royal Navy have done their work." When in January Admiral Cunningham was honoured by promotion to Admiral of the Fleet the feeling was unanimous that no man better merited the esteem and thanks of his King and his compatriots. The opening phase of the expedition was indeed a stirring and convincing demonstration and vindication of sea-power, with its essential and accepted complement of air power. The Royal Navy made possible the seemingly impossible at a time when it was already under intense strain.

The significance of North Africa in the grand design, as Mr. Churchill called it, of Allied offensive strategy is discussed in detail in another article in this review. Here it is necessary to explain that the enterprise had its military side and its political side. Both were equally crucial. On the military side the boldness—and even the audacity—of the conception was immediately manifest, not least to Hitler and Mussolini. So, too, were the resoluteness and resourcefulness with which the American and British forces overcame tough resistance on land and sea at Casablanca and elsewhere in French Morocco and in Algeria, especially at Oran, where a gallant stroke to pierce the boom cost many good lives. It has been asked why the Allies did not, after the manner of the daring German descent on Narvik in the Norwegian campaign, venture as far east as Bizerta and stake everything on a chance. The plan was in fact seriously discussed and turned down, largely because of the probable naval cost: the nearness of the Sicilian air bases with their formidable contingents of the *Luftwaffe* was not to be dismissed lightly. Although the military achievement did not quite realize the immediate maximum promise, there was little enough to cavil at and much to rejoice over in the general achievement at the end of two months. On the political side matters were rather different. No criticism is suggested nor responsibility implied when it is said that the supreme direction was American. In the circumstances that was inevitable and desirable. It was reasonably argued, and widely accepted, that an appeal to the French in North Africa to rally to the Allied ranks as a first step to the liberation of the motherland was likely to get a more powerful response if made pre-eminently by Americans. The Americans, moreover, had maintained close contacts with Vichy France and the Empire, and they were assumed to have gauged accurately the prevailing sentiment and the balance of forces there. In the event—and again no criticism of the State Department's policy is intended—the way the political side of the expedition developed had the

most disturbing consequences and led at one stage to some cross-purposes. In Washington it was, perhaps, not understood how passionate was the average Briton's dislike and distrust of the Vichy collaborationists. In London, perhaps, it was not sufficiently understood how rooted was the State Department's conviction that it could use Vichy for the discomfiture of the arch-enemy Hitler. With the appearance of Admiral François Darlan on the African stage something like a storm broke.

ADMIRAL DARLAN'S RECORD

To think objectively about Admiral Darlan is not easy. Around his personality embittered controversy has raged, and no doubt will continue to rage for many a long day. Any appraisal of him must take account of certain facts and circumstances. As a sailor he was first class. The French Navy was among his outstanding allegiances. His pride in it was invariable, and inspired many of his actions. He developed its *esprit de corps*; he raised its efficiency. Under his strong leadership it became indeed a fine fighting machine. He was not pro-German, but he was reputed to be anti-British. The basis for such bias is not clear, but Trafalgar still counts as a sour memory among a few Frenchmen, and Darlan may have been one of them. That notwithstanding, British naval officers of high rank esteemed him greatly. What certainly is established is that in June 1940 he shared with many French leaders the conviction that the capitulation of France would be followed by the capitulation of Great Britain within a few weeks. As Mr. Churchill put it in his address to the Canadian Parliament, these French leaders believed, or were assured by Berlin, that the British neck would soon be wrung like a chicken's. That was Darlan's cardinal miscalculation. His later activities and aspirations were largely determined by it. It may have been a failure of faith which he shared with others—and not in France alone.

Believing, then, that nothing stood between Hitler and the utter subjugation of all Europe to Hitler's will, Darlan collaborated in the establishment of the so-called new order. The motive of his collaboration may be disputed: the extent of it cannot be. As, for a period, the principal adviser of Marshal Pétain and his political heir-presumptive, he was associated with some of the blackest sins of the Vichy régime. Afterwards, in the freedom of North Africa, Darlan confessed that the Germans had him by the throat at Vichy and that he was surrounded by spies. On the other hand de Brinon, the Vichy Ambassador in Paris, has alleged that Darlan of his own free will provided the Germans with essential information about the defences of St. Nazaire and the successful convoying of Axis shipping in the Mediterranean. De Brinon, however, is hardly an impartial witness. He is quoted and noted here rather as exemplifying the malignancy which has poisoned so much of French political life. Darlan's collaboration with the enemy may well have had a different motive. In politics he was a pure opportunist. He had no party following as such. Against that he had the navy, which even after Oran was still formidable enough to turn the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean. Darlan was not only an opportunist: he was politically and personally ambitious. During the days of his collaboration one always

had the feeling, or suspicion, that, with the navy as a bargaining counter, Darlan harboured the hope of bringing off a grand *coup*—nothing less, in fact, than the displacement of Italy and the promotion of France as the second partner in the Axis.

With the progressive deterioration of the Italian military position in the whole Mediterranean area and the consequent deflation and denigration of *Il Duce*, Darlan, alert and astute, may well have been attracted by so dazzling a prospect. One tragic happening added its stimulus. In the dangerous days after the capitulation of Marshal Pétain Great Britain, then alone in the grim struggle, was driven to the necessity of taking action against the French Fleet at Oran. The action left a mark and a memory. If, then, Darlan was indeed thinking of ways and means of restoring French naval power and prestige in the Mediterranean there were more reasons than one for it. Other considerations arose, however. Already by the end of 1940 Darlan had begun to see that Hitler's overthrow of Britain was going to be neither easy nor swift. By the end of 1941 he was aware that Russian resistance and American entry into the struggle had transformed both the course of the war and the character of the peace. In 1942 Laval supplanted him as the Marshal's deputy. Darlan was appointed commander of the Vichy land, sea, and air forces. There was no love lost between Admiral and Auvergnat. In his new capacity Darlan not unnaturally saw to it that within his own domain—and a crucial one it was—dependable men were in the right place. It was in his new capacity that he set out on a tour of inspection of the Vichy bases and forces in North and West Africa immediately before the Anglo-American landings. The suggestion has been mooted that he was privy to the plan. Certainly Washington had always set great store by its link with Vichy and had retained Admiral Leahy at his diplomatic post—or rather listening post—in face of much criticism and mounting difficulties. The evidence of any arrangement between the two Admirals is, to say the least, slender. At all events Darlan, whether by accident or design, found himself in Algiers when the Allies struck, and, moreover, was armed with Marshal Pétain's full authority to take the action he thought necessary in defence of the territories. He used his authority promptly and ruthlessly. The resistance which was opposed to the Allied forces at Oran, Casablanca, and elsewhere was, as we have seen, well organized, resolute, and even bitter.

REAPPEARANCE OF GENERAL GIRAUD

WHEN the Allies landed one of their first acts was to put Darlan under arrest. The circumstances of this phase of the enterprise are far from clear. Until fuller facts are vouchsafed it will be well to abjure dogmatic statements. The original plan was that General Giraud, a legendary figure of two wars and a proved patriot of uncommon calibre, should rally the French population of Africa to the Allied side. Some account of this remarkable man is necessary. In the Four Years War he was taken prisoner, and escaped from Germany. In the present war he was again taken prisoner when trying to close the breach the German tanks made at Sedan, and again he escaped from captivity—two exploits which made his name familiar and famous.

He is of commanding physical presence—a Kitchener of a man, so he has been described—and has a personality which at once impresses a visitor. He is a devout Catholic, and belongs to the conventional Right, but he is not a political general and has little use for party politics as such. He abhors Fascists. Probably the Allies' path in Africa would have been smoother than it was to prove if he had been endowed with more political nous. General Giraud showed the stuff of his spirit after his second escape from Germany. The enemy resorted to all manner of ruses to bind him to passivity. He refused to give any undertakings. He went to the south, ostensibly to assist General Weygand in the writing of his memoirs. The two were under guard, but it seems to have been not a vigilant guard. The idea of leading the French in North Africa against the enemy appealed irresistibly to a man of his temperament, mettle, and faith. Arrangements were made by the Allies for his escape from Vichy France. A British submarine took him to Gibraltar, where he went on board a British warship and sailed with the expedition on the great adventure. (General Weygand was removed by the Gestapo to Germany as a prisoner.) General Giraud's first broadcasts to his compatriots had an authentic note. "I take up my action station among you", he said. "I ask for your confidence. You have mine. We have one passion—France; and one aim—victory. Remember that the African army holds in its hands the fate of France."

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S DILEMMA

THE response was not what seems to have been expected. One cannot ignore a strong suggestion of naïveté combined with amateurishness about this part of the project. A spontaneous rally to General Giraud on a substantial scale was looked for. This underrated the cumulative effect of the marked *malaise* which had settled on North Africa since June 1940, the Vichy tinge and taint of the whole civil administration, and the surprising and even sinister latitude allowed to open Fascist agitation. General Eisenhower thus found himself faced not merely with a dilemma but with a present danger and a possible disaster. His job was to fight Germans, not Frenchmen, and it was of supreme importance to the whole success of his expedition that he should not have a hostile population to imperil his communications and impede his operations. He wanted a Frenchman who could ensure a quiet rear. Admiral Darlan, still commander of the Vichy land, sea, and air forces, was the *deus ex machina*. Whatever doubts were later cast on the wisdom of the choice, it has to be remembered that hard fighting between the Allied and French forces was still going on and that the longer it continued the better able were the Germans and Italians to strengthen their land and air defences. Time pressed. No less an authority than Admiral Cunningham has stated that Darlan's co-operation was of great practical value to the Allies and that without his "cease fire" order they probably would not have done more for some time than hold small areas round Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers.

It has to be recognized that Darlan's actions on his assumption of office, with Allied approval, as High Commissioner were a source of much mis-

giving and many misunderstandings. In his first proclamation he called not for active intervention but for the observance of strict neutrality; he announced that he was acting in the name and on behalf of Marshal Pétain; he later claimed to be the legatee of the sovereignty of France; he set up an Imperial Council. He had no word for the Fighting French, who since June 1940 had kept the faith. The sequel was not hard to foresee. General de Gaulle disclaimed any responsibility for the political transactions in North Africa. General Catroux, equally forthright, called attention to the danger which an all-powerful Darlan might constitute for the Allied rear. The exiled Governments in Great Britain were frankly alarmed at this elevation of a former collaborationist: it was even bruited that Hacha, puppet President of Czechoslovakia, had made discreet inquiries about his own future. The British public was troubled. The British Government were embarrassed. The Axis, working with might and main to sow discord between London and Washington, were hopeful of an open split between the two great democracies. Then, on Christmas Eve, Darlan was murdered—an act rightly and unanimously reprobated in Great Britain and America. The murderer was at first no more closely identified officially than as a young Frenchman. Later it was disclosed unofficially that he was an adherent of the Comte de Paris, the French pretender, who had betaken himself to North Africa (where he has a following) soon after the Allied landings. The ardent young royalist was tried by a French court-martial, condemned, and shot. General Giraud was chosen by the Imperial Council to succeed Admiral Darlan as High Commissioner.

REPERCUSSIONS

THE effects in France of the landings in North Africa were immediate and radical. Vichy, now under the control of the ineffable Laval, broke off diplomatic relations with the United States—which was a formal rather than a substantial matter. More important was the people's reaction. It is probably true to say that first news of the Anglo-American expedition brought a stirring of French hearts and a revival of hope of deliverance. It was not *le jour de gloire*, but it was, so it seemed, the harbinger of it. Then, when it was learned that Darlan—who was still execrated by so many of his countrymen and women for his share in collaboration—had assumed authority in North Africa with Allied approval, bewilderment and bitterness succeeded the earlier expectations of better and braver times. Whatever may be said in favour of the arrangement with Darlan from the point of view of military expediency, it depressed and disheartened the strengthening movement of resistance in France itself. Psychologically, as is now generally realized, it was bad business. This bewilderment and bitterness were shared, as we have seen, by large sections of all the Allied peoples. Indeed, feeling rose so high and misgivings were so marked that President Roosevelt was constrained to issue a public statement from the White House to the effect that the arrangement with Darlan was no more than a military expedient and was to be regarded as local and temporary. Cynics observed that there is nothing so permanent as the provisional. The French people themselves faced still worse prospects.

On November 11—the choice of the date was characteristic of Hitler—German troops entered Unoccupied France and Italian troops landed in Corsica. “Germany”, Hitler impudently wrote in a letter to Marshal Pétain, “has decided to defend the frontiers of your country side by side with the French soldiers, and at the same time the frontiers of culture and European civilization.” The justification for this violation of the armistice conditions he himself had laid down does not call for comment: it carries its own contradiction and confutation. In all this drama and dragooning the aged Marshal appeared as a pitiful and hapless figure. News from France in these days comes tardily and as a trickle by devious ways. It is said that the Marshal has lately had two strokes. The report may or may not be true, but what is beyond question is Pétain’s increasing enfeeblement, weariness, and loss of leadership. More and more he is reduced to a state of helplessness and impotence: there is only too much reason to think that to-day his plight is as bad and unhappy as that of Hindenburg when the Nazis seized power in the Reich. Events moved inexorably. Hitler had decreed that the great naval base of Toulon should be designated a special region which the German forces would not occupy. The reason was clear and had little to do with magnanimity: he feared that if German troops marched in the French fleet would move out—perhaps to North Africa, which Darlan had “asked”, not ordered, it to do. Hitler needed time to ensure that that should not happen. By November 27 his plans were laid. At 4 a.m. on that memorable day German troops proceeded to occupy the base. Their intention was to seize the fleet, so essential to them in the struggle for mastery of the Mediterranean. They were frustrated. By an act of sublime immolation which at once defeated Hitler and reasserted the sovereign voice of France the fleet scuttled itself. Hitler fulminated. Many French people felt a sense of exaltation. The free world bowed in homage.

THE BRITISH ATTITUDE

As these notes were being written (for clearly they could be little more than notes) the prospects of a broad-minded and sensible political settlement on the basis of collaboration between General de Gaulle and General Giraud seemed brighter. As a footnote may be added a word or two about British policy. This can be summarized—for there is no secret about it—as follows. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have not sponsored the claims of General de Gaulle against those of General Giraud. General de Gaulle’s position and prestige were acknowledged. How could it be otherwise? He at least has never hauled down the flag or treated with the enemy. When French men and women were wearying he sustained them. When they were distraught he directed them to new endeavour. When they despaired he rallied them. He has built up a movement of resistance to which his compatriots of all classes give allegiance. He was, admittedly, a difficult man to deal with, but his devotion to France and his determination to secure the defeat of Germany were beyond question. A large part of the French Empire was under his effective control. These and other considerations could not, in the British view, be brushed aside. There was no

question, and could be no question, of recognizing General de Gaulle as head of any provisional or prospective French Government. But he has rendered important services to the common cause which could not be ignored when French unity and the French position in the war were under discussion. British policy has asked no more than that these matters should be taken into due and sympathetic account.

Looking back on the scene and with the fuller knowledge which time has brought, one is perhaps justified in concluding that if the same care and foresight had been shown in the political as in the military preparation of the campaign, many mistakes and much misunderstanding would have been averted. It is now generally conceded, for instance, that if a British spokesman of comparable standing and authority had from the outset been associated in Algiers with Mr. Murphy, the American representative—who is stated to be a close friend of General Weygand—the situation would have been happier. The appointment of Mr. Macmillan as British Resident Minister at Allied Headquarters—not, it may be noted, as Minister accredited to the French régime—was from every point of view a wise choice; but it was made late in the day and at a difficult juncture. By equipment and experience he was entitled to represent the simple fundamentals of British policy which have been sketched in the preceding paragraph. The situation, however, had got beyond the stage of piecemeal treatment and called for nothing less than review and decision by the very highest authorities—that is, by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill themselves. This came about at the memorable Casablanca Conference. Generals de Gaulle and Giraud were brought together. They were fully agreed on the task of defeating the common enemy, and they set up *liaison* missions. This was something: most observers in Great Britain held that it was not enough.

THE FARMING FRONT

THREE YEARS OF BRITISH ACHIEVEMENT

WHATEVER measure of success or failure the Dictators have achieved elsewhere, they have at least restored our interest in the position of British agriculture. It is a novel experience here to find that the fortunes of our farmers are a matter of close personal interest not only to the urban population of Britain but to the other members of the Commonwealth of Nations and to our allies in America, who have been helping to feed us.

One result of this situation is a recent output of agricultural literature on an unprecedented scale. First comes the stream of information, advice, and exhortation from departmental or inspired sources designed to assist the farmer's war effort, and perhaps inseparable from a war of propaganda. At the same time government and other committees have been investigating and making their recommendations for the better world which is to follow the war, and in which a restored agriculture is to find its place. The agricultural education of the layman is being completed by numerous articles in the press, and even books, written by distinguished individuals whose reputation must entitle them to our respectful attention. Between them they cover the past, present, and more particularly the future of our agricultural industry. Some of them are based on practical experience; others are not. Some suggest that this opportunity is being utilized to ventilate once more particular theories with which their authors have long been identified. To the layman these theories are bewildering and often contradictory. One recent publication discloses for the modest sum of 3s. 6d. how Great Britain should be made self-supporting after the war. At the other end of the line an eminent economist insists that agriculture must have the same treatment as our other industries—no better, no worse—that the future of the industry must depend on the efficiency which it can achieve for itself, and not on direct or indirect subsidies from the community or other special treatment. Between these two extremes we meet the exponents of land nationalization, land improvement, price control by import boards or marketing boards, tariffs and subsidies, large-scale farming and mechanization, or concentration on perishable produce. It is not surprising that a harassed farmer, whose immediate concern is to increase production and win the war, has complained that "we are more planned against than planning". Like most farmers he has no time for the latter at present.

The purpose of this article is first to present to the layman a picture of the "agricultural front", and its achievements during the past three years, from the front line. This claim is based on the fact that since the last war the writer has been farming himself and closely associated with other farmers on considerable estates in a dozen different counties, and that throughout the present war he has been continuously engaged—officially and otherwise—in the food production campaign. The second purpose is to suggest what

lessons for the future of the industry seem to be indicated by the experience of this period.

SITUATION AFTER 1918

THE first essential is to get the background correct, because the so-called sacrifice of British agriculture after 1918 and the resulting condition of the industry have frequently been overdrawn. This has been done with complete sincerity and the best intentions in order to press the necessity for a prosperous agriculture, and to present the strongest possible case for government action to create it. It is also true that between the wars many of the features of agricultural depression could be discerned—lost capital, semi-derelict farms, diminishing output from the land, and a steady reduction in the numbers employed on it. But the veterans of the industry could recall an infinitely worse state of things between 1880 and 1900, from which the industry survived and presently recovered. The root of the evil after the last war was only realized gradually, first by those engaged in the industry and subsequently by the general public and the Government. Prices for agricultural produce in Great Britain had fallen faster than the cost of production, and, though economists explained this as an inevitable time-lag, to the struggling farmer it became clear that the lag would last longer than he would, and that as the Government was not helping him he must help himself. Various expedients suggested themselves and were adopted. As milk production enjoyed a degree of natural protection against foreign competition, with the further advantage of a monthly payment in cash, the number of dairy farmers rapidly increased. Stock farming on grass, sometimes stigmatized as "ranching", reduced expenses—notably in the matter of labour. It was generally found cheaper to buy feeding-stuffs to supplement the grass than to grow crops for stock feeding or sale. When it was not practicable to lay down land to grass, certain exponents of mechanized farming on a considerable area were able to reduce the costs of their cultivations to a point which would be covered by the reduced prices for corn. Though more intensive production was practised by specialists in pigs and poultry with purchased—and largely imported—feeding-stuffs, the general tendency was towards what may be called "extensive" farming based on grass. The primary object of this was to reduce costs; the productive capacity of the land was only a secondary consideration. Like their fathers before them, farmers had learnt that high farming is no remedy for low prices. But they still continued to farm, and in view of the conditions with which they were confronted, most of them were farming as well as could be expected.

By such methods the more adaptable contrived to carry on, while the less efficient went out of business, and their efforts were presently rewarded by government assistance. It was at last recognized that stable prices should be established to cover the cost of production, and that, though in an industrial country dependent on its export trade agriculture could not be saved at the expense of the community by a return to rigid protection, there were other methods which might secure stable prices for agricultural produce without unduly penalizing the consumer. Successive Governments applied the trial-

and-error method to various forms of subsidy, control of imports, regulation of output by marketing boards and other devices, which were steadily improving the situation. Farmers' sons were still prepared to succeed their fathers on their farms, and in most districts it was possible to find individual farmers who had weathered the depression and were "making farming pay".

One feature to be noted at this time is that the principle of control was creeping in. Hitherto such a principle had been anathema to the British farmer, who claimed the right to produce what he liked and to sell it as he liked. But adversity taught him that it might be better to submit to the regulations and restrictions imposed by a Government Department or a marketing board, and to be certain of a fair price for his produce, than to run the risk of finding it unsaleable in a free market. He thus became familiarized with, if not reconciled to, the principle of control and coercion. He was soon to learn a good deal more about both of them.

WAR MEASURES

THE outbreak of war caused an immediate revolution in farming thought and strategy. During the previous 20 years, owing to financial considerations, the objective was to keep down the cost of production without much regard to the quantity produced. Now self-preservation demanded that the last possible ounce should be produced on every farm, regardless of cost. This urgency increased with the progress of the war: the slogan of "digging for victory" became "digging for dear life", and to-day we realize that offensive operations in the Mediterranean call for even more production by the British farmer than defensive lines on our south coast. Events have made it clear to all of us that to save shipping space is the essential prelude to victory. The first step was to reorganize our agricultural front so as to replace as far as possible the annual imports of some 16 million tons of human food and 7 million tons of feeding-stuffs for stock; and the methods to be adopted for this had been tested in the last war. It has been calculated in general terms that, whereas an acre of pasture produces meat for one person, an acre of arable land should grow enough wheat to feed 21 people, or potatoes for 42 people, for the same period. In the case of the dairy farmer 30 acres of grass mown for hay, and afterwards grazed, should maintain 20 cows in milk for the eight autumn and winter months, if supplemented by about 15 tons of imported feeding-stuffs: the same acreage ploughed and cropped with oats, beans or peas, kale and mangold should maintain the same number of cows for the same period with practically no additional feeding-stuffs—thereby saving some 15 tons of shipping space. The case for ploughing was self-evident. A vigorous ploughing campaign was started in the autumn of 1939, and additional quotas of grass to be ploughed and cultivated for each successive harvest have been prescribed by the Ministry of Agriculture, and obtained. Simultaneously an endeavour has been made to increase production in every possible way by better and more intensive farming on every farm in the country. If improved practice can increase the yield per acre, or if improved management can increase the milk yield or the growth of stock by a small percentage, the aggregate contribution to relieve shipping space must be considerable.

The further problem was to decide what home-grown food-stuffs are required most, and how to produce them. As we were only producing about one-third of what we consumed, it was clear that all were wanted, but that some were of more importance than others to a nation on war rations. Bread, potatoes, vegetables, and milk were essential for subsistence. Meat, bacon, eggs, cheese, and beer were desirable. Some of these required more land to produce them than others. Some could more readily be imported under war conditions than others, and this distinction varied with the course of the war. It was therefore necessary to lay down some scale of priorities for home-grown produce, and this again has had to be modified from time to time as a result of changes in the war situation. But the general principle to be followed by farmers was to concentrate on production of direct human food, and to produce as much more as they could.

This too indicated more ploughing, but the point to which the process should be carried is a far more difficult matter to determine. Modern agricultural practice, with two centuries of experience to support it, demands a rotation of cropping and manuring; clover mixtures must be grown to rest and restore the fertility of the land, and root crops to keep it clean. The hay, straw, and roots must then be utilized in various ways to feed stock through the winter, and to make the manure required for satisfactory corn crops. Most of this stock must be summered on pasture, and pasture is generally available because much of it is physically unsuitable for ploughing. These points have to be weighed in relation to local conditions of soil and climate, accessibility, the labour and chemical manures available, and other matters. It is only by correct decisions on these and similar points that the farmer can arrive at the proper balance in cropping and stocking his farm, and without this the maximum production from it cannot be secured or maintained. It would be quite possible to show a sensational increase in the production of one commodity, but to diminish the total productivity of the farm. This would be the danger of a farming programme prescribed in Whitehall, unless it were regulated by local knowledge and experience.

CONTROL—WITH DECENTRALIZATION

THE Government alone has been in a position to decide the relative importance in the present emergency of the various agricultural commodities which can be produced in this country. It was therefore necessary to impose a system of government control on agricultural production, but a system which should not prevent the individual farmer from making full use of his knowledge and experience of the capabilities of his farm. This has been effected by decentralization. The Ministry of Food estimates the national requirements. The Ministry of Agriculture estimates how far these can be met by increased production at home. The task of producing specified quantities of particular commodities is entrusted by it to County Executive Committees, by them to District Committees, and by the latter to the individual farmers. The inspiration and driving force provided by the Higher Command in Whitehall is tempered at successive stages by contact with

the realities of the country-side. On the whole this system has worked satisfactorily and ensures that, while the requirements of the Ministry are met, every farmer is still free to increase production on his own farm on the lines for which it is best adapted. In practice most farmers have concentrated on the production of more direct human food, while making their farms self-supporting in feeding-stuffs for their stock, which they have been anxious to retain.

For a food production campaign on this scale the Government first obtained wide powers under the Defence Regulations of 1939, which placed all farmers under orders, and then created an immense organization extending from Whitehall to every parish to act as agents for the Minister of Agriculture and to give effect to his instructions. Local organization was centred in the County War Agricultural Executive Committee, a body of voluntary workers, nominated by the Minister personally, and representative as far as possible of the different sections of the industry—landowners, land agents, farmers, and farm workers, including the Women's Land Army. The farmers have usually provided the dominating element in the County and even more in the District Committees, because more of them were available with the necessary technical and local knowledge. The requisite staffs were rapidly collected and even more rapidly increased, in accordance with the best departmental traditions, to deal with the additional work continuously imposed on them. No doubt much unnecessary work has been created for them, and by them. From the first it has been an affair of amateurs. Comparatively few of the personnel engaged had the administrative experience desirable for an organization invested with such wide powers and responsibilities. But their work has been cheap, honest, and effective. Mistakes have been made, and it is surprising that there have not been more. Thanks to the system of decentralization the incidence of such mistakes has been limited and their results have never been really serious. On the whole, rough justice has been done by very human Commissars, and the instructions of the Ministry have been faithfully carried out.

The Ministry started with special advantages. First it had the experience of the last war, and whereas the vital importance of increased food production was not then realized until half-way through the war, on this occasion it was realized before the war started and preliminary preparations had been made accordingly. No doubt more might have been done, but a good deal was done. A skeleton organization was in being at the outbreak of war, and in the two preceding years some reserves of soil fertility were built up by the supply of lime and slag to farmers on favourable terms. A most fortunate asset was the increase of mechanization. The tractor was a discovery of the last war, but 20 years later it had become an established feature in agricultural practice, and tractor cultivation has since been utilized and developed to increase enormously the results obtainable from the labour available under war conditions. Another immeasurable asset was the fact that at the outbreak of war the land was in the occupation of a loyal and hard-working body of farmers, small-holders, and labourers, already hardened by adversity, and—in terms of total war—if not required to "take it", determined to "give it" to the best of their ability.

PROGRESS IN FOOD PRODUCTION

THE results actually achieved in the food production campaign are, of course, concealed in the national interest behind an official smoke-screen, through which a momentary glimpse is permitted on suitable occasions to indicate that achievements have been substantial. It has been authoritatively suggested that whereas we were producing one-third of our food we are now producing two-thirds; but the measure of values adopted for this test has not been given. Ministerial utterances on progress, and the press comments thereon, might almost serve as a model for the Ministry of Information; they convey the right impression without giving much away. It is, however, a matter of common knowledge that over five million acres of grassland have been ploughed up, that there is now appreciably more arable than grass in the country, that both are being more intensively farmed, and that satisfactory crops are being grown: also that we have as many cattle as we had before the war, though our stocks of sheep, pigs, and poultry have diminished. It must also be observed that the movement is still forwards, that the peak of production at home is not yet in sight, and that the demands created by increasing output for additional labour, machinery, and fertilizers are being dealt with as they arise; so far the breakdowns have not been serious. Perhaps the best impression of the progress made may be gained from observation of any familiar country-side and a mental comparison with its former condition. Everything that is officially described as "cultivated land" (crops and grass) is now obviously being farmed and not merely occupied, while in almost every district various reclamation schemes have brought into this category land formerly described as "rough grazing" or "derelict". To the agriculturist nothing has been more surprising than the results obtained from considerable areas hitherto covered with heath, bracken, and bushes, or waterlogged, which local opinion had long regarded as incapable of growing any sort of crop: such are the results of the determined application of the resources made available by science and modern machinery. Some of these results have been uneconomic, but they have certainly increased the gross output and have saved shipping space.

These three years have naturally had their effect on the agricultural industry and all engaged in it. First there has been an all-round improvement in the general standard of farming, because more intensive production means better farming, and where improved prices have failed to effect this, it has been imposed by Cultivation Orders issued by the Executive Committee concerned and enforced by subsequent supervision. Farmers are now looking for extra labour, instead of trying to reduce their labour bills. It is true that the average farmer is continually confronted with special difficulties created by war conditions. He has lost much of his skilled labour, and is slowly learning to make the best of the substitutes available. He can no longer count on prompt delivery of the various accessories indispensable to his business—seed corn, fertilizers, feeding-stuffs, implements, spare parts, sacks, threshing tackle and other things: in some cases he is fortunate if he ever does obtain them. The local tradesmen on whom he relied for running repairs—the

saddler, the blacksmith, and the agricultural engineer—are all overworked and understaffed. But he can obtain a measure of assistance from the resources at the disposal of his County Executive Committee, and can count on it and its officers for sympathetic and well-informed advice to meet the difficulties of the situation. Generally speaking it may be said that the best farmers are still able to maintain their high standard, the average farmers are now farming appreciably better than they were before, while the really bad farmers have been dispossessed and their farms are now in better hands.

It is often suggested that in the present emergency we are perforce living on the accumulated fertility—or it might be more correct to say the condition—of the soil, and exhausting it. There is some truth in the allegation. The prolonged rest under grass had certainly stored up a certain reserve in the soil which has been cashed in successive corn crops and sometimes replaced by a legacy of weeds. But one of the great lessons of war farming has been the value of better cultivation and a correct rotation of crops, to supplement or even to replace orthodox manuring. This had long been recognized at Rothamsted and elsewhere, and is now obtaining a wider recognition. The main difficulty is to make good deficiency in lime or phosphates, and government action has now made both available in greatly increased quantities. Under war conditions our cultivations are by no means all that they should be, but we are still a long way from soil exhaustion.

SOME EFFECTS OF CONTROL

THERE is, of course, a general impression that "the farmers are making money", but such a statement must be subject to qualifications. In so complex an industry, at a time when increased production is the primary consideration, no system of controlled prices can be wholly satisfactory. It is recognized that if increased production of certain commodities is to be enforced in the national interest, remunerative prices for them must be assured. If these prices are to be remunerative for all producers, they will inevitably be more remunerative for those who are producing under specially favourable conditions. It has not been practicable to control all prices, and the law of supply and demand has sometimes been responsible for "war prices" which have given a misleading impression to the public. Such wind-falls have been comparatively rare and have been unequal in their incidence. For example, when a sack of malting barley was being sold for four or five pounds in the eastern counties it was still found necessary to pay a cash subsidy in the north and west for keeping hill sheep. Generally speaking, however, prices have been more satisfactory than anything that the farmers have known since the last war: this has stimulated production and improved their financial position, even after taking increased expenses into account. But the national interests have been very adequately protected by tightening up war taxation: the Excess Profits Tax has made it impossible for fortunes to be made, and farming on a large scale is now merely a matter of risking capital for the benefit of the Inland Revenue Department. And as a farmer rented at £100 a year must now pay income tax on his profits—which are not always realizable—the cash situation gives him, as it

does his labourers, serious food for reflection on the responsibilities of citizenship. He has little opportunity, as he had in the last war, to put together a cash reserve in War Loan to meet the inevitable sequel of a falling market.

Another feature of this period is the effect of control on those engaged in the industry. They had seen something of it before the war as a disagreeable necessity, but they did not like it, and they do not like it now. Besides being a business farming is a way of life, and a way of life for the individualist. He may not consider himself 100 per cent efficient—he seldom does—but he has generally learnt certain hard lessons and knows something of the capabilities of his farm. It is therefore only natural that he should resent interference and dictation from an official with no obvious qualifications, who has never risked his own money in the business, or—worse still—from an ex-farmer now invested with official authority, whose own farming career had never been conspicuously successful. He is quite ready to help the Government, but he cannot see the sense of being ordered to grow wheat where he knows that he could grow a better crop of barley or oats, or of growing potatoes which rot in the clamp because he is unable to sell them when he wants to. He finds that he cannot buy or sell without permits, restrictions and delays, the reasons for which are beyond his comprehension. A minor grievance is the obligation to complete an ever-increasing quantity of forms and returns, which give him a good deal of trouble and from which he derives no apparent advantage. Regimentation of this sort may be inevitable, but the more he sees of it the less he likes it. If he resists it, he finds himself in conflict with a higher authority exercising judicial or semi-judicial powers, whose decisions do not always satisfy his sense of fair play. This aspect of the food production campaign has received little publicity, because there is a general feeling that it is unpatriotic to resist or embarrass the action of the Government in war time. It is also realized that the Executive Committees are making the best of a very difficult job, for which they receive no payment, and that their work has generally been justified by results. Under peace conditions farmers would be far more critical. Most of them seem to have realized that control has come to stay. But they sincerely hope that it will be better administered and less exacting, and if it is to be a condition precedent to the maintenance of fair prices and conditions for the farmer they would be prepared to accept it.

FUTURE OF BRITISH AGRICULTURE

ANY survey of the progress and results of the food production campaign must suggest certain conclusions which ought to be of real value to those responsible for shaping the future of agriculture, either by legislation or by the more enduring force of public opinion. It should first be recognized that the agricultural industry will emerge, not as a new industry created for the war, but as the old industry with which we are all familiar revitalized by war conditions, and still in the hands of landowners, farmers, and labourers. All of these have responded equally to the call for service. None have made a higher contribution to increased production than farming landowners or

big-scale farmers, who have freely utilized the adequate capital at their disposal in the national interests without regard to possible cash returns. None have done better with their more limited resources and smaller farms than many small "family farmers", who started life as agricultural labourers. The backbone of our agricultural effort has probably been provided by the small mixed farms. It is seldom realized that nearly 50 per cent of the cultivated land of Great Britain consists of holdings of less than 150 acres, and that a further 30 per cent consists of holdings of between 150 and 300 acres. On comparatively small mixed farms it has generally been a simple matter for the farmer to modify his system by bringing more grassland under the plough every year, and thereby to grow sufficient to keep his stock, besides increasing his output of direct human food. On these holdings a little help goes a long way, and under the system of decentralization adopted by the Ministry all the possibilities of mechanization and improved farming practice under scientific guidance have been brought within their reach. Could anyone who has been continuously engaged on the agricultural front contend that the existing structure of mixed farms in the hands of tenant farmers or owner occupiers should be changed? It is true that production from this structure was far below capacity at the outbreak of war, and the land was not being fully utilized. But this was deliberate, and due to economic conditions beyond the control of the farmer. The existing structure contained all the elements required to increase production and responded readily as soon as government action created the necessary conditions. The food situation has been saved by accepting our farmers and farms as they existed, and by stimulating production on traditional lines without any serious departure from orthodox practice. If this mixed farming had been abandoned before the war in favour of perishable products only or some other form of specialization—the panacea sometimes advocated in the past for agricultural depression—the sequel might have been very different. On the whole, exponents of specialization have fared badly under war conditions, though it is fair to observe that some have adapted themselves to the times with considerable success. The grazier, and the milk producer who had almost eliminated labour by moving a bail over wide areas of grassland, have been confronted with the grim problem of growing concentrates for their cattle besides human food without even the nucleus of the labour and equipment needed for the task. Many of the specialists in pigs and poultry have been put out of business, because they could neither grow nor purchase a fraction of the feeding-stuffs required, and their expensive buildings and plant have been immobilized.

ADVOCATES OF NATIONALIZATION

THE experience of the past three years provides no support for another change in the structure of the industry, generally described as land nationalization, which had—and still has—serious advocates. In one way it may be said that the food production campaign has provided us with many useful examples of land nationalization in practice—in the farms taken over and operated by County Executive Committees. In these cases the committees

concerned have spared no pains to make a success of the venture. They have applied all the resources under their control for cultivation, manuring, and cropping under carefully selected and competent officials, and have frequently produced spectacular results. But a brief investigation of the expenses involved would make the taxpayer pause before assuming any permanent responsibility for such operations. And it is a significant fact that hard-headed committees have only operated farms themselves in special circumstances or as a last resort, and have generally taken the earliest opportunity to relet them to satisfactory tenant farmers.

Another argument sometimes advanced by the advocates of land nationalization gains little support from the experience of the War Executive Committees. These advocates—and notably the late Sir Daniel Hall—have alleged that agricultural landowners, whether in occupation or not, are no longer in a position to provide the “equipment capital” requisite for the industry—farm-houses and cottages, farm-buildings, fences, roads, and water-supplies—as distinguished from the farmer’s capital which consists of his live and dead stock on the farm. But it would appear that the Executive Committees have not found that production is seriously prejudiced by the lack of such fixed equipment. Under emergency legislation they were given special powers to provide it, if and where required, and eventually to recover the cost from the owner. But in practice they have seldom found it necessary or desirable to exercise these powers. This has not been due to any reluctance to expend public money when required for the war effort. They have, for example, expended very considerable sums on land drainage—mainly on clearing ditches and water courses—and claim to have improved some two million acres of land by this means. But to clear these ditches has always been a recognized liability of the farmer in occupation, not of the landowner.

A further argument for land nationalization—that under the old system our land was being badly farmed—is not supported by the experience of the past three years. Farmers did not farm intensively because it did not pay to farm intensively, but as soon as prices improved most of them showed that they were capable of doing so. Official records reveal that some 2,000 tenancies have been terminated during the war under the Defence Regulations, involving 200,000 acres, and that committees have taken possession of some 300,000 acres of land which was neglected or derelict, and which the occupiers were not in a position to farm intensively. This is not a high proportion of the 25,000,000 acres of arable and pasture in England and Wales.

CONSTRUCTIVE WORK AHEAD

But if our war experience supplies no justification for attempting any drastic reconstruction of the industry, there is no lack of constructive work for the reformers to consider. It is clear that for agriculture as for other industries the *laissez-faire* period can never return. From now onwards the welfare of agriculture will be the concern of the nation, which must direct and control it, without dragooning it. The successful war record of the industry has been due to the fact that it was called upon to form a part of the fighting forces mobilized for modern war; the Government assigned definite duties

to it, and had to put it in a position to perform them. The same principle will no doubt be followed after peace is restored. It is recognized within the industry that control is inevitable; the same conclusion appears in the recently published Reports of the Scott and Uthwatt Committees, and we are informed that preliminary discussions are shortly to be initiated by the Government with this end in view. But control can effect little or nothing unless it also provides an economic basis for the industry. This is the one point upon which all the reformers are agreed. They differ widely as to the means for achieving it, but they can at least take as their starting point the various experiments in progress before the war.

The war has made the world smaller, and it is clear that for us it means the end of insularity in agriculture—and in everything else. Our future agricultural problems must be considered in relation to the British Commonwealth and other countries, notably the United States, far more closely than they were before. To some extent this had already been realized before the war. Until the year of the Ottawa Conference we were a free-trade nation and the British farmer had to compete at home in an open market as best he could with producers who were in a position to under-sell him. At that Conference two principles were laid down: there should be preferential treatment in the home market, first for the home producer and then for the Dominions; at the same time it was essential to maintain remunerative price levels for primary commodities. It became clear that to obtain practical results from these principles there must be further and closer collaboration between primary producers within the Empire. Six years later the Primary Producers' Union of New South Wales invited representatives of our National Farmers' Unions to meet delegates of Empire producers' organizations from Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa at Sydney. The resolutions finally accepted by this Conference reaffirmed the order of preference laid down at Ottawa. It accepted the need for orderly marketing of Empire primary products, and recommended that for this purpose the Empire producers' organizations should co-operate to establish Commodity Councils. The latter would be charged with the duty of advising their different organizations with regard to regulation of supplies to the United Kingdom, and to institute a continuous survey of conditions affecting available supplies and markets, with a view to securing the expansion of existing and the creation of new markets to absorb Empire surpluses.

It is clear that after the war the movement must be carried a stage further, and must be profoundly affected by our new relations with the United States of America. It is equally clear that in the changed conditions of a post-war world it will be impossible to treat British agriculture in a water-tight compartment, and that a preliminary to any discussion of its future place in a planned economy for this country must be full consideration of the wider problems of an Imperial agricultural policy.

AN AFRICAN PROBLEM

THREE GROUPS OF TERRITORIES

THE groups of territories, British or other, lying to the north of the Union of South Africa and to the south and south-east of the Sudan present a number of interesting problems, both internally and in regard to their future relation to the Union, which will call for settlement after the war.

There are or will be three such groups—the Rhodesian group, consisting of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; the East African group, consisting of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika; and the Somaliland group. This last, it is fair to assume, will comprise British Somaliland and the territories of Somaliland and Eritrea, once forming part of the Italian Empire, the administration of which, whatever be the hands to which it may be entrusted as the result of the peace settlement, must it would seem be carried on in close association with the Government of Ethiopia, in relation to which Great Britain, so long as her Agreement with that country of January 31, 1942* may last, will have to perform the duties imposed upon her by that Agreement.

I. THE RHODESIAN GROUP†

To take first the Rhodesian group: since the British South Africa Company laid down, in 1923, the burden of administration which it had borne from the time of the first foundation of Rhodesia in 1890, Southern Rhodesia has been a British Colony enjoying local responsible government; not indeed a Dominion, for it has no independent foreign relations and is not affected by the Statute of Westminster, but with an executive government responsible to a small locally elected unicameral Legislature for the conduct of all its internal affairs. Its constitution still purports to reserve to the Secretary of State for the Dominions a measure of control over the conduct of native affairs, but this pretended control is in practice so shadowy as to be, in effect, illusory. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are Crown Protectorates, administered by Governors directly appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and able in the last resort through the use of official majorities to command the obedience of the local Legislative Councils.

Southern Rhodesia contains a white population of roughly 69,000 souls and a native population of about 1,378,000; Northern Rhodesia a white population of about 13,000 mainly dependent, directly or indirectly, on the great copper-mining industry close to the border of the Belgian Congo, on the zinc and vanadium mining industry at Rhodesia Broken Hill, and on the carrying trade of these mines and of the Belgian Congo, and a native popu-

* Cmd. 6334.

† The author desires to express his indebtedness in the first part of this article to Professor W. K. Hancock's *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*.

lation of about 1,366,000; Nyasaland a small white population of less than 2,000 mainly engaged in agriculture and a large native population of about 1,675,000.

For some years past there has been, on the part of a substantial majority of the European population of the Rhodesian group, a strong demand for the amalgamation of the three territories into a single Colony with local responsible government under a constitution similar to that which Southern Rhodesia enjoys to-day. This demand has caused His Majesty's Government in London considerable difficulty; and, thanks to the good sense of all concerned, it has been agreed not to proceed with the discussion of it while the war lasts. But the discussion must inevitably be resumed when the war is won.

THE DEMAND FOR AMALGAMATION

THE demand itself proceeds from motives which command respect. Southern Rhodesia, which by common consent has for now nearly twenty years made a success of her experiment in responsible government, and whose administration of native affairs has, given the presuppositions on which it rests, been liberal, enlightened and humane, may not unreasonably aspire to a larger sphere of power. The elected members of the little Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia, most of them belonging to the local Labour Party which, in a country mainly inhabited by natives, is by no means to be identified with the Labour Party in Great Britain, may not unnaturally suffer from a sense of frustration in a Legislature in which they cannot make their views prevail against the official executive under the orders of "Downing Street". Nyasaland, which possesses no mining industry, and whose finances have been consistently embarrassed, may well wish to join her fortunes to those of her two wealthier neighbours. Yet the difficulty which the demand for amalgamation presents to His Majesty's Government, responsible as it is to the British House of Commons, is very real. The original grant of responsible government to Southern Rhodesia, a community at that time of some 33,000 Europeans and some 770,000 natives, might well have seemed a bold and hazardous step to take. The closest precedent which could be claimed for it was that of Natal, which when it received responsible government in 1893 contained 47,000 Europeans, 41,000 Indians and 456,000 natives, including the Zulus; but it would be flattery to suggest that the history of Natal under responsible government, before the Union of South Africa was effected, was one of unbroken success. Certainly Southern Rhodesia has justified the confidence reposed in her in 1923; but to substitute for a present unit of responsible government with one European to 20 natives a unit with one to more than 50, which is what would result from the amalgamation with her of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, would be to take a long further step indeed. And it might be questioned whether the small European population, almost all the members of which are fully occupied with the business of earning their living, contains enough men of leisure and education to provide personnel for Parliaments, Ministries and Civil Service adequate to the discharge of such greatly extended responsibilities.

The question of amalgamation was in 1938 referred by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, now Lord Harlech, to a Royal Commission under the able and indefatigable chairmanship of Lord Bledisloe. The evidence given to this Commission certainly revealed a preponderant opinion among the Europeans in the three territories concerned in favour of amalgamation, but, equally certainly, a preponderant opinion among the natives against it; not because the natives of Southern Rhodesia had any ground for complaining of oppression, but because the natives elsewhere, rightly or wrongly, felt safer under the direct rule of the Colonial Office than they thought that they would feel if left to the uncovenanted mercies of a small local Parliament elected solely by the Europeans. The Commission itself gave forth an uncertain sound. Its members were far from being unanimous on all points. The report, while indicating sympathy with the aspiration to amalgamation, recommended that it should be delayed until a blending of the native policies followed in Southern Rhodesia on the one hand, and in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland on the other, should have been rendered practicable; and an appended note signed by the Chairman and one other member, a gentleman of great ability and business experience, expressed the belief that the present dissimilarity of treatment of the native problem would in due course give place to a greater affinity of view.

TWO DIVERGENT DOCTRINES

THERE are indeed, in this matter, wide differences between what may be termed the South African and the British, or Colonial Office, doctrines. In the political sphere the British Government and Parliament may have witnessed with regret the abandonment in the Union of South Africa of the old Cape native franchise; but it would be idle for anyone to deceive himself into the belief that in any south or south-central African community containing a substantial and settled European population enjoying or aspiring to responsible government the Europeans will tolerate any effective invasion by the natives, through the franchise or otherwise, of the field of Parliament or consequently of central, as distinguished from local, government. The watchword is "segregation". This is as true of Southern Rhodesia as it is of the Union of South Africa: it would be no less true of an amalgamated Rhodesia. The policy of the Colonial Office, in the territories for which it continues to be responsible, and which contain only small or mainly transitory European populations, may be summarized in its own phrase as that of "paramountcy of native interests". It may well be that both policies are right, that each is the more appropriate to its own sphere; but it is evident that the difference between the two does not make the problem of amalgamation easy.

Again in the sphere of native administration it is perhaps not too much of an over-simplification to say broadly that in the South African sphere the policy obtains of making native chiefs into subordinate officers of the central Government or even of appointing white officers to exercise, in a paternal spirit, in relation to native tribes many of the functions which used to be performed by the hereditary chief; while in the Colonial Office sphere

the policy of "indirect rule" prescribes that the traditional tribal organization and with it the position and power of the chief shall be supported and maintained in the slow march towards a higher civilization. Here again it may be that each policy is the wiser in its own sphere; but the difference between the two is wide.

NATIVE LANDS

OR take the all-important question of native lands. Most of the difficulties of the Union of South Africa in relation to native affairs arise from native land hunger, due to the fact that too much of the whole area of the country was too early parcelled out among the "burghers" or otherwise alienated to Europeans, leaving too little ground on which the natives could continue to lead their accustomed tribal life. Genuine attempts have been made in recent years to remedy this state of affairs, but the evil remains acute and is a fertile source of trouble. In Southern Rhodesia the problem is less grave because it was faced in time. During the period of the British South Africa Company's administration 21 million acres had been inalienably set aside as reserves for exclusive use and occupation by natives as tribes or portions of tribes; and the fundamental law of the territory laid down by Order in Council prescribed that a native might acquire land in individual tenure anywhere outside the reserves in the same way as a European might, though in fact comparatively few natives availed themselves of this right. Only 31 million acres had been alienated to Europeans, and 43 million acres remained undealt with. In 1930 legislation was enacted carrying out in substance the recommendations made in 1925 by a Land Commission, appointed immediately after the institution of responsible government, which had advised that of the 43 million unalienated acres just under 7 million should be set aside for native occupation including individual purchase and just under 17½ million reserved for Europeans.

"This left rather more than a million acres as 'neutral' or 'semi-neutral' areas, and rather less than a million acres as a forest reserve; it also left nearly 18 million acres of land in arid or fly-infested or unexplored country to be allocated at some future date."*

Very different is the land policy which has, just lately, been officially laid down and published by the Government of Northern Rhodesia. This policy, similar in effect to that which has for many years obtained in Nyasaland, prescribes that, while such areas as may be specially suitable for European settlement or industry, in particular mining, shall be reserved for those purposes, the whole of the rest of the country, which must necessarily be vastly the greater part of it, shall be native territory. The difference may be summarized by saying that in the South African sphere the European, in the Colonial Office sphere the native is the residuary legatee of the land settlement.

Lastly in the sphere of industrial legislation there is in Southern Rhodesia, as in the Union, a legal "colour bar" designed to protect the white worker

* W. K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, Vol. II, *Problems of Economic Policy, 1918-1939*, Part II, p. 103.

from native competition in those classes of employment of which the white worker regards himself as being entitled to a monopoly.

"The operation of the Act (sc. the Southern Rhodesia Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934) conformed in almost every particular to the South African example. Its intention was in every particular identical with the intention of the South African system, namely, to protect the privileges of the white trade unionists, both as regards wages and as regards the ratio of employment."*

In Northern Rhodesia there is no such legal restriction on the industrial employment of the native; but in practice a similar restriction exists, not less effective for having no legal sanction behind it, virtually imposed upon industrial employers by the pressure of the trade unions of their indispensable white employees. This indeed may be a case in which, in the language of Lord Bledisloe's report, there has been a "blending" or "affinity" between Southern and Northern Rhodesian practice, but it can hardly be a case such as Lord Bledisloe had in mind, or one well calculated to allay House of Commons misgivings.

Enough has been said to show that the post-war problem of Rhodesian and Nyasaland amalgamation is beset with difficulty. Between South African "segregation" and Colonial Office "native paramountcy" there is a deep gulf fixed, a gulf which must in some way or other be crossed before amalgamation can be effected.

II. THE EAST AFRICAN GROUP

NEXT comes the East African group. Here the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya contains a European population of about 22,000, mainly engaged, apart from civil servants and railway employees, in coffee-growing and other agricultural and pastoral pursuits in the healthy highlands around Nairobi, 3,400,000 natives including the Masai and Kikuyu tribes, and 47,000 Indians. The Protectorate of Uganda contains only some 2,200 Europeans, along with a comparatively highly organized and progressive native population, the Baganda, numbering some 3,750,000, which produces important quantities of cotton for export. Tanganyika contains about 9,000 Europeans, whose principal industry is that of sisal-growing for export, and 5,200,000 natives. The Government of Tanganyika is subject to the obligations of the "mandate" assumed by Great Britain as the protecting Power in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles; but as, apart from the obsolescent duty of making an annual report to the League of Nations, these obligations go no further than those by which Great Britain is otherwise bound by the Treaty of St. Germain en Laye, or which she in any case voluntarily assumes in her administration of native African territories, the distinction between the mandated territory and the other British protectorates may be neglected.

The mining industry of the East African group is, judged by South African standards, at best embryonic.

* *Ibid.*, p. 101.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF KENYA

THE internal problems of this group have a long and chequered history; and the territories concerned have enjoyed the benefit, or suffered the inconvenience, of a whole series of reports by commissions and committees too numerous to mention, too lengthy to attempt to summarize. At one time, in the second decade of this century, there was a movement on the part of the Kenya Europeans for an amalgamation which should also include Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; but it is now common ground that the destiny of these two countries, with their outlet to the sea at Beira, lies with the south and not with the north and east. There were difficulties, not easy of adjustment, between the conflicting aspirations of the European and Indian populations of Kenya, difficulties settled, if at all, on the footing of a white paper issued by the British Government in July 1923. This paper laid it down, in effect, that Kenya was primarily neither European nor Indian nor Indo-European, but African territory; and, using for the first time the term which has been productive of so much passion, asserted that the interests of the African natives must be "paramount" while qualifying the assertion with the condition that the interests of the other communities European, Indian, or Arab, must severally be safeguarded.

"In the administration of Kenya His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population, and they are unable to delegate or share this trust, the object of which may be defined as the protection and advancement of the native races."

No hope was held out of the grant of responsible government "within any period of time which need now be taken into consideration". Here, in substance, the position still stands. The European population has not been without a desire to share the burdens, and the powers, of the trusteeship which, as has been so clearly stated, have to be borne and exercised by their fellow countrymen at home; and there is a continuing demand for closer union between Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. In the management of the railway system serving the East African group, and in other administrative matters, such closer union has been in great measure effected; but political amalgamation or federation, if that be an object of policy, is still to seek. And the conjecture may be hazarded that, if it be effected in the future, the position and influence of the European settlers in Kenya are such that it will be on the basis of South African rather than of British Colonial Office doctrine.

III. THE SOMALILAND-ERITREA GROUP

OF the Somaliland-Eritrea group of the future it is difficult to say, or to predict, much at the present time since we do not yet know who is to be responsible for the future administration of a great part of it, though it is to be hoped that there will never be any question of the return of any of these territories to Italian hands, any more than there ever will be of any reversal of the condemnation which the course of the war has passed on Italian aggres-

sion in Abyssinia. Some civilized authority or other must have the long, and probably thankless, task of keeping order among a number of primitive, in some cases nomadic, and often turbulent tribes and of leading them on gradually to a higher state of life. And this task will have to be performed in close association with that of the Government of Ethiopia, while Great Britain will have the duty of affording to that Government the advice, help and guidance prescribed by the Agreement of January 31, 1942, or by any Treaty by which, as contemplated in its concluding Article, it may be replaced.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNION

WAR AND THE PROBLEM OF DEFENCE

ABOVE and beyond the local problems of the three groups of territories which we have been discussing lies the greater post-war problem, vague as yet in its outline but of the highest interest and importance, of what are to be the relations between the three and the Union of South Africa. That there will be such relations can hardly be doubted. The Union with its white population of over 2 millions and its native population of nearly 8 millions, the seat of by far the most important gold-mining industry in the world, is the one great focus of white civilization, power and wealth in Africa. It is no disparagement of the strenuous efforts and gallant courage of other communities to say that but for the Union the East African group of British territories, perhaps the Rhodesian as well, would have been unable to withstand the Italian occupants of Abyssinia with the help that they might have got from their German allies. As it was, Great Britain was for a time ejected from British Somaliland. As it is, it is the Italians who have been ejected from the whole of the territory which they had so wrongfully annexed, from the source of the Blue Nile and from all the surrounding territory; while still farther north the successful issue of the Egyptian and Libyan campaigns owes much to Union arms. It is not to be expected that after the war the Union will remain indifferent to problems which, if mishandled, may lead to her having again to undertake similar exertions.

The problem of defence from the Cape to the Sudan, perhaps even beyond that, is in truth all one; and neither the Limpopo, nor the Zambesi nor the Abyssinian mountains divide it into compartments. Even before the war the case of Northern Rhodesia which, when rioting broke out on the copper belt in 1935, borrowed armed help from Southern Rhodesia and was offered it from the Union, had shown, just as, before the Union existed, the case of Natal, which in 1906 accepted armed help from the Transvaal in the suppression of the Zulu rising of that year, had shown, that strife is no respecter of political boundaries. And quite lately the armed forces of Southern Rhodesia have, with the full and willing consent of her Government, been placed under the South African command. The various discordant fragments into which the Opposition in the Union of South Africa is broken, agreed only in this, that they anticipate or hope for a German victory, are indeed isolationist. But such myopia does not affect General Smuts, the philosopher

of "Holism"; nor did it affect the one-time Minister of Defence, Mr. Pirow, in his better days, before the disastrous fall from grace which has laid him down among the quislings. It was he who in 1935 offered his help to Northern Rhodesia, and in 1934 in a public speech foretold the formation of all British territory in Africa south of the Equator into two great federations linked with the Union in a common defence.

GENERAL SMUTS'S ATTITUDE

GENERAL SMUTS himself, while wisely avoiding questions of detail or of possible constitutional readjustments which it would be altogether premature to raise, has used language pointing to a greater South Africa, to a Pan-African ideal, and to larger human groupings; while his able lieutenant, Mr. Hofmeyr, has said that the war is going to bring about a radical change in the position of South Africa in relation to the continent of Africa.

It is not that General Smuts entertains any idea of the annexation, or incorporation in the Union, of Rhodesia or of any territory to the north of the Limpopo. He did indeed in 1922 make a very flattering offer to Southern Rhodesia for her addition to the Union as a fifth province; an offer which Southern Rhodesia rejected at a referendum by a majority of six to four, mainly from fear of preponderating Afrikaner influence. But that was more than twenty years ago, and much has happened since. It is probable that General Smuts would be greatly relieved if he could be assured that he would never again hear of such matters as bilingualism or national flags or anthems as matters of controversy; and he would hear a great deal about them if any question of annexation were raised. But it can hardly be doubted that his and others of the wisest minds in South Africa must be pondering the question of much closer co-operation in the future than has existed in the past between the Union and the British territories to the north of it. Such co-operation might take the form of constant and intimate consultation, or even of some very loose kind of federation, though it is almost impossible to-day even to imagine the kind of legal machinery which the latter might involve. In any case the co-operation must, it would seem, cover matters of defence, of relations with neighbouring colonial Powers, Belgium and Portugal, with Ethiopia, and in Somaliland, France: and, probably, the wider aspects of native policy, at least in so far as they have a bearing on problems of defence, internal and external. Evidently such co-operation will be easier, and the more convenient to conduct, if the units of co-operation are few and comparatively large combined groups rather than a large number of smaller and separate Colonies and Protectorates. That there are difficulties about such combinations has, it is hoped, already been sufficiently indicated; but the conclusion clearly emerges that there is in the problem briefly indicated at the head of this article material to engage the best thought which the British Government and Parliament, His Majesty's representatives in the parts of Africa concerned, and the Governments and peoples of those countries can give to it.

STRATEGY OF THE WAR. XIV

A TIME FOR SOBER CONFIDENCE

THE change in the course of the war during the past three months started so suddenly and dramatically that there is some temptation to exaggerate its extent. It is by no means certain that the Allied victories which began at the end of October 1942 should be compared to those which began in July 1918. The true comparison may well be with the Battle of the Marne, which was nearly four years distant from final triumph, rather than with the Foch-Haig-Pershing offensives which were distant only four months. But, whichever comparison proves to be accurate, even the less optimistic is encouraging enough, for it will be remembered that far-sighted German officers knew even after the Battle of the Marne that Germany must lose the war.

No harm can therefore be done by exercising caution in our estimates of the effect upon the enemy of this change of fortune. His material losses, for example, have been colossal, but perhaps not yet mortal. Up to the end of January we cannot be certain that he had lost, since the end of October, more than 850,000 men killed or captured in Russia and in Africa. About 350,000 of these were not Germans, but Rumanians, Italians, and Hungarians. The Germans themselves have lost in three months about one year's intake of recruits. From these figures, it may be concluded that the German Army itself has not yet been irreparably damaged, and that, if it could obtain a respite, it might be capable of carrying out the defensive strategy to which the German leaders are now committed. But will the respite be granted? After the liquidation of the predominantly German Army at Stalingrad which was completed on January 31, the prospects are that the Russian offensive will intensify rather than slacken. The Germans have now run short of satellites, their sacrifice of whom is a sardonic comment on their favourite gibe that the British make their allies do the fighting. They must use their own men. *Ventum est ad triarios.*

In terms of geography, caution dictates the reminder that the Russians have so far recovered most, but not all, of what they lost in 1942 (though their power to recover anything has been a bad shock to the enemy); and that the Allies have not yet got a single foothold in Europe. In short, the enemy's offensive strategy has been compulsorily ended; but his defensive strategy has not yet been seriously shaken. It is just as well to look at these things as he looks at them himself, because only then can we get a true bearing on the state of his morale. There is no reason whatever to believe that anything which has happened so far portends an early breaking-up of his will to fight. People fighting with nooses round their necks do not crack so easily; and that is the position in which the insensate brutality of the leaders of Germany has placed both themselves and a multitude of their agents. Nor can these victories portend the early cracking of Germany's

satellites. They are all occupied countries, whether technically independent or not. No doubt both Italy and Rumania, to whom the war has so far proved an unmitigated disaster, would like to slide out of it if they could. But they can't. Both Mussolini and Antonescu have staked their all on a German victory. Mussolini in particular has had 20 years in which to poison his people politically; and, without denying that masses of people in Italy are sick of the war, the fact remains that the Italian armies are fighting distinctly better now than they did at the beginning. Allied strategy therefore should take account of the fact that Germany's satellites are softer than Germany, but should not count upon their imitating Bulgaria in the last war. It is legitimate, however, to add that Hitler can no longer hope to get more good or even passable troops from his satellites. It is reported that all have refused to send new divisions to Russia. This refusal owes much to the horrible losses suffered there and to the fear that discipline would not survive the order to go, but much also to internal difficulties. Italy sees herself threatened with invasion from North Africa. Rumania and Hungary are at daggers drawn over Transylvania and neither is going to weaken herself relatively to the other.

Having thus damped down exhilaration, we can pass to the grounds for sober confidence. First and foremost comes the fact that the Allies can establish and have established air superiority simultaneously over all areas of active operations. It may take a little time, as it did in Tunisia, in any given instance, but it can be done without losing superiority elsewhere. The *Luftwaffe* used to be able to do this, but can do so no longer, so that we have established the first pre-requisite of land victory. We must not, however, leave out of account the possibility that the enemy is trying to reconstitute his Air Force during the winter for some big concentrated blow somewhere during the spring. A fair estimate of his losses between October and January inclusive on all fronts is 2,500 aircraft, of which about 700 have been transport machines. His losses, particularly in heavy bombers, have not been crippling, given his manufacturing and training resources. We may therefore have to meet a new air challenge in the spring.

EL ALAMEIN AND TUNIS

MEANWHILE the land victories which have been gained since the end of October are real victories, and all fit significantly into one strategic pattern. When the Eighth Army broke through at El Alamein and drove the enemy in rout 750 miles back to El Agheila, they did four things. In the first place they exploded the Rommel legend that the Afrika Corps was invincible and commanded by a new Napoleon. Rommel committed the elementary error of massing practically his whole strength in a wide but single defensive belt. It was therefore practically all destroyed, and he only got out a few thousand of his Germans thanks to the terrible weather which bogged the pursuit for three critical days and thanks to having appropriated for German use all the available Italian transport. Secondly the Eighth Army destroyed the legend of British inefficiency. It was magnificently equipped (though its supply line was 12,000 miles long); it was admirably handled by Generals

Alexander and Montgomery; its co-operation with its air power has never been equalled even by the Germans themselves; and the enemy was both out-generalled and out-fought. In the third place the El Alamein victory put the whole of the Middle East out of danger and made the reinforcement and supply of gallant Malta an easy operation instead of a series of forlorn hopes. The island has now become an offensive forward base instead of a precarious defensive outpost. Lastly, the victory gave vastly greater significance to the landings in French North Africa which it had been timed to precede. As the scale of the Eighth Army's victory became greater, it became more evidently one plate of a press—the Americans and the First Army being the other—designed to squeeze the Axis entirely out of the south shore of the Mediterranean.

It has not been easy to keep up the pressure. So soon as the Eighth Army had collected itself in front of the El Agheila positions, Rommel bolted, leaving his tracks littered with mine-fields and booby traps. At one moment it was hoped to catch a large part of his forces, for a motorized division, after a brilliant dash south-west and then north, was reported to have cut his army in two. The enemy units cut off, however, succeeded in breaking through with fairly heavy losses. There was no further chance of defeating the enemy's plan to retreat right into Tunisia and join the Axis bridgehead there. We could and did catch a few rearguards and inflict fairly heavy casualties from the air, but we could not prevent the main body from getting away. On the other hand, Rommel could not stop our advance anywhere short of Tunisia. He could not save a shred of Mussolini's Empire; and whatever the value of the troops which escaped into Tunisia, it was incomparably less than the value of the Eighth Army, with its seasoned and undamaged formations, its superb equipment, and above all its abundant supplies of petrol flowing along a difficult but safe route.

The bridgehead in Tunisia had been established to comprise Bizerta, Tunis, Sousse, Sfax and the whole Tunisian littoral. Some people seem surprised that the Allied landings could not keep up their momentum enough to get to these places first. The matter for legitimate astonishment is that they got so near them in the first rush. It is true that the French resistance was neither so general nor so tenacious as had been expected. Serious fighting lasted only three days, thanks to the adhesion of Admiral Darlan to the Allied cause and his acceptance by the American Commander-in-Chief. The decision to co-operate with the Admiral is one which must commend itself to the strategists, however irksome it may have seemed to the politicians. It saved precious time and precious lives, and it gave General Giraud—*persona grata* on every count—a chance to get on with the war. The murder of Darlan was not, as some people seemed to think, a solvent, but was, at least temporarily, an additional complication, though this is not the place to enter into the why and the how. Here it is only relevant to note that the French have already taken an indispensable hand in the southern sector of the Tunisian front, and that when General Giraud gets his promised equipment from America he will dispose of a formidable force. The Casablanca Conference did not fully achieve its subsidiary purpose of making

effective political peace between discordant French sections. General Giraud and General De Gaulle did, however, at their meeting arrange for military co-operation between their followers. From the point of view of war strategy, that is the important point; but from the point of view of France after the war, it is clearly not the only important point.

The African campaigns must also be assessed from the standpoint of the proclaimed intention to take some of the weight off the Russians. They have distracted considerable additional Axis forces, and have notably increased the strain on the *Luftwaffe*, which has had to fight hard in Tunisia as well as to ferry reinforcements. They compelled the Germans to occupy the whole of France and probably to reinforce their troops in Italy. On the whole, however, they have not been the kind of "second front" which users of that phrase must have in mind if it is not meaningless. They are not, in fact, the kind of land front in the West which sets the enemy a serious puzzle about how to distribute and to switch his forces between East and West. We may indeed hope that any forces the enemy sends to Africa are doomed to fairly early and complete destruction, but we cannot claim that they are or can be on so large a scale as seriously to embarrass him in the East. Their potentialities are, in the strategic sense, more valuable than their actualities.

THE RUSSIAN VICTORIES

FORTUNATELY the enemy has embarrassments enough in the East without immediate and substantial diversions in the West. There are great and gratifying differences between the Russian offensives this year and last. Last year there were no prisoners worth mentioning. This year the Russians took 200,000 prisoners in the first two months of their attack. Last year the Germans lost none of their bases. This year dozens (Kotelnikovo, Millerovo, Tsimiliansk, Velikie Luki, &c.) have fallen, and there is no saying when the list of collapsed hedgehogs will close. Last year the Russian attack was on a single sector and designed to save a single city—Moscow. This year the Russians launched six successive, powerful and co-ordinated offensives—at Stalingrad; at Rzhev; on the Middle Don; in the Kalmuck Steppes and Central Caucasus; south of Voronezh; and around Leningrad—designed to save whole provinces, though some of them may be no more than holding offensives to draw off the enemy's reserves. The scale and diversity of their offensives have astonished friends and enemies alike. To organize them over inferior lines of communication, and to supply them after so many centres of war industry had been overrun, have been remarkable feats. No doubt supplies from Allied countries have helped, but most of the stuff of these offensives has been Russian stuff.

How far will these offensives go? Without any doubt the Germans made the capital mistake of thinking that they could block them fairly far forward as they did block the offensive last year. The failure of history to repeat itself has been disastrous for them. It has cost them the whole of their Sixth Army outside Stalingrad, which they vainly hoped could hold out with the aid of air-borne supplies until relieved by a counter-offensive. When

compelled to leave that Army to its fate, their next plan seems to have been to hold firm from Voronezh to Rostov, while withdrawing their Caucasus armies to the line Rostov-Maikop-Novorossisk. That would have given them a line backed by numerous railways and a port on the Black Sea. But it seems at the time of writing as though the hinge of the whole plan, namely, to hold between Voronezh and Rostov, would break, or that the Russian armies advancing through Tikhoresk would disrupt the retreat from the Caucasus. This is becoming suspiciously like the practice of counting our chickens before they are hatched, against which a warning was uttered at the beginning of this article. It is not, however, contradictory to observe that the chickens can already be heard pecking at the inside of their shells. On the southern part of the Russian front a big strategic victory, as distinct from merely a magnificent rally, is in the air.

Farther north, in the Rzhev-Velikie Luki sector, the enemy's embarrassment is revealed by his concealment of the capture of the latter fortress. On the other hand he still holds Rzhev itself, or some of it; and it is quite premature to talk of a threat to Smolensk. The Russian offensive here seems indeed to have been designed mainly to pin down his reserves, which it has amply succeeded in doing. The chief military commentator in Berlin, General Diethmar, followed a prolonged period of silence about the Russian battles by an astonishing revelation that the Germans find themselves short of man-power. When it is remembered that the Germans have between five and six million foreigners working in Germany and many millions more working for Germany in occupied countries, General Diethmar's outburst amounts to a confession that the Russian claims about German casualties are not, after all, very wide of the mark. Moreover other commentators, including Goebbels himself, have raised an extremely gloomy chorus about the Eastern front. The Russians, they say, have everywhere numerical superiority. The whole of occupied Russia is more or less of a battle-field, thanks to the "partisans". The Russian fire is terrific and the cold unendurable. It is just possible that these moans are the cover for the preparation of some big counter-attack; but the more likely explanation is that Goebbels is making the best of a bad job. Not even he can prevent the truth leaking out through hundreds of thousands of wounded, through their families, and through the families of the killed and missing; and he may think it best to divert attention towards the heroism of the Army in spite of all handicaps.

The victory which has had probably the greatest psychological effect has been left to the last. It is the raising of the siege of Leningrad, surrounded except for the access by Lake Ladoga for the past 16 months. The ring was broken on January 12 by attacks from outside starting from Volkhov and coinciding with a fierce sortie by the garrison. To the Russians this victory means little less than did the saving of Moscow last year. It is a signal proof that their tenacity has not been in vain. It means almost certainly that the Germans will have to clear out of another big salient, and it must shake Marshal Mannerheim, who has kept the unhappy Finns in the war, to the very core.

BOMBERS AND U-BOATS

ONE measure of the strategic improvement in the German war is that so much less has been heard of the R.A.F. bombing offensive in the West, which was for so long the only active help we could give our Allies. Other important and dramatic moves have had the first call on public attention. The lull in this offensive has seemed disappointing, because of the exaggerated publicity given to the 1,000-bomber raids and the large threats of ceaseless bombing uttered by those who would have been wiser not to count their eggs before they were dropped. In the preceding article in this series the possible defects of this strategic instrument were listed. One of them—unfavourable weather—has been actual. There have, however, been a series of very heavy raids on Italian cities in support of the North African campaign; and two highly successful raids on Berlin in mid-January provoked the enemy into feeble and costly attempts at retaliation. It would be as foolish to say that this bombing has been, or could by itself be, decisive as to say that it has been, or will be, ineffective. If less vast claims had been made for it in some quarters, its true value would be better appreciated. For example, no strategic forecast can leave out of account the enormous power of the American Air Force, still substantially in reserve; the cumulative effect of persistent attacks on enemy-used railways to the Channel coast and of a whole series of small night raids on the Ruhr; and last, but not least, the contribution of aircraft to the battle against the U-boats.

Victory in that battle remains Hitler's chief hope, and it remains in the balance. The present position is that we are not sinking as many U-boats as he builds, and he is not sinking as many ships as we build. The strain on the Navy for escort duties is therefore still increasing. Apart from the idea of building faster ships—a kind of cargo warships, now much canvassed; or increasing the number of escort vessels; or improving anti-submarine tactics; it is clear that our best chance of an early success would be to throw the Axis out of North Africa and make the Mediterranean safe for convoys under continuous fighter protection. That would save the long haul round the Cape to the Middle East, India and Russia via the Persian Gulf; and the shorter distances to be travelled have been estimated to be equivalent to a saving of two million tons of shipping. Even this, however, would be no substitute for a more rapid rate of destruction of U-boats. The enemy has more than quadrupled the number in commission at the outbreak of war; and it has been estimated that he has about 100 operating in the Atlantic zone at any one time. They are probably now pre-fabricated inland, as Mr. Kaiser pre-fabricates his merchant ships in the United States, and that is why air attacks on U-boat bases, yards and factories have had so little effect on output. Uneasiness about the U-boat outlook is better justified than about any other aspect of the war, and General Smuts was, as usual, right to single out the U-boat menace as the only possible preventive of victory. It stands out the more starkly because the air menace to our shipping has been so largely overcome.

THE WAR IN THE EAST

THE warning against over-optimism applies as much to the Japanese war as to the German war. Nothing can detract from the splendour of the operations by which, at the end of January, the Australians and Americans had practically cleared the enemy from Papua. The troops engaged overcame the handicaps of a terrible climate and terrain, and of an enemy who fought to the last man. The Japanese attempts to relieve their garrisons were extremely costly, and their ships proved no less vulnerable to air attack than our own. These operations put permanently out of action some 20,000 men and perhaps 150,000 tons of shipping in four months. The figures show that the fighting, though significant as the first Japanese recoil and as affording relief from the fear of invasion or isolation to Australia, has been an affair of outposts in the general picture of the war. The same features emerge from the fighting on Guadalcanal, where the Americans have held and extended a bridgehead, and inflicted heavy losses on relieving convoys, but have been unable to clear the whole island. In India Field-Marshal Wavell's Army has started an advance on Akyab, which is a stepping-stone to Rangoon, and thus an introduction to the only strategy which can clear the enemy from Burma. Given the broken and almost roadless nature of the country between Assam and Burma, it seems clear that the reconquest of the latter must begin with a coastal operation, and follow much the same line as the Japanese conquest. The same tenacious resistance has been encountered as in the Pacific. The Japanese are probably devoting their main effort to consolidating and exploiting their gains made in the first six months of their war; and Mr. Curtin has lent colour to this explanation by pointing out that the longer a really strong counter-offensive is delayed, the more difficult and costly it will be to expel the Japanese. That may be true, but it does not necessarily follow that a strong counter-offensive must everywhere push the Japanese back along the lines of their original advance. For example, Mr. Roosevelt in his message to Congress on January 8 foretold the heavy bombing of Japan herself, and gave production figures in the United States for 1942 which encourage the hope that a strong counter-offensive will not have to await victory in the German war. Again, a feature of air-fighting both in the East and in the West has been the heavy casualties inflicted by unescorted Flying Fortresses upon enemy fighters. If this type of machine has really solved the problem of the long-distance unescorted daylight raid, it is a poor look-out for Germany, and a worse look-out for Japan.

No better forecast for 1943 can be made than that contained in President Roosevelt's speech. The tone may have been influenced by the fact that he was facing a potentially critical Congress, but the substance was remarkably objective. He said that this year should see a long step forward on the roads leading to Berlin, Rome and Tokyo; and he based this forecast on the facts that both the Axis and Japan have been driven to the defensive, outstripped in war production, and balked of their main objectives. Perhaps one other modifying consideration, besides the U-boat danger, should be

mentioned. Owing to the inevitable limitations of population, the bulk of the land armies will have to be furnished by the Russians (already in action) and by the Americans. We ourselves are likely to be hard pushed to find the men and women for our huge war production, air and sea efforts, and an army substantial indeed but not comparable in size to the numbers of the armies of our Allies. It is therefore pertinent to remember that most of our men and all the Americans will be raw troops, however indisputable their courage and extensive their training. This tells, curiously enough, more on the Q or supply side than on the G or operations side. We shall both have to learn a great deal. The deduction once again is that the sooner the North African venture is completed the better. That will give us a fine nucleus of battle-ried troops and supply services for the next step, wherever that may be taken. This war will not end until in the West as in the East the Allies have met and beaten the German Army. It will still take a lot of doing. Reinforcing a front on the territory of a powerful Ally (which was the Anglo-American job last time) is a very different task from making a front in a Europe where our friends are totally disarmed and have been both persecuted and starved for three years. Supplying fronts overseas and the home front in face of a U-boat campaign, even such as that of 1917, was an easier task than to do the same thing in face of the U-boat campaign of 1943. These are the factors which should preclude jubilation, even though the change in the general course of the war has been astonishingly in our favour.

One word in conclusion about the Casablanca Conference, where President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, and the Anglo-American military leaders met to draw up the strategy of the Western Allies for 1943 and beyond. The absence of Premier Stalin has been the subject of comment; but his presence would really have been more symbolic than practical. To put the matter very simply, the aim of the Conference was to plan an offensive in the West on the assumption of a continued offensive in the East. It is common ground that on both fronts the Allies will go all out all the year. The uncertain factor is when and where the attack will develop in the West. This was settled by the Conference; Stalin was informed, and the Russians now know on what they can count in 1943. Hardly less important than Casablanca was the meeting held immediately afterwards at Adana in Turkey between the Prime Minister and British military chiefs on the one hand and the Turkish President with his military advisers on the other. The fact that such a meeting could be held is the most eloquent tribute to the dimming of the Axis star. It is a warning to the Axis not to try any nonsense in Turkey and an assurance that, if they do, Turkey will be well equipped and swiftly supported by the Allies. The whole of the Near East is now safe. The Axis dream of linking up with Japan has vanished. It remains for the Allies to gain the victory which Turkey is now obviously sure they will gain.

February 1, 1943.

INDIA

I. POLITICAL

THE first news of Allied military successes has been received by political India with mixed feelings. On the one hand there was relief that the danger of invasion was receding, perhaps for good. On the other hand there was evident chagrin that the turn of the tide had come before India had succeeded in turning the war to political account in fact as well as on paper. What Britain had been prepared to do—against her own interests, as Mr. Rajagopalachari admitted—in time of danger and difficulty, the British might not, Indians began to think, be so willing to do when victorious over the Axis. Also it did not give Indians any comfort to reflect that the great political parties had conspicuously failed to do anything to create in Britain a sense of gratitude which might be expected to evoke generosity, nor played that part in the war which would entitle them to a serious hearing at the peace conference. These tremors of an uneasy conscience are reflected in Indian comment on Mr. Churchill's Mansion House speech delivered on the morrow of the successful battle of Egypt. The Prime Minister's promise that Britain would hold her Empire was, political India affected to believe, the writing on the wall for India.

However, the effect of the Allied victories and Mr. Churchill's reaction to them was on the whole salutary, strengthening the voice of reason. It began to be appreciated that, as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Government, agitation of the Congress brand was a declining force. So, for the first time, one read in Nationalist newspapers adjurations to the Congress leaders to appreciate the fact that their method had failed, and to try some other tack. These doubtless reached Mr. Gandhi and the Working Committee in their places of detention, but with what effect can only be speculated. Outside the Congress, the doughty Mr. Rajagopalachari, taking grave risks with his political future, struggled hard to persuade the Hindu leaders that Pakistan was not as bad as it sounded, and was worth conceding in principle for the sake of getting a National Government to see India through the post-war problems and the peace conference. His only achievement was to irritate many of his Hindu fellow-countrymen with proposals which, from what is known of them, would probably have fallen far short of satisfying the Muslim League. Mr. Rajagopalachari, it is true, was not in a position to discuss his proposals with Mr. Gandhi and the Congress leaders, but there is no reason to suppose that this made much difference.

The Congress party, during the period under review, has continued in a state of more or less violent revolt against the Government, but with diminishing returns. There were some rebel bands still active in north Bihar. Terrorist gangs perpetrated a number of bomb outrages—in Bombay province three rather serious ones towards the end of the year—and were responsible also for attempts to damage communications and war industries.

Illegal leaflets, circulated under the name of the All-India Congress Committee, incited to sabotage of food supplies as well as of industrial installations, the peasants being urged to withhold the sale of food crops to provision shops and to hide their grain where the police could not find it. It is doubtful, however, whether the leaflets had a large circulation. This activity was directed by various underground organizations in which the socialist wing of the Congress party plays a large part. They are, however, being cleaned up satisfactorily, and in general their agitation is not felt as anything much worse than pin-pricks.

MR. RAJAGOPALACHARI'S EFFORTS

SPACE does not permit of a full chronological report of all that has taken place in the field of legal political activity. Looking at the broad picture, one would say that the chief feature was two efforts by Mr. Rajagopalachari to obtain a sufficient measure of inter-party agreement to give some reality to the demand on Britain for a Provisional National Government. This Government was to enjoy full powers subject only to the reservation of the Commander-in-Chief's functions and the direction of Allied war strategy. That is to say, whereas the Cripps scheme had envisaged an all-parties Government on the basis of the existing constitution, Mr. Rajagopalachari and his friends thought in terms of a Government outside the existing constitution. This would be all very well for the Hindus who are in a majority. The Muslims and other minorities saw the matter in a different light. They were being asked, for the sake of an independence that would be exercised primarily by Hindus, to give up their constitutional safeguards. What guarantees had Mr. Rajagopalachari to offer them in return? Whatever Government was formed now was bound, they argued, to have a good deal to say in shaping a permanent post-war settlement—a settlement which envisaged an independent India in which there would be no British balancing element. The whole future of the minorities was at stake and, much as they wanted to see India ruled by its own National Government, they preferred not to change the present situation unless they were given what they regarded as an adequate share of power to enable them to hold their own, or until there was some understanding as to the principles of a permanent settlement.

Mr. Rajagopalachari's first effort to deal with this problem was by the numerical adjustment of seats in the Central Government in favour of the minorities—or rather of one of the minorities. While his Provisional Government would have been responsible to a Hindu-dominated Central Legislature, Mr. Jinnah was to be invited to nominate as many Ministers as he pleased to the Government, while Congress were to be limited to five and the other minorities to three. Under this scheme Pakistan would be put in cold storage but not prejudiced. The Muslims would have none of it. They foresaw that, in the event of the Hindu-dominated Legislature quarrelling with the Government, which would not be of the same complexion as the Legislature, there would be the strongest pressure put upon the Viceroy to invite the largest single party, meaning Congress, to take over the Government. But Hindu opinion also repudiated Mr. Rajagopalachari. As one

newspaper said, Mr. Rajagopalachari was being more generous than just towards the Muslims, and justice was a better basis than generosity for constitution making.

Mr. Rajagopalachari had thought of proceeding to England to canvas support for his scheme, but in view of the unfavourable reaction in India, he changed his mind and tried another tack. He took counsel with Mr. Jinnah, and, on the ground, as he afterwards told newspaper men, that his talks with the Muslim leader had convinced him that there were possibilities of a settlement, asked the Viceroy for permission to see Mr. Gandhi. The Government of India's refusal was much criticized in public at the time. In private, however, there was, particularly among Hindu politicians, a good deal of approval. Mr. Rajagopalachari did not say what kind of proposals he wanted to take to Mr. Gandhi, but it soon leaked out that he was ready to concede to Mr. Jinnah the principle of Muslim self-determination. He had admitted to the Viceroy that he spoke only for himself. This turned out to be true enough. The Hindu press would have none of him. Even Mr. Jinnah, who stood to gain something, was not helpful. So the Government need not apologize for their decision. Apart from the inexpediency, from the point of view of law and order, of making what would have appeared to be concessions to Congress, they found their judgment confirmed that Mr. Rajagopalachari's mission would have created more in the way of political unsettlement than settlement. While Congress policy remains unchanged the Government cannot give facilities for interviews without reawakening all the alarm in the breasts of the minorities which was evoked by the Congress quit-India campaign.

THE ALLAHABAD CONFERENCE

MR. RAJAGOPALACHARI, disappointed but not dismayed, then proceeded to do what he should have done earlier. He moved Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to invite representatives of all the Hindu parties except Congress to a conference at Allahabad in December. The object was to persuade them to offer, in principle, Pakistan to Mr. Jinnah. When asked what Pakistan would mean in practice, Mr. Rajagopalachari appears to have explained that Muslim sovereignty would be confined to the contiguous area where Muslims had a majority. That means, presumably, that half of the Punjab would be excluded from Pakistan, which conflicts with the claims to the whole province that Mr. Jinnah upheld during his visit to the Punjab in November. Secondly, Mr. Rajagopalachari is believed to have urged that the existence of one or more Muslim States need not be any greater bar to the centralized conduct of all-India affairs than the Princely States are to-day. There Mr. Rajagopalachari is probably nearer to Mr. Jinnah, although the status the latter envisages for his Pakistan—that of a Dominion or Dominions—is rather different from that of the Princely States of India. When the conference broke up it was given out that there would probably be an approach to Mr. Jinnah after the delegates had consulted their constituents. They had not long parted, however, when the Hindu Mahasabha, meeting at Cawnpore,

blew the whole thing to pieces. That ended the present phase of conciliation in Indian politics. Nobody sees what is to be done next.

The attitude of the Government of India throughout has been perfectly simple. Their primary concern is the efficient conduct of the war and, although sympathetic towards any effort to bring about party unity, they are not prepared to encourage schemes which do not promise to produce a Government that is of a representative character, has administrative capacity, and looks like being able to maintain communal peace. The present Government, whatever its shortcomings, meets these requirements. India may or may not have escaped the danger of being invaded, but a great offensive against Japan has still to be mounted from this country. If the Government's reluctance to concur in any political scheme without regard to its reactions on the war effort lays them open to the charge of unwillingness to part with power, then doubtless they must plead guilty.

It cannot seriously be pretended that British and American opinion would not welcome an opportunity of changing a situation in which the Government must conduct the war against the opposition, or in spite of the non-co-operation, of the greatest of the political parties. This opportunity they have not been given. Basing his views on the happenings of previous months, the Viceroy, than whom there is no shrewder observer of Indian affairs, told Indians in the course of a speech in Calcutta in December that, so far from the troubles of India being due to Britain's refusal to part with power, they were due to Britain's expressed readiness to part with power.

"It is because," he said, "agreement cannot be reached between conflicting interests in this country as to who is to take over the responsibilities which Britain is only too ready to transfer to Indian hands that the deadlock has arisen."

The Viceroy took the opportunity also of reminding Indians that consideration of the conditions in which the various communities were to live together inside an independent India should not be divorced from the question of the conditions in which they were to live *vis-à-vis* the outside world. The desirability of preserving Indian unity could not be doubted by anyone who tested the proposition in terms of foreign policy, tariff policy, defence, and industrial development. In this connection the Viceroy called attention to the merits of the federal scheme of the 1935 Act. This represented a measure of agreement between the communities and parties, between British India and the States, which had not since been improved upon. It would have given India a Government, representative and authoritative, covering the whole or almost the whole of India, composed of persons of the highest standing in the country, able to speak with authority and general support.

II. MILITARY

THE end of the monsoon had been awaited with some trepidation in India. In the spring of 1942 British and Indian forces, fighting in Burma under the command of General Hutton and General Alexander successively, had kept the Japanese away from India's frontiers until the rains came, and the air attack on Ceylon launched from Japanese aircraft carriers, which might have

been the prelude to invasion, was satisfactorily dealt with by the air force in Ceylon. The question was, would the return of fine weather bring the resumption of the Japanese offensive eastward from Burma to India?

The answer, to everyone's satisfaction, turned out to be in the negative. Two factors contributed to this. The first was that the summer had given the Indian army command the time needed for the reinforcement and strengthening of India's land and air defences on a formidable scale. The second was that the Japanese losses in ships and aircraft in the south-west Pacific apparently imposed on them a defensive strategy in Burma, more particularly in view of the strength of the opposition which, they appreciated, an invasion would have encountered. By late autumn the Indian army was even able to pass to the offensive, although on a limited scale, on the ground as well as in the air. The air forces, both British and American, had in fact kept up offensive operations throughout the monsoon, and one got the impression from the communiqués that the weight of their attacks was steadily increasing, while Japanese air strength was not very great. So that there was one frontier about which India—barring a general Japanese "comeback"—did not, it was thought, need to have much anxiety; and when the Eighth Army and the Russians between them removed the menace to India's left flank, confidence in India bounded. The bombing raids, which began in Christmas week, left this feeling of security unaffected. The raids were regarded as a confirmation of the view that the Japanese were on the defensive, rather than contradicting it. The raids were very light, and Calcutta stood up to them better than had been expected.

It is hoped, naturally, to have the Japanese out of Burma before they have aircraft to spare for severer raids. That is not to say that much is expected from the present ground campaign, which is being conducted along the coastal strip of Burma. This looks like a harassing operation in which the army's intention, apparently, is to advance as far as possible without investing too much in the way of troops or material in the business. The territory which may be taken is not regarded as very valuable, either to the British or to the Japanese, but already the Indian army's advance has deprived the enemy of ground on which it would have been practicable for the Japanese to lay out advanced landing-fields for air attack on the industrial heart of India. Also the further our troops get towards Akyab the less useful does Akyab, the most forward Japanese aerodrome, become as a base of operations across the Bay of Bengal against India. At present the small British and Indian forces operating in this Arakhan front, as it is called, are held up by the Japanese at Rathedaung on the Arakhan peninsula, and at Donbaik, a coastal village on the Mayu peninsula. The Japanese are holding out with the same stubbornness as they have shown in New Guinea, but with this difference, that in Arakhan they are probably still able to get reinforcements by water-ways from Akyab. From the main Japanese forces in the interior of Burma they are cut off by the Arakhan mountains, which, with the Kaledan river, protect the Indian army's flank. There is, however, a trail across the mountains from Pakokku, the Japanese base in the interior, to the Kaledan river somewhere near Kyauktaw village, recently announced as having been occupied by the

Indian army. To what extent it is possible for the Japanese to send troops and supplies along this trail and to get them across the river is not known. The whole thing is not of very much importance except that an inconclusive issue to the operations would, or might, have reactions on public confidence in India, which tends to measure the worth of British arms by successes scored against the Japanese—in any event the nearer enemy—rather than against the Germans and Italians.

III. ECONOMIC

Food rather than politics was the chief preoccupation of the Government of India during the last three months of the year. Local shortages, generally attributed to transport difficulties, particularly of grains and sugar, had been remarked in the late summer, but did not give cause for alarm. By November and December, however, the Government had to face the fact that there was an acute shortage of food-grains in most industrial areas, which was already causing industrial unrest and might well, unless remedied, have a paralysing effect on Indian war industry.

The position statistically is, roughly, that the amount of food-grains in India is not much less than the average amount, including imported Burma rice, that there was in the country during the last of the three pre-war years. In fact the statistical position was better than in five out of ten previous years. But, comforting though it was to know that the grain was probably there, it was also a fact that it was not getting to the markets and provision shops. The Government, after scratching their heads a good deal, finally diagnosed the situation as a crisis of confidence, leading to the paralysis of stocks, aggravated by the statutory control of the price of wheat, but not of other grains, at which the Punjab growers, on whom India is dependent for its wheat, were aggrieved, and the multitude of controls, not always well co-ordinated, exercised by the Central, Provincial and State Governments on the movement and distribution of food-grains. (In parenthesis it may be mentioned that the food crisis has impressed on many people the disadvantages of provincial autonomy without a federal Government at the centre.) The reasons for the collapse of confidence are many. It probably began with the interruption of supply in a number of districts last autumn, due to military demands on transport and to Congress interference with communications. Then there was the fear of invasion, the influx of refugees from Burma, reports of the loss of crops through floods and cyclones, and the failure of the season in parts of Bombay and elsewhere. Apprehensions on these accounts tempted both cultivators and consumers to build up reserves, and the inflationary trend of prices generally encouraged speculative holding. As for those key people, the Punjab wheat-growers, they simply would not part with their wheat at five rupees a maund (about 40 lb.) while the growers of other grains were being allowed to make as much money as they liked. After all, they said, when the price of wheat goes low nobody thinks of fixing a minimum price. Until they do, do not speak to us about maximum prices. The Punjab Government professed its willingness to co-operate with the

Central Government in getting wheat to market at the controlled price, but it pointed out the practical difficulties in the way of extracting it forcibly from every cultivator's barn. In any case the families of the Punjab farmers are the backbone of the army, and their sons and brothers with the forces both at home and overseas might not like to hear that such summary treatment had been given to the folks at home.

THE GOVERNMENT'S PLANS

THE first inclination of the Government was the extension of price control to other grains. They were worried about the inflationary effects of rising food prices. There were, however, several difficulties in the way. First, there is no organized market for grains other than wheat. Secondly, the Indian members of the Government of India are mostly men with very conservative views on the subject of government interference in private enterprise. Thirdly, there is no federal machinery for making laws and enforcing them, which means roughly that the States and Provinces tend to follow the directions of the Central Government only when it suits their own particular interests.

Finally the Government hit upon a policy which was received with acclamation by everyone except the spokesmen of labour, who were apprehensive of its effects on the cost of living. Arrangements were made with His Majesty's Government for substantial imports over the next two or three months—that is to say, to help tide over the period until the next harvest, which is expected to be a bumper one, is reaped. Secondly, the maximum price for wheat was cancelled and a free market restored. This, it is hoped, will bring out the surpluses of the Punjab farmers—at what price one cannot yet be certain. It is hoped, however, that the price will settle down round about seven or eight rupees per maund. Further, government agencies operating under the control of the Provincial and State Governments will buy the surplus grain in surplus areas for the supply of deficit areas and the defence forces. These agencies will have a monopoly of export over the Provincial and State frontiers, and exported grain will remain under Government surveillance until it reaches the frontiers of the needy Provinces, where it will be taken over by the importing Governments. By means of these measures the Government hope to achieve two things—to restore confidence by bringing an adequate flow of grain to the markets and to maintain some control over prices by eliminating competition in the exporting areas and by reducing the opportunities for hoarding.

India,

January 1943.

GREAT BRITAIN

THREE GOOD MONTHS

THESE have been the first three months of almost consistently good news, and the people of this country have avoided what might have been their greatest peril in the fourth year of war—over-optimism. True, there are many who speculate how soon Germany may be defeated; but the general attitude is to recognize Mr. Churchill's wisdom when he spoke about "the end of the beginning". Everyone realizes that the war against Japan may be much longer drawn out, and that this country must steel itself to see that through to a finish as decisively as the Americans, the Australians and the Chinese. One of our hopes is that reciprocal Lease-Lend, already considerable, may come into its own then.

TWO DOMINATING NAMES

THROUGHOUT December two entirely different names dominated our thoughts and our talk—Beveridge and Darlan. The House of Commons went into secret session about the Darlan affair on December 10, and presumably learnt much of which the rest of us had to remain in ignorance. One of the deepest characteristics of the British electorate, which no Government can ignore in conducting world affairs nor any Member of Parliament in handling his constituency, is a simple and stolid, maybe unenlightened, morality. For two years it had been taught to regard General de Gaulle as the brave upholder of all that was good in France, and Admiral Darlan as a Vichy craven. When the time came, it could not stomach recognizing the latter and slighting (as it thought) the former.

Sir William Beveridge, whose report was published on December 1, had the enjoyable experience of moving towards the opposite pole of popularity. Everything fell out right for him in the timing, for the British victory over Rommel and the Anglo-American landings in North Africa had relieved war tension and at last brought presage of victory one day. Minds sprang forward to seize on dreams of after-the-war; and at that moment came the Beveridge report to give part of these dreams a concrete shape. It was unlucky, however, for Sir William Jowitt, the Minister principally charged with reconstruction work, that its publication exactly coincided with and overshadowed his first speech giving to the Commons an account of his stewardship. In this important, if somewhat indecisive, pronouncement he officially forecast several years of very good employment after the war, during which we ought to have the time to perfect our plans for keeping British industry and employment at a high and stable level. He emphasized the necessity of making sure that primary producers continued to receive fair and remunerative prices, and looked forward to deliberately planned schemes of public works for countering incipient slumps. Demobilization plans, he said, would be based

on age combined with length of service. Tremendous housing needs would then have to be met, and their fulfilment would greatly help to restart and to stabilize peace-time industry. One of his few announcements of definite news value was that the Government had decided to put into effect a really vigorous forestry policy after the war, so that this country, than which none in the world is said to be more suitable for growing timber, would make its proper contribution to the avoidance of a world timber shortage, repeatedly prophesied by experts unless counter-measures are taken in time.

CARE OF THE DISABLED

A SPECIALLY valuable contribution on one problem of the post-war world, which nobody would say it was too early to think about, has been made by an official committee on the rehabilitation and resettlement of disabled persons, presided over by one of the most popular and promising of Labour M.P.s, Mr. George Tomlinson, who at present holds the office of Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour. Since the last war we have had in operation a scheme whereby employers who voluntarily undertook that 5 per cent of the total staff they engaged would be disabled ex-service men were admitted to the King's Roll, and qualified not only for that public distinction but also for a preference in the awarding of Government contracts. The Tomlinson committee takes the view that after this war voluntary arrangements will no longer suffice. In addition, therefore, to comprehensive medical and reconditioning proposals, it recommends a statutory obligation on all employers to engage a quota of disabled persons (the percentage possibly varying for different industries) and the reserving of certain suitable occupations for disabled persons alone. A novel feature is that, in the judgment of the committee, these special services and arrangements should not be confined to ex-service men, but should apply to the whole population—juvenile and adult alike—regardless of the cause of disablement. The committee cogently argues that "as disablement represents a double loss to the community—a reduction of the total productive capacity and an increase in the cost of maintenance and remedial services—the restoration of the disabled person to productive employment will be an economic advantage".

PHYSICAL RECONSTRUCTION

WAR-TIME affords an exceptional opportunity for getting things done which, during peace, arouse such sharp and apparently irreconcilable controversy as to lead too often to the pigeon-hole solution. The depopulation of the Highlands of Scotland has been for decades a national weakness and sadness. One of the obvious remedial measures has been the provision of cheap electricity, for generating which there is ample water-power available. But fears have persisted that to grant powers for large-scale hydro-electric development in so lovely and unspoiled a land to any private company might start a chain of consequences which would lead to all kinds of unforeseeable but, by that time, irremediable results. Accordingly Parliament over the last 15 years, without having any positive policy of its own, has thrown out

a series of private Bills promoted to authorize the generation and distribution of electricity from Highland water-power. At long last, in 1941, the Government appointed a committee under Lord Cooper's chairmanship to recommend a policy. On the basis of its recently presented report Parliament is being asked to approve a Government Bill for the establishment of a "public service corporation" of five appointed members to undertake hydro-electric development in the Highlands, to collaborate in measures for economic development and social improvement there, and at the same time to have regard to preserving the beauty of the scenery and avoiding injury to the fisheries. The Bill is a piece of strictly localized socialism, and at this stage of affairs is probably the only means of progress out of an old slough of shilly-shally which does little credit to anyone. It may afford a test case of the degree of efficiency which a public utility corporation controlled by nominated persons, and not working for profit, can attain.

A much wider field is opened up by the recent decision to create a new Ministry of Town and Country Planning. Before the war, town and country planning powers were exercisable by local authorities, under the eye of the Ministry of Health. There was almost universal agreement that this policy of leaving local authorities to take the initiative resulted in the rate of progress being intolerably slow. There are few left who would question the truth of Sir William Jowitt's dictum, in introducing the Bill, that "if town and country planning is to be a reality, it will require the whole-time services of a front-rank Minister". The Bill was criticized only for its omissions. We now have a machine, but still no policy. The new Minister is to work out and present the policy. That was just what Parliament was told when it was asked to transform the Ministry of Works and Buildings into the Ministry of Works and Planning (now stripped down to plain Ministry of Works) early last year. Let us hope that he will manage it in good time, and be brave about it, for the country does not intend to endure a second post-war outbreak of ribbon-building, bungaloid development, and commercial defilement of coastal and inland beauty.

MINISTERIAL CHANGES

THIS new Ministry in part occasioned the second of two sets of changes which Mr. Churchill has made in his Government. It was recorded in the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE** that Sir Stafford Cripps, who returned from Moscow a year ago in an aura of popularity and high political hopes, was making heavy weather with the Leadership of the House of Commons. At the end of November the Prime Minister appointed him to the totally unexpected post of Minister of Aircraft Production, which entailed his losing his seat in the War Cabinet. Possibly as a result, there have been recent indications of his desire to make up his pre-war quarrel with the Left. But he can never be one of them, for the intellectual gulf is too great; and he is a legal, but not a political, genius. His predecessor in Aircraft Production, Colonel J. J. Llewellyn, who won the warm approbation of Lord Beaver-

* No. 129, December 1942, p. 64.

brook when he was his Parliamentary Secretary, was sent to Washington to fill a never satisfactorily explained or defined post as Minister Resident there. Mr. Eden, remaining Foreign Secretary and a member of the War Cabinet, was made Leader of the House of Commons at the age of 45, a tricky task which he has so far discharged without disaster and indeed with growing confidence. Colonel Oliver Stanley, the last Secretary of State for War under Mr. Chamberlain, who refused a post offered to him when Mr. Churchill's Government was formed and has been serving meanwhile in the Army, has returned to office as Colonial Secretary; he is one of the ablest debaters in the House, and a Government without him is proportionately weakened. Lord Cranborne, whose departure from the Colonial Office was universally regretted on personal grounds, succeeded Sir Stafford Cripps as Lord Privy Seal, with access to but without membership of the War Cabinet. The Labour party's claim to three seats in that body was preserved by raising to War Cabinet rank Mr. Herbert Morrison, Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, in that dual capacity already carrying an impossible departmental burden. So little store do our present rulers set by the successful invention by Mr. Lloyd George (who celebrated his eightieth birthday on January 17) of a War Cabinet unhampered by departmental duties; so greatly are party calculations still allowed to obstruct the free choice of the best available men for collectively directing the war.

A month later Mr. Churchill issued his second list of appointments. Mr. W. S. Morrison, a popular Conservative Minister relegated in 1940 to be Postmaster-General, came to the fore again as the new Minister of Town and Country Planning, a delicate position in which his already wide departmental experience should help him to thread his way through Whitehall jealousies. Captain Crookshank, a skilled politician who had fallen into negative ways during long tenure of the thankless post of Financial Secretary to the Treasury, went to the Post Office, and was succeeded by Mr. Ralph Assheton, who as Parliamentary Secretary first to the Ministry of Labour and then to the Ministry of Supply has shown a grasp and maturity outstripping his 42 years. Mr. Duncan Sandys, the Prime Minister's son-in-law, was appointed to succeed Mr. Assheton: a fortunate young man, whose qualifications to do so are unknown, except that he is commonly reputed to have failed to see eye to eye with his chief in the post he vacated as Financial Secretary to the War Office. At the same time Mr. Harold Macmillan, one of the three dozen back-bench Conservatives who cast their votes against Mr. Chamberlain in May 1940 and brought about his fall, was appointed to the newly created post of Minister Resident in North-West Africa, his own first experience of front-rank office. The Duke of Devonshire, whose place as Under-Secretary for India and Burma was taken by young Lord Munster, succeeded to Mr. Macmillan's former post of Under-Secretary for the Colonies. Finally Mr. Churchill promoted his own trusted personal assistant Lord Cherwell (formerly Professor Lindemann) to Government office as Paymaster-General. It was a notable feature of these two sets of Ministerial appointments that they were completed without bringing a single untried member of the House of Commons into the Government ranks.

That is not to say that any large army of qualified candidates for office is waiting on the doorstep. The House has, it is true, been strengthened and in some degree rejuvenated by the return from the Middle East and elsewhere of several more of the young members who patriotically donned uniform when war broke out. Unhappily it has suffered its losses too. Lord Apsley and Lieutenant-Colonel Somerset Maxwell have been killed on active service, and will not return. They bring the number of M.P.s who have given their lives in this war to eight, all Conservatives.

PARLIAMENT AS GUARDIAN

PARLIAMENT is just running into its busiest period of the year; between November and February the pressure is traditionally least heavy. There was a significant absence of criticism against the Government proposal that both Houses should adjourn for a full month at Christmas. Military successes had stifled the professional critics; members also had the not easily digestible Beveridge report to masticate, and knew that they needed time for it. But on the day the House rose for Christmas a unique incident occurred which will live in its annals. The Foreign Secretary had just read to a deeply feeling and unanimous audience the United Nations' declaration of horror at the bestial German policy of cold-blooded extermination of the Jews, and of solemn resolution that those responsible should not escape retribution for their crimes. It came into the mind of a little-known Labour member, Mr. Cluse, to ask, "Is it possible, in your judgment, Mr. Speaker, for members of the House to rise in their places and stand in silence in support of this protest against disgusting barbarism?" "That should be a spontaneous act by the House as a whole", replied Mr. Speaker. And for a minute or two—so *Hansard* in passionless words recorded passion—"members of the House then stood in silence."

Anyone who cared to compare British with German mentality might dwell for a moment also on events which have lately come to public knowledge as the Wilson case. In June 1940 a Mr. Wilson, detained under Regulation 18B, wrote to the Courts asking to be put on trial for some specific offence, instead of being detained under regulation. The letter was stopped by a Home Office official, who thought in good faith that this was not the proper way for a detainee to approach the Court. His action was held by the Court to be an unwarrantable interference with the right of free access for every British subject to the source of justice; and it became necessary for the Home Secretary (Mr. Herbert Morrison), on behalf of himself and his predecessor in 1940 (Sir John Anderson), to offer an unqualified apology to the Court and—on January 31, 1943—to Parliament, that "this grave error should have occurred". Nothing less would have satisfied the relentless determination of the House of Commons, even when the safety of the State is at stake, to preserve citizen rights.

FINANCE, PRODUCTION AND LABOUR

WAR expenditure, swollen by the North African campaign, is now running at the record pace of £14 million a day, and the budget estimates both of

expenditure and of revenue seem likely to be exceeded. Government credit is unimpaired; indeed, for the newest issue of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent National War Bonds at par it has been possible to extend the maximum period of maturity to $10\frac{1}{4}$ years. A less reassuring item of news is that Mr. Bevin estimates wage-rates to have risen by 32 or 33 per cent between the outbreak of war and last December; and further wage claims by trade unions seeking special favours for their own industries continue.

Plans are laid for 1943 becoming our peak year in war production. Ships, aircraft, anti-submarine devices, tanks and certain specialized types of army equipment are to have priority. Our objectives can only be achieved by further withdrawals of labour from less essential industries, further mobilization of women, and a sharp throttling down of production on those lines (such as common kinds of guns and shells) which we have manufactured so successfully that our reserve stocks are by now immense. No closing of war factories is psychologically easy, however, and the Minister of Production (Mr. Oliver Lyttelton) will need to use all his explanatory and persuasive powers, as well as all his stubbornness, if labour transfers of this sort are to be carried through smoothly. Conscription for the Auxiliary Services or for industry has been extended downwards to include girls of 19 (the former minimum age was 20), and Mr. Bevin is proposing to put compulsorily into part-time work women without children who are deemed to be not yet pulling their weight, though ineligible for full-time employment. We have long had girls in control of barrage balloons (some of whom specially distinguished themselves when air raids on London were resumed on January 17), and mixed batteries of men and women operating anti-aircraft guns; now girls of the A.T.S. have taken over the entire operation of searchlights. In the combing out of men we have reached practically the extreme limit, but a new National Service Act renders it possible for boys to be actually registered before, in order to be called up on, their eighteenth birthdays.

HARBINGER OF VICTORY

SINCE the summer of 1940 we have been without our church bells, reserved as a local warning of enemy invasion. On Sunday, November 15, we were allowed to hear them for the first time, in honour of the victory of El Alamein. Again on Christmas morning they were permitted to ring out; that afternoon we, in company with the rest of the Empire, listened on the wireless to the voice of the King. We do not know when the church bells will ring for final victory, and we realize that unceasing effort and many a heavy personal sorrow must lie between us and that. But hope makes the road easier, and as a nation we look forward with certainty now.

Great Britain,
February 1943.

IRELAND

PUBLIC OPINION IN EIRE

IT is hard to reconcile Irishmen completely to being passive spectators when the destiny of the world is being decided for perhaps a thousand years to come. Many remember the days when for good or ill the politics and the struggles of Ireland were the object of sustained interest throughout the world, and instinctively contrast with this the lack of interest which the world shows in Irish affairs to-day. Paradoxically enough it is the younger generation as a whole who are the more content to watch as spectators the onward march of the United Nations to a victory which the great majority now both welcome and accept as inevitable, while their fathers are afflicted by the vague malaise which inaction so often produces. This greater degree of acceptance on the part of the younger generation springs from a belief that neutrality as a positive assertion of Eire's sovereignty is an end in itself.

Young and old alike feel considerable resentment when an Englishman or an American comes over to Eire, pays a brief visit and then returns home to comment on the state of mind which he finds. "Half-way between illusion and reality" is the verdict now usually pronounced on the effects of our prolonged period of isolation from the world and our partial insulation from the ideas which influence it. Their comments arouse resentment, but in fact criticisms differing in emphasis, but identical in inspiration, are becoming a commonplace amongst the people here whose innate distaste for the half-tones of life in a neutral State has come to the surface now that all danger of invasion by the Nazis appears to have passed. In the earlier days of the war it was felt that neutrality and the enforced isolation which it entailed would bring its own peculiar stimulus to intellectual activity and social reform. These hopes are now dispelled, for enforced isolation has not revitalized our intellectual life, and there is now the Beveridge Report to bring home to the public that Britain, at a critical period in the war, is discussing more far-reaching social reforms than have been considered in this country since the establishment of independent government. Indeed it is difficult to over-emphasize the effect which the Report has made on a public opinion nourished on the twin beliefs that war was wholly destructive and that Britain was a plutocratic Imperialist State. The Beveridge Report has brought to the surface dissatisfaction with the outworn creeds of the major political parties and has presented their leaders with a challenge which they cannot afford to ignore.

SOCIAL SECURITY

THE Beveridge Report has aroused anxiety as well as interest in Eire. The anxiety is the product of two considerations. On the one hand, if the Beveridge scheme should come into operation, the family allowances and the increased social security which it would confer would take effect in Northern

Ireland. This would mean an aggravation of the contrast between the rates and the comprehensiveness of the social services in Northern Ireland and in Eire. In consequence wage earners, in particular, in Northern Ireland, and probably professional classes as well, would have strong social and economic reasons for preferring to remain part of the United Kingdom. On the other hand the acceptance of the Beveridge social security plan would encourage the tide of emigration to Britain and make the emigrants who are already there reluctant to return. These consequences could only be counteracted if social services in Eire were substantially expanded and the rates of benefit materially increased.

Even at this comparatively early stage in the election campaign all parties have to a greater or lesser extent responded to the challenge of the Beveridge Report. Speaking at a Fine Gael Party Convention at Cork on January 16, Mr. Cosgrave announced that his party proposed to institute a scheme of family allowances. He pointed out, however, that the allowances would not be on so attractive a scale as those proposed in the Beveridge scheme since the resources of the State would not be equal to the expenditure involved. Mr. Cosgrave also stated that before the publication of the Beveridge Report his party had decided to advocate an overhaul of the administration of our social services in order to effect an economy in administration. The Labour party has been less cautious in its promises since it feels that it can only stand to gain by an election. Its leaders have already promised a reform of the financial system in order to facilitate heavy expenditure on a sweeping programme of social and economic reform. Their promises are more far-reaching than those of either of the major parties, no doubt because it is out of the question that the Labour party should increase its representatives sufficiently to form a government. At the same time there is no doubt that the social appeal of Labour is peculiarly attractive to the electorate at the present time, and it is generally believed that their representation will be substantially increased at the forthcoming election.

Mr. De Valera's party is, however, in a stronger position than either of his opponents, since it need not confine itself to promises. In January the Government agreed to increase the salaries of government employees and national school teachers, thereby departing officially from the wages standstill order enforced earlier in the war to guard against inflation. Inevitably the advances in salaries have been represented as an election bribe. However this may be the increases are not hard to justify, for it is unlikely that they are sufficient to offset the rise in the cost of living which has taken place since 1939. What has happened is that the standstill order in wages has been enforced but without any similar control over prices. The inevitable result has been that prices of essential commodities have advanced sharply whilst wages have remained static. Striking evidence of this is produced by the fact that the pre-war £ is now officially reckoned to be worth only 13s. To alleviate the situation thus created the Government has taken corresponding steps to assist the farmers and the agricultural workers to meet higher prices. The price of sugar-beet has now been advanced to £4 per ton, which is nearly twice as much as the fixed price before the war. This advance is

justified by the argument that self-sufficiency in sugar is essential, but it is, of course, none the less attractive to growers. At the same time the minimum wage for agricultural labourers, which varies according to the estimated cost of living in various parts of the country, has been generally increased.

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

FOR the first time since the creation of the Irish Free State the old political divisions no longer represent political realities to the electorate. One by one the party leaders who have brought out "the party cries of long ago" have been greeted by apathetic audiences. Though many election speeches have already been delivered, the party programmes have so far only been outlined in principle and have not referred to the problems which lie most heavily on our minds to-day. The country is conscious that the aftermath of the war will be at least as difficult a period for Eire as the years of the war. Then the country will be faced with the return of more than 100,000 young men and women who have been working in war factories in Britain and who have been earning wages very much higher than any they can hope to receive in this country; then, too, we shall be confronted with the political consequences, whatever they may be, of the policy of isolation which has been pursued during the war.

In this respect Mr. Herbert Morrison's allusion in a speech made on January 10 to this country has not passed unnoticed, and has indeed aroused some misgiving. Mr. Morrison is reported to have said that Eire's neutrality "had been to the great hurt of the Empire's cause and little advantage to Eire's reputation". At Cork on January 16 General Mulcahy made a studiously moderate reply in the course of which he said that he was confident "that it will in time be clearer to all in Britain, that our neutrality is as honourable as the neutrality of Sweden, or Portugal, or Spain, or Turkey, or Switzerland. We have had no part in creating the circumstances that have brought about this war. Indeed it will occur to many that the Partition of our country is the prime cause in bringing about an internal situation which prevented us from playing a fuller part in international affairs in the League of Nations and at Imperial Conferences . . ." But generally speaking the problems which fill the thoughts of most Irishmen now have not been discussed with candour by the leaders of the political parties.

All parties are agreed that neutrality is not an issue in the forthcoming election. To make his standpoint abundantly clear Mr. Cosgrave stated in Cork on January 16 that "the people had made up their minds on neutrality" and, he continued, "that the person or the party who seeks to sell the country on this issue should be put in the Dundrum Criminal Lunatic Asylum for the duration of the emergency". But while all parties are agreed that neutrality is the only policy which this country can and should pursue, that does not prevent candidates from arguing how neutrality can most effectively be safeguarded. Mr. Cosgrave, who has come out definitely in favour of an "All-Party Government", argues that no party "could maintain the neutrality of the State as effectively as all the parties united". This is a point of view which does not appeal to Mr. De Valera at all, and in the competition of

words he has a clear advantage over his opponents since he and his colleagues have achieved what was generally considered to be impracticable of achievement—they have maintained neutrality throughout the most critical period of the war with conspicuous success.

Inevitably perhaps, the Government is not prepared to let its record speak for itself, and various members of it, Mr. Lemass, Minister of Supply, in particular, have suggested that at various periods of the war the situation was so critical and so dangerous that only Mr. De Valera's unique skill enabled the country to survive. In a speech on January 4 Mr. Lemass stated rather mysteriously that the public had never been told how "a major catastrophe had been avoided by a hair's breadth" at one period during the past three years, and that even now it would not be in the national interest for the full story to be told. A few days later Mr. Lemass intensified the mystery by saying that members of the Cabinet had to be exceedingly careful in their election speeches lest some details of this major crisis should become public knowledge and thereby presumably endanger the maintenance of neutrality. How far mysterious pronouncements of this kind have impressed a rather critical electorate it is difficult to say; but on the whole the reaction must have been disappointing to the Government since the speech was not successful in making many people's flesh creep. At the same time it is probably a safe presumption to say that the view which Mr. Lemass and other Government spokesmen so assiduously endeavour to convey is in fact accepted by the electorate. They do believe that neutrality was maintained only by the diplomatic skill of Mr. De Valera's Government and they feel that relations with the belligerent States would not be handled with equal skill by any alternative leader. It seems very likely that in the election the Fianna Fail party hold the ace of trumps, and though they may not succeed in frightening the public into believing that neutrality would be imperilled were an alternative Government to be returned, they will succeed in convincing them that it is better to "play safe" and that some slight risk might be involved were Mr. De Valera no longer to remain in office.

The date of the election has not been announced and indeed it still remains uncertain whether or not an election will take place. On December 8 Mr. MacEntee, Minister for Local Government, stated at the party meeting that the election "would come sooner than we expected". This was a rather curious statement from a Cabinet Minister, and it suggested that the Cabinet itself had at that date reached no decision. If an election is to be postponed, it will mean that the agreement of the Fine Gael and of the Labour party will have to be obtained. And there is no sign at the moment that this condition will be fulfilled. The Labour party, in particular, feels that it can only stand to gain by an election.

IN THE SIX COUNTIES

THE long period of office which the Unionist Government in Northern Ireland has enjoyed is due to the frozen political state which exists in the Six Counties. Any alternative Government must necessarily be also Unionist in complexion and therefore can be created only by a revolt within the party.

Half of the members of the present Cabinet have been in office since Lord Craigavon formed his first Government 22 years ago.

Widespread dissatisfaction with Northern Ireland's war effort has been freely expressed within the Unionist party, and its back-benchers now feel so strongly that they have insisted on the rejuvenation of the Cabinet. On January 19 a meeting of the Northern Ireland Parliamentary party was held in Belfast with the purpose of considering the back-benchers' request for changes in the Cabinet. It is understood that the back-benchers demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister, Mr. J. M. Andrews; the Home Secretary, Sir R. Dawson Bates; and the Minister for Finance, Mr. J. Milne Barbour. Their candidate for the Premiership is generally understood to be Sir Basil Brooke, and they hope that the Home Secretary and the Minister for Finance will be replaced by younger men. An official statement issued after the meeting on January 19 announced that it had been agreed that consideration of the demand for changes in the Cabinet should be deferred until the Prime Minister calls a party meeting for that purpose. For the moment, therefore, the question is 'shelved', but the results of recent by-elections have shown very clearly that it cannot be shelved for long.

Ireland,

January 1943.

[The usual quarterly contribution from the United States arrived too late for publication in this issue.]

CANADA

THE NEW CONSERVATISM

THE national convention of the Conservative party of Canada, held at Winnipeg on December 9, 10, and 11, may well constitute an important landmark in Canadian political history, for it witnessed a resolute effort to revitalize a party which had governed Canada for more than half the period elapsed since Confederation in 1867. Never was a historic party in such need of energizing reinvigoration, because since the retirement of Lord Bennett, whose forceful personality and varied abilities had given it a spell of power from 1930 to 1935, its fortunes had been at their own lowest ebb in all its long history. It had been handicapped since 1921 by its inability to tap the great reservoir of conservatism which exists in the French-Canadian community, and it had also suffered from an abnormal dearth of younger leaders who could make an effective appeal to the voters. A year ago its prospects of revival seemed so feeble that many shrewd observers of the political scene saw looming before it the same fate as has overtaken the British Liberal party, and it was obvious that some very drastic measures would be required to carry out the necessary process of regeneration.

The general election of 1940, in which the Conservative party under the leadership of Dr. Manion had signally failed to show any recovery of popular strength, had brought into high relief the need for its wholesale reorganization, if it was to survive as an effective political instrument. An attempt made to give it effective leadership in the House of Commons at Ottawa by the recall of Mr. Arthur Meighen to its headship in November 1941 was rendered abortive by his defeat at a by-election. But with the country preoccupied with the national war effort, and thousands of younger Conservatives away from their homes on active service, the moment was deemed unpropitious for any revivalist efforts until the plebiscite held in March 1942 upon the issue of full conscription disclosed the recurrence of a deep racial fissure on this issue and, as a concomitant, a serious split in the Federal Liberal party. The widespread exasperation in the English-speaking provinces over the apparent apathy of the great majority of the French-Canadian element towards the war and the national war effort, seemed to unfold an opportunity for rebuilding the Conservative party on lines calculated to give the large body of voters who had withdrawn their support from the King Ministry, a chance of replacing it at the next general election. A new Conservative administration, it was hoped, would meet the challenge of the Socialist programme of the fast-growing C.C.F. party by its own commitment to sane progressive policies, framed to meet the aspirations of millions of Canadians to build for their country a more creditable civilization than it had hitherto evolved for itself.

The first move towards this objective was made by a group of younger Conservatives who, without seeking the blessing of the professional poli-

ticians of their party, organized and held at Port Hope last September* an informal conference for the purpose of discussing the future of Conservatism and ways and means for improving its prospects. This conference was attended by about 175 delegates, who in the main represented the progressive element in the party; and its proceedings produced a valuable harvest, whose full fruits were later reaped at the Winnipeg convention. The delegates at Port Hope, after exploring every facet of the political situation and the problems involved in the revival of Conservatism, formulated for the party and published a tentative programme whose clauses covered virtually every phase of the national life. The radical nature of its basic proposals surprised both the public and the Conservative leaders; but the latter were so much impressed by the generous volume of favourable press support and popular comment which the new programme evoked that they decided to respond to a mounting demand among their adherents for a national party convention which would provide the party with a new leader and a fresh programme. So Winnipeg was chosen as the scene of the convention, and a national committee was appointed to make for it arrangements, which proved to be admirably efficient.

THE PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP

THE problem of the party's leadership was felt to present more difficulties than the revision of its programme, but one complication was removed when it became known that Mr. Arthur Meighen had reached an unshakable decision not to seek re-election as leader. Mr. Meighen possesses the ablest intellect which has been applied to Canadian politics in his generation, but it has been his lot to share the fate of Charles James Fox, who only held the highest offices for brief spells. Like Fox, Mr. Meighen has been the finest parliamentarian of his day in Canada. He has performed invaluable services in clarifying the public mind upon important issues and in educating national opinion; while it should never be forgotten that he laid the foundation for the present fruitful co-operation between the British Commonwealth and the United States by pressing a reluctant British Government to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese treaty in 1921. He has never paltered with his principles for the sake of winning the plaudits of the public or garnering votes and he has never stooped to oratorical fustian and claptrap. He has preferred to employ his remarkable gifts of lucid speech for stripping issues down to their essentials and presenting their stark realities to Parliament and the public. He has made many mistakes, for which he paid heavily, in his public career, but throughout it he has been a zealous and unwavering advocate of full and effective partnership for Canada in the British Commonwealth of Nations. His farewell speech to the convention revealed that age had not impaired his intellectual and oratorical powers, and even his bitterest opponents admit that the public life of Canada will be poorer for his retirement from active politics.

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 129, December 1942, p. 81.

But a survey of the roster of known aspirants for the Conservative leadership did not breed much hope. None of them was without serious disqualifications for the rôle. Mr. M. A. MacPherson of Regina, who had nearly defeated Dr. Manion at the party convention in 1939, had more popular support than anybody else; but his sponsorship of anti-Catholic legislation on education during his tenure of the Attorney-Generalship of Saskatchewan imposed a grave handicap in a country where to-day nearly 45 per cent. of the voters are Roman Catholics. Colonel Drew, the provincial Conservative leader in Ontario, by reason of his fine presence, his platform gifts and his assiduous industry, seemed to have all the essential qualities for a national leader, but the abandonment of his commitments and responsibilities in the provincial field presented difficulties. Mr. Howard Green of British Columbia and Mr. Diefenbaker of Saskatchewan were promising young politicians who had acquired some reputation as parliamentary debaters, but neither possessed the abilities, prestige and experience needed by the leader of a party which had before it an uphill path for the recovery of popular favour. There was also in the background Mr. H. H. Stevens, a member of bygone Conservative Ministries and a very experienced and capable parliamentarian, who had repented of his mutinous secession in 1934 and rejoined his old party; but, as the voting for the leadership proved, his sins had not been forgiven. So the convention opened on December 9 with the disabilities of each of the candidates ominously apparent to the assembled delegates.

DELEGATES AND PLATFORM

In the choice of delegates most of the normal practices of Canadian political conventions were followed—with the addition of the notable innovation that credentials were made available to individuals who had had no previous affiliations with Conservatism but had come to favour its policies. The muster-roll showed an attendance of some 870 delegates, and the high quality of the men and women, who had fared forth at their own expense to face the rigours of a Manitoba winter, indicated an encouraging rebirth of enthusiasm for the Conservative cause. One very heartening surprise for the organizers of the convention was the arrival of a substantial French-Canadian contingent from Quebec, where the party had in recent years fallen into a state of complete debility outside of a few constituencies in which there was an English-speaking majority. It was composed of people of good standing in their own communities, including some new figures of marked ability, and it was able to make very useful contributions to the discussions and decisions. Moreover there was ground for the belief that this French-Canadian delegation had been mustered with the deliberate encouragement of the Roman Catholic hierarchy of Quebec, who, with their usual shrewdness, had probably decided that it would be unwise to leave French-Canada without some representation in the councils of a revived Conservative party. Throughout the convention the delegates worked with keenness, industry and great intelligence; they conducted their discussions upon a high plane, and divergent elements manifested a willingness to reach harmonious compromises

about controversial issues. But there was also visible a marked spirit of genuine independence which on various occasions asserted itself successfully to check strategical moves made by the party leaders but considered objectionable by the majority of the rank and file.

The platform adopted by the delegates draws heavily upon the programme formulated at the Port Hope Conference and marks an enormous advance upon any policies ever before officially sponsored by either of the two historic parties of Canada. The reconstruction clauses of the programme endorse the principles that every person able and willing to work must be assured of gainful occupation with sufficient means to maintain a home and family, and that full employment at fair wages under progressively improving standards should be regarded as a national objective. For the achievement of this objective there is a strong pronouncement in favour of the strengthening of the basic Canadian tradition of individual initiative and enterprise and the removal of bureaucratic controls over economic activities; but it is accompanied by a declaration that government authority should be maintained and exercised, wherever necessary, to protect primary producers, workers and consumers from exploitation through price-fixing combines, monopolies and patent cartels. As a corollary of the doctrine that the Government must seek to create conditions assuring the maximum volume of employment and the maximum national income, there is laid down the doctrine that it is the duty of the State

"to initiate, undertake and control projects of public and national benefit in those fields in which private enterprise is precluded from serving or is unable to serve the public interest".

There are also outlined in general terms ideas about the proper fields of state intervention for the purpose of filling the gaps which might be left by private enterprise; and for the encouragement of the latter special consideration was urged for the interests and problems of the substantial proportion of the Canadian population who secure their livelihood in minor individualist occupations.

RECONSTRUCTION

THE delegates endorsed a social security programme under which both the scope of existing services and the scale of certain benefits would be enlarged, and the creation of a Ministry of Social Security and Reconstruction. Another clause insisted upon the obligation of the State to make available to every citizen adequate mental, dental, nursing, hospital and pre-natal care, and to promote improvements in public health and standards of nutrition by a programme jointly financed through a contributory system and government assistance; while commitments were made for long-range low-cost housing schemes to be underwritten by the Government, for a continuous and flexible plan for the gradual elimination of all slums, and for an elaborate programme for the effective rehabilitation of the veterans of the present war in civil life.

The agricultural section of the programme pledged the party to a wide range

of reforms for the removal of the disabilities of agriculture, whose existence was frankly admitted, and the influence of American agricultural policy, based on the doctrine of "parity prices", was discernible in a clause which accepted the principle that agricultural prices should bear a stable relation to the cost of living index and proposed the creation of a Price Stabilization Corporation to assist farmers in securing fair prices for their products. The labour programme of the Port Hope Conference was adopted with some modifications, and the endorsement of the principles of compulsory collective bargaining and compulsory recognition of trade unions by employers marked an enormous advance in Conservative thought about labour problems. The plank about tariff policy was expected to provide the convention with one of its thorniest problems; but the high protectionists among the delegates refrained from pressing their views, and there was unanimous support for a general declaration that Canada's tariff policy should be framed on three guiding principles—namely to provide gainful occupation, to maintain a high standard of living and to ensure a fair price to the consumer. Other sections were devoted to such problems as aerial transportation and the position of women, who were promised full equality of status, while a gesture for the recovery of French-Canadian goodwill was made through a declaration to the effect that Canada's true greatness depended upon a sympathetic understanding between the two original races and all others who had come to join them in the building of the country.

The pronouncements of the convention about Canada's future rôle in the world and her external relations—a negative condemnation of the isolationist view that Canada could remain as a world force, continue as a great trading country, and yet divorce herself from responsibility for international policies—was followed by this positive declaration:

"We regard the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, of which Canada is one, in partnership with the United States of America, as the most appropriate association of nations through which we in Canada should seek international co-operation."

Formal endorsement was also given to the aims of the Atlantic Charter and to Canadian co-operation in effective international measures for their attainment. The resolutions about Canada's policy for the present war were regarded as a delicate subject in view of the presence of French-Canadian delegates. But the latter showed such an accommodating spirit that their request for the omission of the terrible word "conscription" was accepted, and they cheerfully voted for a resolution, which pledged support without limitation to Canada's fighting forces, promised them adequate reinforcements, and expressed a belief that a total war effort demanded compulsory selective service with the proviso that "everybody selected for the armed forces should be available for service wherever required". There were also embodied in the resolution about war policy clauses declaring that Canada could achieve her best destiny as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and advocating the formation of an Imperial War Council, on which Canada and all the other Dominions should be represented.

THE VITAL DECISION

THE adoption of the programme paved the way for the vital decision about the leadership, and its progressive character was the determining factor in the selection eventually made. Before the convention opened the name of Mr. John Bracken, the Liberal-Progressive Premier of Manitoba, had been mentioned as a possible candidate for the Conservative leadership; but, although he was known to have become a severe critic of the King Ministry and its policies, his background and record seemed to make the suggestion farcical. But powerful figures in the Conservative party, including Mr. Meighen, whose great influence was decisively exercised, had reached the conclusion that Mr. Bracken offered a better hope than any of the available orthodox Conservatives of mobilizing under the banner of Conservatism the forces desirous of blazing new trails for the party and of reversing some dangerous trends in Canadian policy. Their first approaches to Mr. Bracken found him cautiously responsive to their overtures about the Conservative leadership but indisposed to make any definite commitments until certain preliminary conditions, in his view indispensable, were fulfilled. He insisted that he could only lead a party committed to a genuinely progressive programme, and naturally he also desired the assurance of strong support from some of the leading figures in the Conservative party.

At one time it looked as if Mr. MacPherson, by far the most formidable of the Conservative aspirants, would retire from the contest and exert his influence for Mr. Bracken. However, while negotiations with Mr. Bracken were proceeding behind the scenes, Mr. MacPherson revised his earlier decision and definitely announced his candidacy; and, as Mr. Green, Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Stevens had also formally entered the race, it became plain that Mr. Bracken could not secure the leadership without a contest, in which his rejection was a distinct possibility. Obviously he could not afford to emerge as a sudden convert to traditional Conservative principles; and so, on the first day of the convention, he issued a statement intimating that he could only accept nomination if the Conservative party would add the word "Progressive" to its name as a prefix or suffix. But when this proposal was submitted to the convention, it encountered strong opposition on the ground that it was an attempt to dictate terms to it and that its adoption would confer an unfair advantage upon Mr. Bracken. So it was dropped, and Liberal journalists proceeded to telegraph to their papers that Mr. Bracken must now be considered definitely out of the running. It was only after further conferences that he was persuaded that opposition to a hasty change of the party's name did not necessarily imply hostility to himself, and in the end he consented to his nomination with his condition unfulfilled. The speech which he delivered to the convention after his nomination did not reveal him at his best; but most of the delegates were impressed by its simple candour and by his frank declaration that he did not seek their leadership for his own personal aggrandizement and that his best qualification for it was his ability to speak the language of the common people. Happily for him the speeches of all the other candidates deepened

the conviction that Mr. Bracken was by far the best available choice. So the result of the first ballot gave him 420 votes, which was only 16 short of a clear majority, and showed 222 cast for Mr. MacPherson, 120 for Mr. Diefenbaker, 88 for Mr. Green and 20 for Mr. Stevens. Mr. Green and Mr. Stevens immediately withdrew from the contest and the other two Conservative candidates were ready to follow their example. But a second ballot was insisted upon, and, when it resulted in 538 votes for Mr. Bracken against 255 for Mr. MacPherson and 79 for Mr. Diefenbaker, the chairman, without making any official announcement of the figures, declared Mr. Bracken elected "by an absolute majority". Thereupon the two defeated candidates moved and seconded, each with a pledge of loyalty to the new leader, a motion that his election be made unanimous and it was carried enthusiastically. Mr. Bracken, freed from anxiety about the outcome of his daring adventure, then delivered a modest but excellent speech of acceptance, which convinced the delegates that they had made no mistake in their choice. The implications of the choice of a leader with a progressive background were recognized by the immediate decision of the convention to change the party's name to "Progressive Conservative".

MR. BRACKEN EMERGES

ACCORDINGLY Mr. Bracken, at the age of 59, has embarked upon the novel but interesting enterprise of rebuilding the fortunes of a historic party, to which his only previously known link of adherence was the attendance of his father at the funeral of Sir John Macdonald in 1891. He can lay no claim to fine oratorical powers, but he has a large fund of practical wisdom and a reputation for political integrity and administrative ability. His continuous tenure of the Premiership of Manitoba for twenty years argues indeed not merely a record of honest and successful administration but considerable mastery of the political arts; and the fact that he has carried on since 1940 with the aid of a Coalition Ministry demonstrates his capacity for gaining the support of elements other than those which approve wholeheartedly of all his views and policies. In regard to his political and economic views he is a happy blend of the conservative and the radical, is conservative in his anxiety to preserve institutions and practices which have stood the test of time, and his indisposition to countenance rash experiments in any field, a radical in his conviction that the pre-war social and economic order contained so many weaknesses and discreditable features that its re-establishment in its old form is unthinkable and its drastic reformation not merely desirable but imperative. His agrarian background and partialities may alarm some Conservative industrialists, but they are an asset to him in a country where agriculture is still the largest single industry. His election as leader is a bold experiment; but it is in conformity with the decision of the massed wisdom of the Conservative party to adopt a highly progressive programme, and it is to a politician of ripe experience, wearing the garments of success, that they have entrusted the guidance of their fortunes.

Canada, January 1943.

✓ AUSTRALIA

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

FOR the first time in five years constitutional questions have been again to the fore in Australian politics during the last quarter of 1942. In federal communities such as Australia, in critical times the strain of the normal division of authority raises problems of constitutional power and constitutional change. The surprising thing is that the existing constitutional structure has proved in the main sufficiently elastic to meet the requirements of total war. The Statute of Westminster in most of the countries of the British Commonwealth is so much a normal part now in the working of Imperial relations and Constitutional Law that some explanation is required of the necessity for dealing with the Statute in Australia in 1942. The reason is to be found in the political history of 1931. The Australian Parliament, following New Zealand's lead, joined with the other Parliaments in the Commonwealth in recommending the enactment of the Statute, but asked for the insertion of special clauses suspending the main sections in Australia until adopted by Act of Parliament here. The suggestion, which came from the Opposition, was accepted without enthusiasm by the Labour Government of the day, which was in a minority in the Senate. The adoption of the Statute therefore required positive action on Australia's own part.

THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER

THE present Attorney-General, Dr. Evatt, introducing in October 1942 a Bill adopting the main sections of the Statute, struck out a new line of approach to the problem which he hoped would avoid controversy over Dominion Status and Australia's place generally in the British Commonwealth. The question of status, he said, had been settled once and for all by the Balfour Declaration of 1926. What remained now was the consideration of war-time legal and administrative exigencies. Whereas formerly there may have been little or no practical advantage here in removing existing restrictions on Dominion legislative powers, war conditions were very different. The Colonial Laws Validity Act, for example, threatened with invalidity much of the unprecedented shipping legislation rendered necessary to meet the developments of the war. Again, "reservation" for the King's assent to Australian shipping laws had recently involved prolonged delays. The adoption of the Statute of Westminster would solve these and similar problems.

The Government's proposal aroused spirited criticism in some quarters. There were observers who feared that beneath the logical legal case presented by the Government lay the possibility of far-reaching separatist policies. Linking up the adoption of the Statute of Westminster and Australia's separate declaration of war in December 1941 with the trenchant avowals of the Prime Minister and others in the early part of 1942 of Australia's present dependence upon the United States, they treated the new proposal, no

matter what the Government might say, as disruptive in tendency. What Mr. Curtin's Government has done is actually in full accord with the established principles of Dominion Status as understood in Canada and South Africa. But Imperial sentiment in this country has been such as to make these principles not merely unfamiliar, but altogether unacceptable, possibly to the majority of Australians. Nothing could be more explicit and emphatic than the Attorney-General's disclaimer of any intention to weaken the Imperial tie. On the contrary, he said

"The passage of the Bill will give further emphasis to the undoubted fact that the real link between Britain and Australia is not the legal subordination of the Parliament of this great Dominion to the United Kingdom Parliament at Westminster, but the unity of the Crown throughout the Empire, our common allegiance to the King, and the indissoluble tie of tradition and kinship which for ever binds the two peoples."

The removal of obsolete legal restrictions on Australia's powers will not and should not be regretted. Under modern conditions they have become what can best be described in Lord Balfour's famous phrase as "wooden guns". It has not been the legal inferiority of Dominion Parliaments that has kept the British Commonwealth together in the present century through two major wars. When the change came in 1942, moreover, Australian opinion proved quite ready for it. Indeed every major event of the year had prepared the country for the acceptance of the full legal measure of Dominion Status and for the fuller acceptance of the responsibilities of nationhood.

COMMONWEALTH POWERS

THOUGH the Commonwealth Constitution bears the date of 1900, the general division of powers follows closely that of the United States' Constitution of 1787, altogether an earlier age of economic and social development. Furthermore because there are in Australia only six States, the American division of powers has provided a narrower basis of national authority here than it has in the United States, where power over inter-State commerce has become increasingly a vehicle of national control over the country's economic life. The Commonwealth of Australia has thus no general power to regulate commerce, production or employment. The need for such powers as these, relatively small in 1900, has rapidly increased, and even before the war was already acute. Almost ever since federation indeed Commonwealth Governments, both Labour and non-Labour, have sought, by way of referendum as prescribed by the Constitution, enlarged economic powers for the Commonwealth.

On any view the problems of the post-war world will call for national planning and action on a scale hitherto unknown in any democracy in time of peace. To begin with there will be the problem of restoring ordinary civilian economic life. By the end of the war something like half the entire working population of Australia will be engaged directly in the war effort, either in the forces or in industry and associated occupations. The first phase of post-war reconstruction therefore will be concerned with what may be called the repatriation and rehabilitation problem. Even this task calls

for action as resolute and on a plan as comprehensive as that which the task of organizing the nation's resources for war involved. Again, the war aims of the United Nations, however vaguely formulated so far, involve at any rate the pledge that each will use the nation's full powers to secure "improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security". Declarations such as those of the Atlantic Charter must be treated as implying wider powers of internal economic control than the National Government has at present, under the Australian Constitution at least. In some of the more specific international engagements to which Australia is a party, along with others of the United Nations, the implication of wider national powers is plainer still. This is true, for example, of Article 7 of the Mutual Aid Agreement with the United States, the International Wheat Agreement and the Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau.

The Commonwealth already has some constitutional power, although uncertain in scope, for carrying out treaty engagements. But for implementing the general promises of post-war reconstruction, the existing economic powers of the Commonwealth are insufficient. During the war the defence power of the Commonwealth under the Constitution has served as sufficient foundation for the war effort. This power will not altogether disappear when hostilities cease. In particular it will be available for dealing with conditions arising directly out of the war in the immediate post-war period. Nevertheless the defence power is too uncertain in scope to provide a base for any comprehensive plan of reconstruction. Even in war-time it has its limits, as the recent decision of the High Court has shown, more particularly in the fields of economic regulation and social control. Yet these are precisely the fields in which most of the general national plan of reconstruction must lie. Reconstruction, moreover, can scarcely be regarded as a process that will be completed in the immediate post-war years. To the first phase of repatriation and rehabilitation will succeed the continuing problem of directing the use of the community's resources, so as to provide suitable employment for all, develop the national estate, organize the marketing of commodities, improve the standard of the social services, promote social security generally, and attain the economic and social objectives to which the Governments of all the United Nations are pledged. For this continuing process in peace-time the Commonwealth's defence power would admittedly be inadequate. Without some enlargement of its powers, therefore, the Commonwealth would have to rely during the reconstruction period on the co-operation of the States. In abstract principle this should, perhaps, suffice. In the working practice of politics, however, as the history of all federations shows, the agreement of the States is insufficient as a substitute for national power. In Australia, even when several Governments have agreed, they have often enough been unable subsequently to secure the necessary support of their Parliaments.

THE CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1942

EARLY in October 1942 the Commonwealth Attorney-General, Dr. Evatt, introduced a Bill to initiate a constitutional amendment. Its title was "Con-

stitutional Alteration, War Aims and Post-War Reconstruction 1942". The main proposal was to insert a new section in the Constitution conferring on the Commonwealth Parliament the power to make laws, notwithstanding anything in the Constitution, "for the purpose of carrying into effect the war aims (and objects) of Australia as one of the United Nations, including the attainment of economic security and social justice in the post-war world and for the purpose of post-war reconstruction generally". The Government arranged to have the Bill considered by an Advisory Body without precedent since federation. There was to be a Constitutional Convention of 24 members representative of both the Commonwealth and the States. The Commonwealth Parliament elected an all-party Committee of 12 and the Premier and the Leader of the Opposition in each of the six States were invited to attend. In each State Parliament a preliminary full-dress debate was held on the proposals, in some cases at joint sittings of both Houses. The idea was that, after discussion at the Convention, the Government would bring down definitive proposals to Parliament at the end of 1942, with a view to a referendum early in 1943, as required by the Constitution. Considerations of space make it impossible to give a detailed account of the Attorney-General's first Bill, which had some extraordinary, even bizarre, features. It is sufficient to say here that it aroused the widest possible diversity of opinion.

Whether the Government ever intended the Bill as anything more than a sort of constitutional kite to test the strength and the direction of public opinion, or as a preliminary manifesto to convince the plain man that, without a drastic increase in the Commonwealth powers, there could be no post-war reconstruction worth the name, is a matter of pure speculation. What happened, however, was that the Bill was hotly criticized, and that when the Convention met the Attorney-General announced the Government's withdrawal of the original Bill and the substitution of a modified proposal. The core of this Convention Bill was a proposal to give the Commonwealth power to make laws "for the purpose of carrying out post-war reconstruction", and, in addition, independent permanent power of wide dimensions in the fields of commerce, production, employment and social services. The new Bill, however, was not fully discussed on its merits by the Convention, partly no doubt because of its late arrival on the scene. So long as the party system endures, no constitution amending process can be dissociated from party politics.

Under the Australian system any Government, in deciding what amendments they can and will sponsor, naturally have regard both to the party platform and to their own electoral position. The Opposition will do exactly the same in determining their attitude to the Government's proposals. Identical considerations of course apply to the States. It cannot be otherwise. In Australia at the present time there are Labour Governments, not only in the Commonwealth, but also in four of the States—New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania. In Victoria the Country party is in office; in South Australia the Liberal party. Taking into account, however, representatives of the Opposition in both Commonwealth and

States, there was an exact party balance as between Labour and its political opponents in the Convention as a whole. At the Convention it became apparent, not only that the federal Opposition and the State leaders from non-Labour parties, but even the Labour Premiers of Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania were averse to holding a referendum at all during the war.

It may be doubted whether the undesirability of a direct appeal to the people on constitutional issues was in this instance the really decisive factor determining what attitude should be adopted towards the Government's Bill. More fundamental, for example, was the natural antipathy of State leaders to proposals which on any showing would have given the Commonwealth full overriding powers in all major spheres of modern legislation, and would thus have reduced the States to a purely subordinate position. The Labour Premiers of the less populous States had also to reconcile their party loyalty with their responsibility to the State Parliaments' electorates, in which regional attachments and local sentiment are exceedingly vigorous.

A CONSTRUCTIVE COMPROMISE

THE Labour Premier of Tasmania, Mr. Cosgrove, has the honour of having suggested a compromise with real constructive possibilities. His plan conceded the undesirability of making or attempting to make permanent alterations in the Constitution during the war. On the other hand it conceded the necessity of conferring on the Commonwealth enlarged and adequate powers in relation to post-war reconstruction. He proposed that for this purpose recourse should be made to the existing provision in the Constitution, hitherto little used, whereby new matters can be brought within the scope of the Commonwealth powers without a formal amendment of the Constitution by referendum. This section, based on the procedure that had been available under the Australasian Federal Council Act of 1885, gives the Commonwealth power to make laws for any State in respect of matters "referred" to the Commonwealth by the Parliament of that State. Mr. Cosgrove's plan was that the States should forthwith "refer" to the Commonwealth, until the expiration of five years from the cessation of hostilities, such matters as would give adequate powers for post-war reconstruction. There was also the stipulation that such "reference" should not be revoked during that period. The Government and representatives of the federal Opposition wisely accepted Mr. Cosgrove's plan. It was eventually adopted by an unanimous vote of the Convention. There remained only the task of agreeing if possible upon a common list of matters to be "referred". This formidable task was accomplished by a committee of the six State Premiers, together with the veteran federal leader of the United Australia party, Mr. W. M. Hughes, and the Commonwealth Attorney-General as Chairman. The fact that this agreement was reached is not only a tribute to the personal and political qualities of all the people most intimately concerned, including the Prime Minister, Mr. Curtin; it reflects also the realism with which the political leaders of Australia as a whole are viewing the constitutional problems of the post-war world.

The State Premiers at the Convention agreed to do their utmost to secure the passage through their respective Parliaments of a Bill in a common form, and in any event to introduce it before the end of January 1943. The list of matters in the Bill includes employment, unemployment, profiteering, prices, production and distribution of goods (but primary production only with the consent of the State concerned) organized marketing of commodities, trusts, combines, monopolies and family allowances, and certain additional financial matters to complete the Commonwealth's power to control investment and exchange. All these powers, of course, are in addition to, and not a derogation from, the existing powers of the Commonwealth. There are one or two limitations and omissions which may prove awkward. But if the Commonwealth Powers Bill is passed by the States, the Commonwealth will have adequate powers, no matter what party is in office, for the immediate post-war period. During those five years the Australian people will be able to decide by referendum whether or not they wish to make these wider powers permanent. Insufficient attention has perhaps been given to the practical problems raised, both for the Commonwealth and for the States, by the grant of purely temporary powers. On the one hand some powers in the list can scarcely be exercised effectively under threat of withdrawal at the end of five years. On the other hand some of the powers could be so exercised by the Commonwealth as to make it practically politically impossible for the States to withdraw them at the end of the period fixed.

DIFFICULTIES OF "REFERENCE"

THESE problems have apparently been left to be dealt with when they arise. The tacit assumption is that if the Commonwealth uses its powers wisely, the people will not want to see them withdrawn. The method of enlarging federal powers through "reference" by the States is full of difficulties, both legal and political. It has been tried before, in each case without practical result. This failure, however, cannot be imputed to chicanery on the part of the States. In the nature of things a process of some kind of inter-governmental conference will have begun. But when the Governments have reached agreement, the task of carrying it out will fall on the State Parliaments, which, of course, are not parties to the agreement at all. Few members will have given close attention to the discussions out of which the agreement proceeded. The prospects are that the Bill will have affected wholly extraneous matters, such as the general political position of the State, and so forth. In the Opposition groups mere inertia will have a maximum opportunity. To proceed by the method of State "reference" encounters in fact all the difficulties which have confronted the League of Nations and other international bodies. In the present instance the prospects of success are, from some points of view, brighter, since the Convention included the Leader of the Opposition as well as the Premier in each State. In all the States except Queensland, however, there is a Legislative Council, and in the four southern States—Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia—these Councils are at once powerful and conservative, and not very amenable to party discipline. A State which passes the Commonwealth Powers Bill will

not be able to repeal or amend it before the end of the five post-war years without an affirmative vote of the electors in the State. This provision in the Bill was based on the formula that was successfully employed in New South Wales in 1929 to prevent the abolition of the Legislative Council by an ordinary Act. The proposal to enlarge the economic powers of the Commonwealth comes at a critical stage in Australian affairs. Business interests have hitherto accepted with little protest the increasingly stringent government control. There are unmistakable signs, however, that the period of quiescence is coming to an end. In the present phase of the war effort, resources can only be secured for war purposes at the expense, not merely of our luxuries, but of industries and occupations that in ordinary times are regarded as an essential part of civilized existence. Some of the Government's measures of curtailment have been assailed as ill-considered, unnecessary and savouring of class legislation. Some recent regulations have been successfully challenged in the courts. In principle, of course, the proposed new powers are to be given, not to the present Government or any other Government, but to the people of Australia as a single nation, to be exercised from time to time as the nation itself determines at the polls. In practice, however, the attitude of the ordinary man to the Commonwealth Powers Bill will probably be determined, not by this admirable but abstract principle, but rather by his general view of the policy and activities of the present Commonwealth Government and the efficiency the Commonwealth has displayed in administering the manifold phases of the nation's life, for which it has had to assume responsibility.

OPPOSITION TO THE BILL

THE passage of the Bill is being vigorously opposed by many leading business organizations, such as the Chambers of Commerce and Manufactures and some stock exchanges. If the attitude at the Convention of the Labour Premiers from the less populous States bore testimony to the continued vitality of regional sentiment in Australia, subsequent criticism of the Bill in commercial and industrial circles has borne testimony as eloquent to the vitality amongst us of economic and social individualism. Indeed the preservation of substantial State powers in the federal system has long been recognized as an essential part of the political programme of social and economic conservatism in Australia. Through the Legislative Councils of the States, it is much easier to curb a radical programme than it is through the Commonwealth Senate, which much of its time, though not at the present moment, is a mere replica of the House of Representatives. Procedure by way of State "reference" also raises legal questions of the greatest complexity which have never been elucidated by judicial decision.

In 1915, when an abortive agreement was reached to "refer" to the Commonwealth wide economic powers for the duration of the war, it was thought to be so doubtful whether a time limit could legally be placed upon a State "reference" that an Act of Parliament in the United Kingdom might be necessary to validate what had been done. In the event, only one State, New South Wales, passed an agreed Bill, so the vital legal question was left at

large. While the Commonwealth Powers Bill of 1942 has been before the State Parliaments, leading constitutional lawyers have given conflicting opinions again on this same question. The air is thick, too, with criticisms of the drafting of the Bill. Legal doubts are powerful weapons in the hands of the opponents of any measure, let alone one fraught with such far-reaching consequences as this Bill. New South Wales has already passed a Bill in the form agreed upon at the Convention. What its fate will be in the other States no man can yet safely predict. If the attempt to proceed by way of State "reference" turns out once more a failure, the Government must either abandon the proposals for constitutional change or fall back on the ordinary procedure by way of referendum. If not by one route, then by another the problem of arming the Commonwealth with adequate powers for the post-war period must be tackled, and solved.

Australia,
January 1943.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. THE QUALITIES OF GENERAL HERTZOG

THE death of General Hertzog has removed a South African who has been in the front rank of political leaders ever since the end of the Anglo-Boer war. His character was one of great contradictions. Personally he had exceptional charm. His ideals of public life were exacting, his life simple, his personal integrity unquestioned. But he was a very bitter partisan, resented criticism and opposition intensely, and carried his enmities towards his opponents to extreme lengths. This bitterness in political controversy was always concentrated upon a single opponent. Hertzog was never in any doubt that he was right. His convictions always represented themselves to him as deeply based on moral grounds. It followed that a man who opposed him was not merely in the wrong, but that there was more than a tinge of moral obliquity in that opposition. Hence even trusted associates venturing to differ from him were immediately condemned by him to wrathful ostracism. He would walk past them without a sign that he saw them. General Smuts for many years ranked highest among those whom Hertzog thus singled out for special enmity. At times there were others. His feuds and hatreds are a blot upon his memory, for they passed the bounds of legitimate political hostility.

Yet his was a great career. He struggled for years, after his breach with General Botha in the early days of the Union, against what then seemed insuperable odds, for the victory of his beliefs. In 1924 he defeated General Smuts and became Prime Minister. There he remained for over fifteen years. He was a strong Prime Minister in the sense that he never compromised on being master in his Cabinet house. His predominance was founded on the very real devotion which he won from the majority of the Afrikaans-speaking people who followed him. His strength and weakness alike were in his nature, which was narrow, clear-sighted towards ends more emotional than statesmanlike, self-sacrificing, intensely governed by his patriotic beliefs. This narrowness gave him his prestige and power as a political leader. He never had any doubt about his objects, saw them vividly, and fought for them without cease or tenderness towards his own or anyone else's susceptibilities. His was a one-track mind. As an advocate, before in comparatively early life he forsook his practice for politics, he made little impression, though he became a judge in the Orange Free State before the Anglo-Boer war. In politics the defects which limited his success at the bar became sources of strength. His stubborn insistence on minor points often succeeded in elevating them into major issues; his garrulity appealed to a people which loves long involved speeches; his white-hot conviction of his own rightness seemed to those who followed him sufficient proof that he was in fact right. If Hertzog had never been a successful political leader, the verdict of posterity upon him might well have been that his defects

made it impossible for him to succeed. Yet his actual success, inexplicable as it often seemed to those who saw only his too obvious limitations, was a direct result of his personality, set as it was in circumstances which suited it.

General Hertzog's fame among the Afrikaans-speaking people of South Africa rests upon his championship of equality for Afrikaans-speaking people in every article of citizenship, and of the national independence of South Africa as a Dominion. In theory, though by no means fully in practice, both were achieved without him. The South Africa Act, our Constitution, prescribed full equality for both white races. But this meant, in practice, far-reaching changes to which there was stubborn, though often unacknowledged, opposition on the part of large sections of English-speaking people. On this issue Hertzog resigned from the Botha Cabinet in the early years of the Union. He was convinced that Botha and his colleagues were lukewarm in their trusteeship of equal rights in language, official employment and all other incidents of citizenship for Afrikaans-speaking people. He devoted himself to this cause, founded the Nationalist party as his weapon, and triumphed after nearly fifteen years of struggle. Dominion autonomy too was secured in academic theory for South Africa and the other Dominions after the end of the European war of 1914-18. But the full recognition of this new right was slow in coming, and Hertzog's insistence at the 1926 Imperial Conference on having it embodied in a charter was a very long step forward. He had an accurate instinct that full Dominion independence would not be a living fact in the international existence of South Africa till such a charter was in writing; and the Status Act in which under Hertzog's leading the independence of South Africa within the Commonwealth was enshrined in the legislation of the Union was an innovation and a precedent in which South Africa set the pace for the rest of the Commonwealth.

In both these respects also Hertzog showed great breadth of mind in marked contrast to his narrowness in less important matters. He never wavered in his belief that both the English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans must share in full citizenship, and that, if the rights of either were injured, there could be no enduring concord between the two or any growth of a permanent South Africanism. In the end, after he had declared for neutrality when war broke out in 1939, and had thus lost the Premiership, Hertzog was driven out of the Nationalist party because he would not compromise about the rights of English-speaking South Africans. That refusal, which he knew meant the end of his political career, will vindicate his memory against the charge of having been anti-British. He was not anti-British; he was fervently, often fanatically, pro-South African. This deep conviction was at the root of his declaration for neutrality in September 1939. He could not be convinced that to enter the war on Britain's side was the best course for South Africa, and that that was why General Smuts and his following were for war. Hertzog saw the abandonment of neutrality as a process of being dragged at the heels of Great Britain into a war in which South Africa had no real concern. For years, after Versailles, he had sympathized with the plight of Germany because he remembered so vividly the plight of his own country after defeat in the Anglo-Boer war. This was

why his speech in Parliament in favour of neutrality developed as a plea for Hitler, to the dismay of many of his own followers. The final word about him is not yet. Meanwhile, he is remembered as a strange, complex man of strong convictions and puzzling contradictions, a great patriot according to his lights—sincere, honest, incorruptible and often lovable.

II. PLANNING RECONSTRUCTION

THE available national income per head in recent years for the South African population of 10,160,000 was only about 2s. a day—lower even than that of either Egypt or Japan, and only one-fifth of that of Canada. That is not a very large amount with which to weave visions of new orders of finance and codes of social security.

A brief survey of the basic factors in South Africa's economic life will give some indication of future possibilities and limitations. For fifty years gold not only formed the mainstay of the Union's economy and, with diamonds, accounted for three-fourths of the country's exports in value, one-fifth of the country's net income and nearly one-half of government and provincial taxation, but it also acted as a stabilizing influence in general, though in recent years a "multiplier" of great importance. Gold thrived on the depressions and the shock of recent years. With the shelving of the gold standard the price of gold in national currencies doubled, rising considerably higher than the cost of production. Moreover, it enjoyed the only market where fixed dollar prices were paid, whatever the supplies offered. Yet for many years now the Union has realized that something must be found to replace this wasting asset. Recently an Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission has expressed the view that "with the present price-cost relationship and the known resources of payable ore, production will decline rapidly within about ten years". Consequently it is advisable to make hay while the golden sun shines and at the same time look round for an alternative for our activities. The former will involve ultra-deep mining, the discovery of new producing areas and a possible revision of mining taxation. Even with gold the country is poor. Without it the problem of poverty would become even more acute.

Agriculture at the moment is not a very promising alternative. In fact, one of the main reasons for the country's poverty is the large extent of what is little more than subsistence farming. Six in every ten (one-third of the European and over two-thirds of the non-European population) are engaged in agriculture, earning between them only one-eighth of the total national money income. In spite of this large proportion of the population engaged on the land, there is widespread under-nourishment and occasional starvation. Nature is partly to blame for this unfortunate deficiency. In most areas the rainfall is deficient and in all cases erratic. The soil generally is poor and thin, and good agricultural land on this continental plateau is scarce. But man as well as nature is to blame. It is estimated that more than 20 per cent of our slender soil resources have already been lost. Deforestation, erosion, over-stocking, improper pasture management, and

unsuitable cultivation have in large areas seriously impaired the productivity and carrying capacity of the land. Admittedly much is being done to prevent deterioration, and afforestation and water conservation are being extended. But the cost is heavy and only the fringe of the problem has been touched. At the moment the desert is winning. Stock farming, orchards and market gardens should, it is suggested, take the place of much of the soil-exhausting maize and wheat. So far most agricultural exports have been subsidized by levies on the home consumers or taxpayers. Even with such help, agricultural and pastoral exports in pre-war years did not exceed 20 per cent of total export values. But, however it is to be achieved, South African farming needs considerable reorganization and improvement if it is to produce the food necessary for the country's own health and efficiency, instead of attempting to subsidize the unwilling consumption of overseas buyers.

INDUSTRIAL PROSPECTS

If gold-mining is to disappear and agricultural possibilities remain uncertain, what other possibilities remain? Industries born in the travail of the first world war were nurtured by policies of self-sufficiency and other economic safety-first devices invented in the days of the depression. The industrial achievements in the present war have been even more striking. Starting almost from scratch, South Africa not only built up an army of some 150,000 Europeans from an occupied population of only some 750,000, but has manned the industries to provide it with much of its large and varied material and weapons. Both men and equipment have proved their worth. Engineering production has responded well to war demands, while clothing, boots, shoes, food and drink industries have expanded considerably. A new blast furnace has been built, electric ferro-alloy smelting is now carried on, and a new steel plant is being erected. The new activities include the making of machine tools, farm implements and woollen goods. In war-time output is vital and costs are secondary. But in normal times the cost of production is all-important. South African manufacturing costs are high, and most industries depend on protection, which costs the country some £10 million a year. Costs can no doubt be reduced by a greater degree of mechanization and the use of semi-skilled labour on a larger scale than is evidenced by the present ratio of two non-Europeans to one European. A country that wishes to buy imported goods or services, or to pay interest, or to make repayments of capital, must export goods or services, or borrow from abroad. South Africa will always need some overseas goods and services, and doubtless other countries will want some of hers. But production for export must be at competitive prices unless exports are dumped abroad or subsidized at the cost of South African consumers and taxpayers and overseas groups of workers.

The country is not only looking to industry to absorb the growing population and the exodus from rural areas, but there is also a popular belief that South Africa can become an exporter of manufactured goods. Secondary industries may save her future, but they will hardly be export

industries. It is difficult to see how a country which produces on a small scale and at high cost, and which needs high tariff barriers to protect its internal market, can expect to succeed in a free market. For example, new steel industries are being started in all parts of the world and the post-war world steel capacity will be enormous. As overseas industrial countries are rapidly increasing their efficiency in many other directions, South African industry will not find conditions too easy. So far as the African continent is concerned, the natives in other territories are even poorer than those in the Union, while the European population is very small and has the world for its choice. What of South Africa's internal market? This consists of 2,000,000 Europeans (at least one in every five is very poor) and 8,000,000 non-Europeans (Coloured, Natives and Indians) largely unskilled, mostly under-nourished, living in ignorance and poverty and quite unable to play a proper rôle in the development of the country. The internal market for industrial and agricultural products is therefore restricted by the small number of the Europeans and the poverty of the majority of the inhabitants.

THE FUTURE OF THE NATIVE

BUT, whatever the cost and the difficulties, the new pattern of South African economy must at once be knocked into shape. If gold-mining declines and our agriculture remains weak, there are very few alternatives. Industries are not produced like rabbits from a hat, and even so they do not always survive. Fortunately cheap coal and power, and resources of base minerals such as iron, chromium, manganese, limestone and asbestos, and a labour supply (as yet largely unskilled) are available if intelligently developed. But industrialism cannot be developed without supplies of skilled and semi-skilled labour in given proportions, and this will call for considerable improvements in the health, education and training of the large majority of the Union's population. At the present time a large proportion of the Europeans acquire no kind of skill, while the large majority of the non-Europeans are unskilled and casual workers with very low incomes, either in industry or agriculture. So far as the natives are concerned, it would seem that native policy stands at the crossroads. Industrial development will call for more native labour, yet the Native Affairs Commission, alarmed at the movement of natives into the towns, where they are in danger of becoming a "submerged proletariat", seem to prefer the development of native reserves and the continued availability of native labour for mining and European agriculture. The reserves with their present area and productivity cannot support their present population, and natives must continue to seek incomes outside their family anchorages.

The Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission has already suggested the revision of the present classification of skilled labour categories and of the apprenticeship regulations, a gradual adjustment of the minimum wage rates to conform more closely with the differences in training and skill required for different tasks, and a reduction in the period of training where justified by changed conditions. There are fears, however,

that the economic improvement enjoyed by non-Europeans will either be at the expense of the "civilized" standard or will result in the narrowing of the wage difference, and so undermine caste privileges and social distinctions. There is also the risk that the greater productivity of non-Europeans may go only to swell profits. Certainly any revision in the categories of skilled labour and shorter periods of training and apprenticeship will seem to be an attack on the organized trade unions. After all, there has never been enough skilled and semi-skilled work available to absorb continuously all the European workers. Consequently fear has prompted the restriction of the industrial openings and the competition of non-Europeans. This will not be allayed by the suggestion that manufacturing industry, at its pre-war rate of development, will not be able to absorb more than half the additional labour force in 1945.

A SMALL HOME MARKET

THERE are other difficulties. The small size of the home market not only precludes internal economies of large-scale production and marketing, but also keeps the national overhead charges of transport, distribution and social services high per unit of output. This gives one explanation for the high distribution costs of agricultural products. Yet the blame for the wide margin between producer and consumer prices usually, and on the whole unfairly, falls on the trader. The most effective remedy would therefore seem to lie in increasing the size of the market. One way of doing this is to increase the productivity and the purchasing power of everyone employed, but especially of a section of the Europeans and the large majority of the non-Europeans. This, of course, will be a long process, and for a long time yet most of the latter, especially the natives, will continue to be employed in low-paid occupations. A quick expansion of the home market would require the immigration of skill and capital. In fact the best way of raising the standard of living of non-Europeans would be an increase in the European population. The less privileged groups would be carried along in the march of progress and gradually enabled to improve their relative place in economic activities and secure a larger share in an expanded national income. Moreover in an increase of non-European employment there would be a growing need for skilled workers, foremen and managers. In any case the Union cannot afford to jeopardize its future by continuing to restrict the productivity and earnings of the majority of its population. It is inevitable therefore that coming changes in mining, agriculture and industry will result in a large movement of natives into the towns. These workers with their families will become a permanent part of our urban population, for whose education, health and housing local, provincial and government authorities should lose no time in planning. Higher money wages may neither be economically possible nor the best method of at once assisting less privileged groups. Improved housing, if necessary on a sub-economic basis, extension of social and medical services, and subsidized food consumption may prove more desirable and more economical.

Naturally all these proposals would entail considerably increased taxation. What of post-war trade? So far the only tentative suggestions for the economic reconstruction of a war-torn world are the Atlantic Charter and the Lease-Lend Agreement, of which Article 7 refers to "the expansion of production and employment and exchange of consumption of goods", and "the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce and the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers". These objectives will doubtless clash. The first is more fundamental; but the second will arouse controversy since the interests of a large number of people will be threatened, and the short-period costs of adjustment will be very large. An agreed change will be slow and halting, and a free trade world must be ruled out as an immediately practicable goal. Countries will not find it easy to plan both for full employment and stable exchange rates. It is impossible for all countries to keep in step, and differences in the rate of advance will threaten any stability of trade and exchange. South Africa must not only face such post-war problems in common with other countries, but also her own special difficulties of declining gold, smaller protection for her industries, and less support for her agriculture. South Africa must "think until she busts", and go in for drastic slimming.

THE UNION'S RÔLE IN AFRICA

WHAT of the Union's rôle in the African continent? The Union should be able to play an important part in the future progress of the continent, but so far it has assumed little initiative in such possibilities and seems to be hardly aware of its responsibilities. There is little doubt that Africa, as the largest colonial bloc left in the world, will be very much the centre of post-war discussions. After the last war despair and disillusionment settled like a blight on a world at peace. Once more we realize that again there is a risk of confusion, and that war-time sacrifices will not of themselves guide the survivors into a haven of peace and security. It is all the more encouraging therefore that there seems to be a growing readiness in the Union to face the facts of poverty, hunger, disease and inequality. With knowledge may come the courage to strike at the roots of social evils. Fair visions of social security are now being seen in calmer perspective, and ordered progress is being planned by those responsible for the country's social services.

South Africa,
January 1943.

NEW ZEALAND

A BRIGHTER OUTLOOK

THE picture of New Zealand and the problems facing us this New Year is brighter than last New Year. Then, anxiety and a dour determination to "take it", if necessary, as Great Britain had done, were the two keynotes of the feelings of New Zealanders. For the first time in her history there seemed to be a possibility of her having to defend her own shores against an invader. Even in 1940, in the discussions of a British-American co-operation movement (founded on the lines of an Australian organization to promote closer relationship between the United States and New Zealand) on the possible extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Australia and New Zealand, as suggested by Senator Downey in Congress, a business man in close touch with American sentiment declared emphatically that the idea that the United States would intervene, even if the Japanese overran Australia and New Zealand, was completely dead. It was no longer in the realm of practical politics. Others considered that America must protect what were her advanced bastions in the Pacific, for her own sake, quite apart from the question of kinship or the protection of the white race against the yellow.

CO-OPERATION WITH AMERICA

At the end of 1941 the crisis had come. The question was no longer academic. Hitherto New Zealand's war policy had provided for her own protection by an expeditionary force in the northern hemisphere; now she had to adopt hastily one of military and civil defence at home. England had her own hands full and could give little assistance in men and material. Since the disaster at Pearl Harbour, would and could the United States come to the rescue? She could and did—with what swiftness and efficiency the world knows in general but not in detail. Since then, to use Mr. Churchill's phrase, America and New Zealand have been well mixed up together; and such was the harmony between the great democracy and her two bastions in the South Pacific that the latter were proud to put their forces under her command, as Britain has done in North Africa. On October 30 the Minister of Defence, Mr. Jones, announced that the New Zealand Army and Air Force in the Pacific had been placed under American command, but that the movement of New Zealand forces of all Services out of New Zealand for any new commitment was a matter requiring the approval of New Zealand before any new measure could be put into effect.

This somewhat bald and vague statement was, on November 6, amplified and explained by Lieutenant-General E. Puttick, G.O.C., New Zealand military forces, who gave the following explanation of the relationship between the United States and New Zealand forces:

"From the moment the United States assumed responsibility for the Pacific, it was recognized that, unless that responsibility included New Zealand itself, there

was a risk of divided control and failure to make the best use of all resources in the Pacific. For example, the danger of an attack on New Zealand depended very largely on the United States' naval plan for the Pacific, and upon the Army and Air Forces stationed in the various Pacific islands and their ability mutually to support each other. Only the United States Commander of the Pacific area could gauge the effect of these measures on the defence of New Zealand. Obviously the strength of the forces required to be maintained in New Zealand depended very largely on the appreciation of these factors. The Commander of the South Pacific area in which New Zealand is situated, who is kept informed by his commander, the Commander of the Pacific, is in the best position to weigh up the various considerations, and could determine from time to time the most suitable distribution of forces throughout the area. He is thus in a position to make requests to the New Zealand Government for forces to be employed in the area, basing his requests on the general military situation. It would then be for the New Zealand Government to decide, after reviewing all the factors, including man-power and other civil aspects of the matter, as well as the military factors, whether the requests of the United States Commander should be acceded to. In agreeing to the United States command over New Zealand forces, the New Zealand Government does not, and cannot, divorce from itself the responsibility for adequate defence of New Zealand, and the responsibility of ensuring as far as it can that the New Zealand forces dispatched into the Pacific are adequate for the task and suitably supported. The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff are still responsible for advising the Government on these matters, as they are responsible for consulting the United States Command on them, and also for carrying out such directions of the United States Command as accord with the policy of, or are approved by, the Government. In practice the measures for the defence of New Zealand by its home forces will remain the responsibility of New Zealand's Chiefs of Staff, guided by such advice as they receive on the strategical situation from the United States Command. The training of the New Zealand forces will also remain New Zealand's responsibility, though obviously any special training required to fit the troops for a particular rôle, and especially if co-operation with the United States troops is involved, would be discussed with the United States Command.

"Close co-operation has been maintained with the United States Commanders of those forces who, in an emergency, have the operational rôle in New Zealand as Home Defence Forces under the New Zealand Command. A considerable quantity of the United States' training manuals &c. has also been made available to the New Zealand forces, which are equipped almost entirely with British equipment, though they have large numbers of United States tommy-guns, rifles, machine guns, vehicles, tanks and a few heavy guns. Various factors, such as the rôle of New Zealand troops (whether independent or otherwise), the availability of United States' equipment, and the time factor, would determine whether our troops would make increased use of United States' equipment. Right from the start there has been close co-operation and consultation with the local United States Command, which has always been invited to ask New Zealand for any co-operation required, and a good deal has already been done in that direction. So far as the New Zealand Army is concerned, the announcement regarding the United States Command goes little further than official recognition of what had already been arranged between the respective Commanders."

It appears therefore that such matters as the maintenance and supply of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Middle East, the maintenance

of essential production for the war and for civilian needs, and New Zealand's commitments to Britain in the matter of supplies, remain under the control of the New Zealand Government. In any event there is no need to anticipate anything but the most harmonious co-operation between the American and New Zealand commanders and the forces under them. To-day the danger to New Zealand herself seems to have lessened. The feeling of tense anxiety has been replaced by calm confidence. Lighting restrictions have been relaxed and fire-watching suspended, although the E.P.S. keeps watch and ward, and there are to be refresher rehearsals for E.P.S. and the public in case of any future emergency. There is, however, no complacency or feeling that New Zealand can rest on her oars. On the contrary the danger is rather that the endeavour to extend her war effort beyond her capacity may upset the balance between the armed forces and agriculture and industry.

THE WAR EFFORT

AFTER three and a half years of war a review of our war effort is not inappropriate. At the Annual Conference of the New Zealand Manufacturers' Federation Mr. C. V. Smith, its President, and Mr. Sullivan, the Minister of Supply, and on December 27 Mr. Jones, the Minister of Defence, gave figures worth publishing in order to give the world some idea of the achievement up to date of this little nation of bankrupt farmers, as the Nazis called us at the outbreak of war. Mr. Smith estimated that there were 160,000 men in the armed forces, 150,000 engaged in farming, 110,000 in factory and industry, and tens of thousands of women doing war work, and there are only altogether about 900,000 men and women between the ages of 18 and 60. Since then more men have gone into the forces and more women have been recruited. Here are Mr. Jones's figures comparing the numbers before the war and at present—the Navy 700 and 7,000, the Army 16,000 and 160,000, the Air Force a mere handful and 30,000, and soon the numbers in the Air Force overseas will exceed 10,000. Mr. Sullivan gave a statement on New Zealand's output of goods for war purposes that was a revelation even to New Zealanders, showing not only a vast production of clothing, barbed wire, food, small arms, ammunition, mortar bombs and hand grenades, universal carriers, components of the Bren gun and the conversion of rifles to the Charlton gun principle for our own troops, but also the manufacture of thousands of radio receivers (combined transmitter and receiver) for use abroad as well as at home, telegraph ladders, insulating board, and special foods, in addition to our usual primary products; all to be shipped overseas. The demand and supply are still increasing. We are building Fairmiles for overseas in our naval building programme. Eighteen naval vessels have either been put into commission or were under construction at the time of Mr. Sullivan's statement. We have also in hand, as pointed out by Mrs. Grigg, M.P., in a recruiting campaign for women land workers, a large programme of tinning for our American allies. To this must be added a complete civil defence organization.

To sum up, in face of the crisis New Zealand remained calm and self-reliant, helping herself by all the means at her command, and rising to the

situation. Our future defence policy has been outlined by Mr. Fraser, the Prime Minister, on December 4 in his review of the war situation, when he said that there could be no greater mistake than to regard the Pacific as a minor or secondary front. He did not believe in the theory of a holding war in the Pacific while the fullest efforts were concentrated on one second front in Europe:

"It is only right that we should take part in the Pacific offensive which will keep the Japanese as far as possible from our own shores. This new forward move necessitates a review of our defence responsibilities and commitments."

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION

Two years have elapsed since the Economic Stabilization Conference made its recommendations to the Government.* Although its Working Committee, consisting of an even number of representatives of employers and labour, has continued its work, little has since been done to give effect to those recommendations beyond the price decisions of the Price Tribunal, and the partial stabilization of 38 commodities deemed essential. During the past two years the situation has seriously deteriorated and become unbalanced. On December 15 the Prime Minister announced the Government's adoption of the Economic Stabilization Scheme, and emergency regulations to carry this out were issued the same day. The need for a decision to stabilize individual rates of remuneration, rents not covered by the fair rents legislation, and the prices of essential goods was stated by the Prime Minister to be due to the fact that a substantial gap had opened up between the supply of goods and purchasing power; if events were to take their course the result would be inflation leading to the destruction of all that had been attained in the way of social security. Mr. Sullivan, the Minister of Industries and Commerce, is charged with the general administration of the regulations; Mr. B. C. Ashwin, Secretary to the Treasury and Financial Adviser to the Government, is to be Director of Stabilization, assisted by an Economic Stabilization Committee consisting of six selected members from the Working Committee of the Conference. The number of stabilized commodities was increased to 110. These include, as well as the 38 commodities already mentioned, the essential articles of food (in which connection Mr. Fraser stated that meat, bread and butter had not increased in price since the beginning of the war and, it might be added, have been in ample supply), clothing, light and power, kitchen and household furniture and utensils. Fruit and vegetables have been so scarce and soared to such fantastic prices that, as a newspaper correspondent wrote, never before have so many paid so much for so few. In this respect we are not promised much relief, for the only fresh vegetables and fruit on the list are potatoes, onions, carrots, parsnips, cabbages, swedes, lemons and apples. Tobacco is on the list; so are hair cuts and razor blades, tram fares, postage rates and telegrams. No luxuries are dealt with. The intention is that the prices of the articles taken as a whole shall remain stable. If any variations arise in one, they will be offset

* For a summary, see THE ROUND TABLE, No. 122, March 1941, pp. 389-99.

by a fall in another. Penalties for profiteering and black marketing are made severe—heavy fines, imprisonment, and confiscation of the goods concerned.

This stabilization, said Mr. Fraser, applies to all rates of remuneration, including time and piece wages and overtime allowances, fees, commissions, travelling expenses, and directors' fees. Not only wages and salaries, but all incomes have been, or are to be, stabilized. The price the farmer receives for all main farm products, many of them now stabilized, will not be increased. This means, in effect, that internal prices are divorced from export parity, and any excess will be paid into pool accounts. The major items of farmers' costs will be correspondingly held and the cost of holding them will be debited to the appropriate accounts. Incomes of companies and individuals are held down through the combined operation of income tax, excess profits tax and price orders.

"The great majority," said Mr. Fraser, "of those commodities which will be fixed in price are made in New Zealand, produced with the skill and labour of New Zealand workers, using New Zealand materials, power and transport. The cost of labour and materials and also the rents of business premises and land determine the prices; therefore we must stabilize wages and rents."

A new war-time prices index of commodities and services included in the scheme was established from December 15, prices to be reviewed every quarter. If there is a marked fluctuation of prices after three months, provision is made to offset it. In general, if the average price of a whole group of essentials rises by more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., then the Arbitration Court will issue a general order raising wages. After that there will be no adjustment of wages up or down, unless prices rise or fall more than 5 per cent. The farmer will be treated in the same way. In the event of a general order affecting other forms of remuneration, the farmer also will receive adjustment of his prices, but the whole purpose of the plan is to avoid any such marked fluctuation. The basic rate of remuneration is the rate actually being paid for any particular position or employment at the date of the regulations.

The regulations relating to the stabilization of rents bind the Crown, and cover all business and farming rents; for example, all types of real property other than those included in the Fair Rents Act—namely dwelling-houses and flats let at a rent not exceeding £156 yearly. Rents Commissions are to be established and courts may refer rent applications to them for investigation. The Commissions were authorized to act both under the Fair Rents Act and under these regulations. The regulations prohibit the charging of rent in excess of the rent payable on September 1, 1942, unless a fair rent has been fixed, in which case it is an offence to charge more than the fair rent.

The programme of stabilization has on the whole been well received by the press, although there has not yet been time to master the full details of so complex a scheme or to realize what further inequalities and anomalies than those frozen thereby may emerge. Among objections to the scheme are the following—that the plan is belated; that the scheme preserves abnormal spending power in that section of the community exerting pressure on the prices of uncontrolled commodities, real estate and the like, while the pro-

vision for an increase of wages will tend further to inflate spending power; and that the remedy provided is a negative one, the real one being to produce more goods and suspend the 40-hour week as an emergency measure, the payment of overtime ranking high among inflationary influences. In this connection it may be stated that on November 3 Mr. Sullivan, the Minister of Supply, said that it had been decided to adopt the principle of the 48-hour week for war industries, and that the Wellington Chamber of Commerce had recommended the extension of the 40-hour week in all Dominion industries. Finally it is objected that the Government disregarded the Conference's disapproval of subsidies, and that the scheme touches the lives of the people so intimately that Parliament should have been consulted.

MINISTERIAL CHANGES

THE resignation by four National party representatives of Ministerial positions in the War Administration has resulted in the re-allocation of their positions as follows—Minister in Charge of War Expenditure, Mr. A. Hamilton, Associate Minister of Supply; Minister of Primary Production, Mr. J. G. Barclay, Minister of Agriculture; Minister of National Service, Mr. A. McLagan, Minister of Industrial Power; Minister of Civil Defence, Mr. D. Wilson, Leader of the Legislative Council and Minister of Broadcasting. Mr. Langstone, Member of Parliament for Waimarino, who recently resigned his position as High Commissioner in Canada, has resigned his portfolios as Minister of Lands, Commissioner of State Forests, Minister of External Affairs and Native Minister. During his absence these portfolios were distributed among his colleagues. Mr. Nash's appointment to Washington is only temporary. In order to emphasize the importance of adequate representation abroad, our representatives should be the best men in New Zealand, independent of party. Our Government might well take a leaf from the Australian Labour Government's book, which appointed one of the judges of the High Court, Sir Owen Dixon, a man of outstanding ability, culture and refinement, as its Minister in Washington, and when it needed a special envoy in Washington, appointed the Attorney-General, Dr. Evatt, Minister of External Affairs, who had also been a judge of the High Court. The death of Mr. H. T. Armstrong, to whose worth and sincerity many tributes were paid in Parliament, has led to the appointment in his place of the Government Whip, Mr. J. O'Brien, who is 67 and one of Labour's old guard.

THE TASMAN TRICENTENARY

THE fact that Holland and the Netherlands East Indies are for the moment overrun by invading armies made the celebration of the tricentenary of Tasman's discovery of New Zealand all the more essential. Queen Wilhelmina sent a delegation thoroughly representative of the Netherlands' courage and culture, led by Dr. van der Plas, a distinguished diplomatist, linguist and authority on colonial problems. The Army was represented by Major-General van Temmen, the Navy by Lieutenant-Commander Quispel and trade by Mr. van Holst Pellehaan, Trade Commissioner in Australia.

The New Zealand celebrations opened with a civic reception and state luncheon in Wellington, at the former of which Dr. van der Plas suggested that New Zealand's spirit was well represented by the crest and motto of the old Zealand, after which she was named by Tasman—a lion struggling up from the wild waves, and the motto *lucto et emergo* (I struggle and I emerge), and at the latter of which he presented to the Government a framed copy of the chart of New Zealand made by Pilot-Major Visscher for hanging in Parliament House. At the reception Mr. Sullivan expressed New Zealand's gratitude for the hospital ship *Oranje* and the care that wounded New Zealanders returning from the Middle East had received from the nurses and staff. Then followed a journey to the west coast and welcomes at west coast towns, and the delegation flew to Okarito, opposite which Tasman obtained his first view of "a great land uplifted high", and to Waiho where they saw something of our mountains, glaciers, lakes and forests. On December 18 there was unveiled at Tarakohe, Golden Bay, a monument—a high white concrete column with an inscription commemorating Tasman's closest approach to land, also Tasman, Visscher and the men slain by the Maoris. In a speech at the state luncheon Dr. van der Plas had referred to "the pleasant little blows" exchanged by Dutch and British; and the participation of the Maoris in those blows was attested at Tarakohe by a party of Maoris, among whom were descendants of those who attacked Tasman's cockboat, which greeted the delegation with songs of navigation (*whakipoi*) and welcome.

On December 19 the Abel Tasman National Park, a coastal area of 38,000 acres on the western side of Tasman Bay, of which Queen Wilhelmina had accepted nomination as Patroness, was officially declared by the Governor-General open to the people of New Zealand, to whom a personal message from Queen Wilhelmina was read. An eloquent and touching farewell broadcast to the people of New Zealand by Dr. van der Plas showed how much the delegation had appreciated the warm welcome received, and "the high scientific and spiritual standard of the celebrations".

New Zealand,
January 1943.

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